LANL: The Back Story

Pu Pits Made into MOX Fuel?

2012-02-04T19:14:00.019-07:00

Yesterday, Friday, February 3, 2012, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) hosted a public meeting at the Cities of Gold Conference Center, in Pojoaque, NM; the meeting was a necessary step in the NEPA process (National Environmental Policy Act.) According to rules set forth in NEPA legislation, NNSA is required to publicly explain its most recent plans to turn 7 tons of pit plutonium (Pu), declared surplus from the nuclear weapons program into Mixed Oxide (MOX) fuel, to be burned in commercial nuclear power reactors; this would be in addition to the 34 tons tons of pit Pu and 6 tons of non-pit Pu declared surplus in 2003. (The term "pit plutonium" refers to Pu that has been fashioned into "pits", or triggers, for inclusion in nuclear weapons.) NNSA must also offer the public an opportunity to comment on its plans, and to suggest alternatives to these plans.

The meeting began with a ~1 hour long poster session, in which NNSA sketched out its surplus Pu to MOX plans, while NNSA experts were present to answer questions. This was followed by a ~1/2 hour long talk, on the same topic, by the NEPA Document Manager, S. McAlhaney. Perhaps the most gripping info to be conveyed during these presentations was that NNSA retains the option of sending all of its surplus Pu pits to LANL, where they will be transformed chemically into Pu oxide powder, for eventual shipment to Savannah River Site (SRS), there to be converted into MOX fuel; i.e., 34 tons, or more, of Pu might be added to the large Pu inventory already present at LANL.

Nevertheless, given the time allotted, only a brief outline of the topic could be conveyed by the NNSA presenters. More information is available on the world-wide web, and I'll quote here relevant sections taken from the website of the World Nuclear Association (WNA), a trade group "representing the people and organizations of the global nuclear profession"; http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf13.html. This material also gives a sense of the politics involved, and suggests the financial interests that may be in play.

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“PLUTONIUM and MOX”

“Disarmament will give rise to some 150-200 tons of weapons-grade plutonium (Pu). Weapons-grade plutonium has over 93% of the fissile isotope, Pu-239, and can be used, like reactor-grade Pu, in fuel for electricity production. Options considered for it included:

• Immobilization with high-level waste - treating plutonium as waste,

• Fabrication with uranium oxide as a MOX fuel for burning in existing reactors,

• Fabrication with thorium as a fuel for existing Russian reactors,

• Fueling fast-neutron reactors.

In 1994 the USA announced that 52.5 tons of its military plutonium stockpile was surplus to military requirements. This included non-pit material, and about 20 tons of it was of such quality that it might not be possible to utilize it for MOX.

In June 2000, the USA and Russia agreed to dispose of 34 tons each of weapons-grade plutonium by 2014. The US undertook to pursue a dual track program (immobilization and MOX), self-funded, while the G-7 nations were to provide some US$ 2.5 billion to set up Russia's program. The latter was initially MOX-oriented for VVER reactors, the high cost being because this was not part of Russia's fuel cycle policy. A revised agreement signed in April 2010 allows the Russian plutonium to be used in BN-800 fast neutron reactors, and stretches the timeline to 2018. However, the G7 funding is not available on this basis and Russia will fund most of the program, with the USA contributing $400 million. The 68 tons of plutonium in both countries is equivalent to about 12,000 tons of natural uranium.

Weapons-grade plutonium entering the civil fuel cycle needs to be kept under very tight security, and there are some technical measures needed to achieve this. MOX fuel made from it should degrade it so that Pu-239 cannot be extracted. As it became clear that this could be achieved, the USA dropped its immobilization plans for most military plutonium, and this is reflected in the April 2010 agreement with Russia.

After environmental and safety reviews, the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission authorized construction of a MOX fuel fabrication plant at the DOE Savannah River site in South Carolina by Duke, Cogema, Stone & Webster. Construction started in August 2007, by Shaw Areva MOX Services. It will make about 1700 civil MOX fuel assemblies from depleted uranium and at least 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium, unlike other MOX plants which use fresh reactor-grade plutonium having around one third non-fissile plutonium isotopes. US reactors using the fuel will need to licensed for it. Shaw Areva MOX Services is under contract to the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which will own the plant, expected to be in operation from 2016. The high cost of the plant - $3.5 billion plus $1.3 billion contingency and $183 million per year to operate - is justified on non-proliferation grounds. Annual cost will be offset by revenue.

The following is a comment on this US situation from Dr C. Wolfe, former chairman of the Technical Advisory Panel to the Department of Energy's Plutonium Focus Area, whose task had been to advise on technology to enable the disposition of the excess plutonium: In discussion with Russia, ‘the USA often emphasized elaborate technology schemes to immobilize the plutonium in a proliferation-resistant state. These included grouts, synthetic rock, glass and co-disposal with spent nuclear fuel. The Russians were astounded. They couldn't believe that we were willing to take this material, which we had spent billions of dollars producing, and just throw it away. Not only throw it away, but spend a lot of additional money to get rid of it. The Russians saw it for what it was: a tremendous energy resource. The US eventually came to the same conclusion and opted for converting 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium into MOX fuel to provide electrical energy for the US economy.’ (Aiken Standard 10/8/09)

In June 2005 the first four fuel assemblies with mixed oxide fuel made from US military plutonium (plus depleted uranium) started generating electricity in Duke Power's Catawba-1 nuclear power plant in South Carolina, on a trial basis. They incorporate 140 kg of weapons-grade plutonium. The plutonium was made into 2 tons of pellets at the Cadrache plant and then fabricated into fuel assemblies at the Melox plant in France. This trial was concluded satisfactorily.

In September 2007 the Department of Energy announced the release of a further 9 tons of weapons-grade plutonium from dismantled warheads (cores, or pits). This will be made into MOX fuel at Savannah River. It brings to 61.5 tons the amount that is surplus to defense requirements and available for recycling into civil reactor fuel (leaving some 38 tons in the US nuclear weapons program.)

DOE is moving all its surplus non-pit weapons plutonium - reported to be 12.8 tons - to Savannah River by 2010. Once the material is consolidated there, the Department's plans for disposing of it involve the use of three Savannah River site facilities: the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility (under construction) for 7.8 tons, the existing H-Canyon processing plant followed by a proposed new small-scale plutonium vitrification plant for the balance of 5.0 tons. The H-Canyon facility is the last such US plant able to treat used Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel and similar materials still operational.

H-Canyon dates from 1955 and originally recovered uranium, neptunium and plutonium from used military and research reactor HEU fuel. Since 1998 it has recovered HEU from degraded materials and spent fuel, to recycle it as Low Enriched Uranium (LEU). This program will continue to 2019.

Following the September 20007 addition of 9 tons of plutonium to the MOX program, NNSA decided that the Savannah River plant might also produce starter fuel for advanced fast reactors, part of the advanced fuel cycle initiative program.

Meanwhile the US has developed a 'spent fuel standard.' This specifies that plutonium should never be more accessible than if it were incorporated in spent fuel and thus protected from interference by strong gamma radiation. The plutonium immobilization plant, if and when it is eventually built, would thus incorporate the Pu in a version of Synroc ( artificial rock), and encase small discs of this in canisters of vitrified high-level radioactive waste. Alternatively, plutonium would be mixed with fission products and vitrified at the small plant proposed for Savannah River.

Europe's well-developed MOX capacity suggests that weapons plutonium could be disposed of relatively quickly. Input weapons-grade plutonium might need to be mixed with reactor grade material or blended with Pu-238, but using such MOX as 30% of the fuel in one third of the world's reactor capacity would remove about 15 tons of warhead plutonium per year. This would amount to burning 3000 warheads per year to produce 110 billion kW-hr of electricity. [Thus, the electrical energy needs of ~10 million homes could be satisfied for a year. But, ~10 large nuclear power reactors would probably be needed to burn so much nuclear fuel.]

Over 35 reactors in Europe are licensed to use MOX fuel, and 22 French reactors are licensed to use it as 30% of their fuel.

Russia intends to use its plutonium to fuel fast neutron reactors such as its BN-600 and BN-800, and later BREST at Beloyarsk. The USA earlier insisted that it duplicate US plans to make it into MOX fuel for late-model conventional reactors, and for this Russia insisted that the USA pay all costs. But after announcement of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership in 2006 with its proposals for use of fast reactors, US objection to Russian plans disappeared. The 34 tons of plutonium initially available for MOX would have been enough for 1350 fuel assemblies for light-water reactors, but will now go into MOX fuel for BN-600 and BN-800 fast reactors - the former with one third MOX core and the latter with full MOX core, and accounting for most of the usage. The USA has agreed to contribute US$ 400 million towards the cost of this - much less than for the MOX option in VVER reactors.

Burning the plutonium in the BN-600 reactor is to commence in 2012, with the breeding blanket of depleted uranium removed and replaced by stainless steel reflector assemblies. The BN-800 reactor now under construction will have a uranium blanket but will operated as a net plutonium consumer for the life of the disposition project. Jointly they are expected to burn 1.5 tons of this weapons plutonium per year. The USA and Russia intend to continue cooperative development of a gas-cooled high-temperature reactor (GT-MHR) in Russia 'which may create additional possibilities for speeding up plutonium disposition from about 2015.

The 2000 US-Russian agreement precludes the reprocessing of MOX fuel using military plutonium if the plutonium is separated out, so such reprocessing will be either to give plutonium plus uranium or plus actinides. Russia is said to have 40 tons of separated reactor-grade plutonium already from reprocessed fuel.”

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Next, ~1 1/2 hours were given over to public comments, with each member of the public allowed 4 minutes to speak. Remarks were recorded both electronically and by stenographer.

Two members of the public criticized the Pu to MOX plan as being very unwise and volunteered specific alternatives: T. Mello suggested that Pu pits be “filled with wire and then buried”; J. Coghlan thought that the Pu pits should be “chopped up and the pieces buried.” But, it seems that these comments were made tongue-in- cheek.

An impassioned hour-long condemnation of the nuclear weapons program, and the nuclear power industry, was then presented by C. Montaño, aided by a group of 15 like-minded and “shy” individuals. However, rather than attempting to summarize these interesting and poetic views, I'll quote similar thoughts taken from the website of the Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NRIS), an advocacy group opposed to both nuclear weapons and nuclear power; www.nirs.org. (In contrast to C. Montaño, the NIRS does not go so far as to condemn all forms of radiation; viz., without the prodigious amounts of radiation coming to us from the sun, life on planet earth would probably be impossible.)

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“PLUTONIUM PROLIFERATION AND MOX FUEL”

“The Department of Energy’s (DOE) decision to mix 34 or more metric tons of plutonium from nuclear weapons with depleted uranium into a mixed-oxide fuel for use in commercial nuclear reactors is a direct reversal of decades-old U.S. policy aimed toward non-proliferation of nuclear weapons materials. A plutonium fuel program will increase the risks of nuclear terrorism and the international proliferation of plutonium.

A decision on the part of the U.S. government to engage in a large scale civilian plutonium program would encourage the continuation of the messy and dangerous reprocessing programs in Europe and Japan. A plutonium fuel program would destroy any leverage the U.S. might have to influence non-weapons states from creating their own civilian reprocessing programs.”

“PLUTONIUM ECONOMY”

“The U.S. plutonium fuel program would create facilities and financial interests based exclusively upon the use and spread of plutonium. The corporation most involved in a potential U.S. plutonium fuel program is the French reprocessing company Cogema. This company has teamed up with Duke Power and Virginia Power to create a new consortium, and would be responsible for the storage, safeguarding, and some processing of weapons-grade plutonium.

This industry structure builds an economy upon the false and dangerous notion that plutonium is an asset. The involvement of these corporations places the responsibility of these deadly materials in the hands of corporate entities whose single goal is the generation of profits.”

“REPROCESSING”

“Reprocessing is the chemical process of separating plutonium and uranium from other fission products in the irradiated fuel from a nuclear reactor. The separated materials can then be made into a mixed-oxide fuel (MOX) which is reused in a reactor. Since the 1970s, the U.S. has had a policy of not allowing reprocessing, and instead treating the nuclear fission products as the high-level atomic waste it is. This policy is based primarily on non-proliferation grounds, and is met to discourage countries from engaging in the separation of plutonium and uranium—since these substances—once separated—can also be used to build nuclear weapons.

Even now, the Department of Energy says that its proposed MOX program will only be a "once-through" program, meaning that once the plutonium from nuclear weapons has been processed into MOX and used in civilian reactors, no further reprocessing would be allowed. But the industries involved in the plutonium fuel program will have a vested interest in the possibility of a U.S. commercial reprocessing industry as part of waste management policy. And the necessary infrastructure—including construction of all the need facilities—would be in place.”

“THEFT AND DIVERSION”

“In recent years the US has seen a surge in devastating terrorist activities on its own soil. The knowledge necessary to create a nuclear weapon is available to the public. The best policy toward the prevention of nuclear terrorism is to ensure that the materials necessary to make a nuclear bomb cannot be obtained. The US plutonium fuel program would increase the risks of theft of weapons grade plutonium. The process of fabricating plutonium fuel involves the handling of bulk amounts of plutonium. This process makes accurate accounting of plutonium extremely difficult, which leaves measuring disparities that could be an open invitation for diversion of the plutonium for weapons purposes. In some cases it may be impossible to know whether plutonium has been stolen or is simply left in residues at processing facilities without an expensive clean-out. Once the plutonium fuel has been made, it would then have to be transported to commercial reactors where safeguarding of that plutonium will be the responsibility of the utility. This also makes the plutonium vulnerable to theft or diversion.

Irradiating weapons plutonium in a reactor does not make the plutonium unusable for weapons purposes. The U.S. government proved with a nuclear test in 1962 that so-called ‘reactor grade’ plutonium can be used in nuclear bombs. Using weapons plutonium in reactors does not effectively safeguard plutonium, and it undermines disarmament efforts.”

“PROLIFERATION WORLDWIDE”

“A U.S. plutonium fuel program would send a clear signal to other countries: the U.S. government approves of separated plutonium fuel programs. This would undercut the government's ability to discourage reprocessing in other countries and may encourage other countries to pursue plutonium programs. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Director John Holum explained the situation clearly in a memorandum to former Energy Secretary Hazel O'Leary:

‘U.S. decisions on plutonium disposition are inextricably linked with U.S. efforts to reduce stockpiles as well as limit the use of plutonium worldwide. The multi-decade institutionalization of plutonium use in US commercial reactors would set a very damaging precedent for US non-proliferation policy.’

The alternative, to encase the plutonium in ceramics or glass (immobilization), will not affect the government's non-proliferation goals, nor encourage civilian reprocessing in the U.S. or elsewhere. Immobilizing plutonium will send the proper signal that plutonium is a dangerous waste and needs to be treated as such.”

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The Framework Agreement

2012-01-08T13:43:00.080-07:00

Thursday 1-5-12/

NMED officials and NNSA/LANS/LANL managers met this evening in the Cities of Gold Conference Room in Pojoaque, NM for a polite and public exchange of views regarding LANL's cleanup of waste from the ongoing

nuclear weapons program. The meeting was held under the auspices of the Northern New Mexico Citizens Advisory Board.

Appearing for NMED were Secretary David Martin, Resource Protection Division Head Jim Davis, and Ryan Flynn from the Office of General Counsel. Among the NNSA/LANS/LANL participants were Associate Director for Environmental Programs Michael Graham and Assistant Manager for Environmental Operations George Rael. There were also ~15 NNMCAB members in attendance.

As described by Sec. Martin, NMED has determined that its highest priority for future work will be the protection of New Mexico's ground and surface water, as well as its air. With that in mind, NMED has asked LANS to expedite the removal of TRU waste, now being stored aboveground in tents at LANL's TA-54 (Area-G). Sec. Martin noted the public concern expressed about the possible release of radioactive material by wildfires that might burn over TA-54, engulfing the TRU waste being stored there. He said that, considering the near catastrophic consequences for the environment of last June's Las Conchas wildfire, it is of the utmost importance that TRU waste stored aboveground at Area-G be removed as soon as possible. On the other hand, removal of TRU waste currently stored below ground at Area G will not be a priority for NMED. [1-11-12: As pointed out by Wren Abbott in this week's SF Reporter, NMED's intent to prioritize the removal of TRU waste stored aboveground at Area-G may be at variance with the 2005 Consent Decree, which mandates the removal of all TRU waste from TA-54 by 2015.]

Quoting from LANL's magazine National Security Science (http://www.lanl.gov/science/NSS/issue3_2011/story5full.shtml): "Of great concern to the public and media during the Las Conchas wildfire, the 63-acre site (Area-G at TA-54) is the main waste storage and handling area for Laboratory-generated low-level and transuranic radioactive waste. Currently, Area G stores 10,000 55-gallon drums and other containers of waste above ground, under 10 domes made of fabric stretched on metal ribbing. Another 6,000 drums are buried in underground storage."

George Rael agreed that the removal of TRU waste from TA-54 should be a high priority. However, he also said that it will be difficult for LANS to pursue this priority while complying with the cleanup timetable set forth in the 2005 Consent Order; i.e., especially since large cuts in the LANL cleanup budget are being anticipated. Therefore, Rael asked that the Consent Order's timetable be renegotiated. NMED managers countered that, although they appreciate the problems being experienced by LANS, they were not yet ready for this renegotiation. They said that perhaps in a year or so, they'd be ready, but not now. Explaining further, NMED's Mr. Flynn said that an agreement now to renegotiate the Consent Order might be seen by Congress as a reason to cut LANL's cleanup budget even farther than was now being planned. Two NNMCAB members objected, saying that this seemed to them to be a poor reason for NMED to delay start of a renegotiation, one adding that her own view should carry special weight since she was a member of an old New Mexico family.

Several LANS speakers pointed out that, with a part of the ARRA funding received by LANL, ~20 new monitoring wells had been constructed. But, NMED’s Davis noted that LANL’s program of construction of new monitoring wells may be at an end. He added that the collection of large amounts of contaminant data from LANL’s very extensive network of monitoring wells may have reached a point of diminishing returns, and that NMED would, in the future, emphasize efficiency of data collection and interpretation instead of volume. A NNMCAB member opined that there were already too many monitoring wells, and that these wells might themselves provide a route for contaminants to move from surface water down into the aquifer.

Evidently, the views expressed at this meeting were well known beforehand to most of the participants, having been the product of prior talks between NNSA/LANS and a reorganized NMED under the new Gov. Martinez; e.g.., the so-called Framework Agreement (http://www.nmenv.state.nm.us/documents/LANL_Framework_Agreement.pdf.) By contrast, the 2005 Consent Decree was the product of protracted discussions between NNSA and NMED under the then Gov. Richardson. Whereas the Framework Agreement has no legal standing, the Consent Decree continues to have the force of law.

N. Korea in the News

2011-12-31T11:10:00.009-07:00

Dec 27, 2011: Appearing on the LANL website (www.lanl.gov) under the heading "Media Coverage" (normally containing only LANL-related news) is an entry entitled "N. Korea closer to nuclear-tipped missile: U.S. expert". This is a reprint of an article appearing on the Reuters website (www.reuters.com), written by the Reuters national security correspondent Jim Wolf. In turn, Wolf quotes from a "recent" publication by the Congressional Research Service's Larry Niksch who opined that N. Korea may be one to two years away from being able to place a nuclear weapon atop an intermediate range ballistic missile. Ostensibly, LANL is reprinting Wolf's story because it mentions LANL ex-Director Sig Hecker and his trip, ~1 year ago, to N. Korea. But, it seems to me that by carrying this story LANL engages in some unsavory self-promotion. That is, by calling attention to Wolf's interpretations of Niksch's ruminations, LANL places itself in the position of seeming to advocate for more support for its own R&D on nuclear weapons, the management of which, as we know, has become a lucrative for-profit business.

Interestingly, the most recent article on N. Korea by Larry Niksch, listed on the CRS website (opencrs.com), is dated Feb. 24, 2009. Is this the article to which Jim Wolf referred? If so, then Niksch's predictions are hardly "recent". What's more, according to the Federation of American Scientists, Larry Niksch has not worked for CRS since Feb., 2010.

Accidental Fallout from LANL?

2011-11-24T19:12:00.015-07:00

Although contrary to today’s festive spirit, let's think for a bit about possible future releases of radioactive material from LANL, as a result of earthquake and/or wildfire. How much radioactive fallout would be experienced by local residents? Could this radioactive fallout constitute any sort of health hazard? Could a retired physicist like myself, with no particular knowledge of environmental science, have anything sensible to say about such questions? Well, let’s see!

A release of Pu-239 from PF-4, or the still to be built CMRR-NF, could occur sometime in the future. In the event of a major earthquake (>7 on the Richter scale) followed by fire, there might be a release from either of these facilities of Pu-239 in dust form, or in the form of fumes from burning Pu-metal. Since many tons of Pu-239 is expected to be stored at PF-4, and/or at the CMRR-NF, one might imagine that a release of >1 ton Of Pu-239 could be possible. [1 ton, or 1000 kg of Pu-239 corresponds to 73,000 PE Ci.]

Such a possibility was said last week, at a meeting in Santa Fe, NM, by the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board Chairman, Dr. Peter Winokur, to be “not far-fetched.” (The DNFSB is a group of scientists and engineers tasked by the US Congress to provide advice on safety practices, at US nuclear weapons facilities, to the US President and to the DOE Secretary.)

A wildfire burning over Area-G might have serious consequences. Currently, there are 10,000 barrels of TRU-waste stored above ground at Area-G, and these are only poorly protected against the effects of wildfire. Each barrel contains ~10 PE Ci of actinide residue, mainly Pu. If these barrels were to burst during a wildfire, ~100,000 PE Ci could go up into the air. (At the DNFSB meeting in Santa Fe last week, DOE/NNSA manager Anderson testified that the las Conchas wildfire "was very scary" and that "if the wind hadn't shifted when it did, LANL might have been consumed by fire.")

Thus, there are at least two different scenarios that might result in the release of ~100,000 PE Ci into the air over LANL.

If a bad accident at LANL, accompanied by a hot fire, were to release 100,000 Ci of Pu-239 into the atmosphere, and if the ensuing fallout exhibited circular symmetry with an activity decreasing exponentially with distance r from the source, over a characteristic distance R (that is, if r=R, then the concentration at r would be 1/e = 0.37 of its value at the source, according to the law C(r) = C(0) * exp( -r/R), where C(r) is the activity per unit area, at r, in units of Ci per square meter, or Ci/m**2) then the activity of Pu-239 deposited on the ground at a distance r, and for R = 1.0 mile, would be:

Table 1

r (miles) C(r) (Ci/m**2)

-------- --------------------

0.01 30.7

0.10 0.307

1.00 0.00113

5.00 8.28 * 10**(-7)

10.0 1.39 * 10**(-9)

20.0 1.59 * 10**(-14)

If, instead, R = 5.0 mile, then:

Table 2

r (miles) C(r) (Ci/m**2)

-------- --------------------

0.01 30.7

0.10 0.307

1.00 0.00307

5.00 4.52 * 10**(-5)

10.0 4.16 * 10**(-6)

20.0 1.41 * 10**(-7)

For a small fire, one would expect fallout to be concentrated over and around the facility which was burning, with the density of fallout and, therefore, of activity, both areal and volumetric, decreasing with distance from the facility; i.e., as described by the numbers in Table 1. For a hotter and more extensive fire, Table 2 might instead pertain. But, if the fire were both very hot and very extensive, such that the hot gases being generated rose up into the stratosphere, then the fallout would be distributed over larger distances than those indicated in the Tables, and the fallout pattern would elongate along the direction of the prevailing winds. In such a case, both Tables would need to be modified. (The Fukushima-Daiichi disaster exhibited a pattern of fallout that extended in the northwest direction over a range ~10 times that of its width. Since the damaged nuclear reactors were located on the eastern seacoast, strong prevailing sea breezes blew the fallout away from the coast and towards the northwest. In May, 2000, smoke from the Cerro Grande wildfire extended from its source in the Jemez Mts., through Los Alamos, and towards the northeast, over the town of Española, and over the pueblos of Santa Clara and Ohkay Owingeh, again blown by the prevailing winds. The length of the smoke plume was ~3 times its width, and it extended all the way into Oklahoma.)

But, to continue:

Let's estimate the amount of Pu-239 that would be deposited in the lungs of a local resident over the ~1 year's time that it would take for all of the fallout to come to earth. Let's assume that the amount of Pu-239 suspended in the air, during that 1 year's time, remains at a constant value and is distributed evenly in a vertical air column up to an altitude of 1000 m. (One could object to this number since, as we will see, it plays a critical role in our calculation; however, as a rough value I think that it may not be so bad.) The volumetric activity of Pu-239, as a function of r, would then be given by the numerical values in the above Tables, reduced by a factor of 1000 (and in units of Ci/m**3). Then, since the volume of air exchanged per breath by the human lungs is ~0.5 liter, or 0.0005 m**3, and the number of breaths taken per year is ~2 x 10**6, the volume of air exchanged in 1 year would be ~1,000 m**3. If we assume that all of the inhaled Pu-239 is deposited in the lungs, and remains in the lungs, then the activity of the Pu-239 concentrated in the lungs in 1 year, as a function of r, is given by the numerical results appearing in the above Tables (but, now in units of Ci).

A LANL compendium of radiation effects published in June, 2000 (Los Alamos Radiation Monitoring Notebook, by J. T. Voss) noted that Pu-239 deposited in the lungs of dogs was fatal, within a year, if its activity exceeded ~5 x 10**(-7) Ci/gm (Ci per gm-weight of lung tissue.) Therefore, for adult humans with an average lung mass of 900 gm, inhaled Pu-239 might be lethal for activities > 4 x 10**(-4) Ci (corresponding to a dose > 4000 Rem.) Since single doses < 10 Rem are usually considered to be marginally safe, one could say that for adult humans inhaled Pu-239 would be marginally safe if the activity of all the inhaled material was < 10**(-6) Ci.

Returning to the Tables, we see that, for R = 1 mile (Table 1), and at a distance of 5 miles from a Pu-239 release of 100,000 Ci into the atmosphere, the amount of Pu-239 concentrated in the lungs of a local resident, within 1 year of the release, does not exceed a marginally safe value. However, at a distance of just 1 mile from the release point the amount accumulated would be lethal. Therefore, for this case, a zone of exclusion extending out to at ~5 miles from the release point would be necessary.

Similarly, for R = 5 mile (Table 2), and at a distance of 10 miles from a Pu-239 release of 100,000 Ci into the atmosphere, the amount of Pu-239 concentrated in the lungs of each local resident, within 1 year of the release, is marginally safe; but, at a distance of 5 miles the amount accumulated would be unsafe and possibly lethal. In this case, the zone of exclusion would have to extend to ~10 miles.

Shocking stuff? Well, maybe.

Clearly, many assumptions have been made in these rough "calculations", some more critical than others. The form of the distribution assumed is very important, as is the value of R chosen, if the distribution were to be exponential. The height of the air column through which the fallout occurs is, obviously, very important; i.e., the actual volumetric density of Pu-239 at ground level is critical. Moreover, there is uncertainty in the amount of Pu-239 which would be inhaled by persons in the vicinity of the release point and the maximum dose of inhaled Pu-239 which can be tolerated by humans is also not very well known.

But, in spite of these uncertainties, I claim that my rough "calculations" suggest the need for a careful study of these important questions by independent qualified experts. But, perhaps such studies have already been performed? Then I wonder what their results have shown and why they aren’t already available as public information? Maybe they’re just too shocking?

DNFSB Criticizes LANL's Risky Practices

2011-11-18T22:15:00.015-07:00

17 Nov 2011/ Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB, or the Board) public meeting held at the Santa Fe, NM Convention Center / Thursday, 17 Nov 2011/ 1PM - 5:30PM; 7PM - 9PM.

The Board was created in 1989 to advise the President and the DOE Secretary on safety issues at the DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories. The Board has ~100 full-time staff and an annual budget of ~$22 million.

Today, safety practices at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) will be addressed by the Board. Of particular interest to the Board are:

1) effects of the latest information about seismic activity beneath the Pajarito Plateau as it concerns the ongoing planning for the CMRR-NF construction project at LANL;

2) effects of lessons learned from the Cerro Grande and Las Conchas wildfires on planning for the CMRR-NF construction project at LANL, as well as on the Area G cleanup, and upgrades to the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility;

3) effects of lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi natural disaster on planning for the CMRR-NF construction project, and on other projects at LANL.

The Board Chair, Peter Winokur, and four other Board members listen to short formal presentations from two panels of LANL/NNSA managers (6 per panel), and ask follow-up questions. Approximately 50 members of the general public are also in attendance. However, no questions from the general public are allowed and several uniformed security personnel are present to keep order. Nevertheless, the general public has been invited to present comments, 5 minutes per person, during a 45 min period at the end of the meeting. The Board Chair also announces that the meeting record will be held open until 19 Dec, 2011 and that anyone may add remarks to the record. Proceedings of the meeting are being recorded by means of redundent audio and video, a stenographic record is being created, and several photographers are at work in the meeting hall.

Panel member Donald Cook (DOE/NNSA manager) remarks that the latest seismic studies show that earthquakes which might occur beneath the Pajarito Plateau could be so large as to exceed the design standards for LANL's PF4 (an existing plutonium facility) and that the PF4 building structure might experience multiple failures during such an earthquake. However, he asserts that even assuming a maximum release of plutonium (powder, or fumes from burning metal) into the atmosphere, the resulting biohazard would be 10,000 times less serious than current natural occurring biohazards. He also claims that planned upgrades to the facility will reduce future possible releases of plutonium to below levels specified as safe by the DOE.

Cook also claims that lessons learned from Cerro Grande wildfire helped to mitigate effects at LANL of the Las Conchas wildfire. Similarly, he expects that lessons learned from the Las Conchas wildfire will mitigate the effects of future disastrous wildfires at LANL; ditto [somehow] for the Fukushima Daiichi earthquake and flood.

LANL Dir. Charles McMillan talks about "the broad scope of what we have done at the Lab." He says that "safety is our highest priority at the Lab", and that "our goal is to encourage reporting safety issues before they become serious." He asserts that "one of the reasons that we are here today is because of the Lab's self-reporting of possible problems at PF4." He says that, however, "PF4 is so well-designed that, in the event of an earthquake he would feel safer in PF4 than in his own home."

Board Chair Winokur remarks that, in the event of earthquake inspired structural failures and fires at PF4, “the levels of radiation in and around the destroyed facility might rise to 100,000s of Rem. It is doubtful that anyone could be safe under those circumstances.”

DNFSB LANL site-representative Brett Broderick points out that PF4 was designed and constructed in the 1970s using the best seismic info then available. However, in 2007 new seismic data showed that ground motions during a strong earthquake could be (1 1/2)x greater in the horizontal direction and 2x greater in the vertical direction, than previously thought. Projected radiation releases during such extreme events were shown to be 100x greater than had been thought possible earlier. He said that, nevertheless, approximately 1/2 of the revealed vulnerabilities at PF4 had already been corrected. Remaining vulnerabilities were primarily in the ventilation systems and in the fire suppression systems.

At this point, Board Chair Winokur notes that the US Atomic Energy Act required the DOE to protect the public against hazardous conditions at DOE nuclear weapons facilities. In this regard, he believed that DOE was designing its facilities so that worst case accidents would not result in radiation doses to members of the general public of greater than 25 Rem. However, recently, he has become aware that the DOE has actually been designing its faciities such that doses to individuals could be as high as 2500 Rem.

DOE/NNSA manager Cook immediately objects, saying that the "risk" to the general public is being appropriately computed by DOE as the product of the probability of an accident with the "consequence" of that accident.

Board member John Mansfield objects strenuously, saying that he does not believe that the DOE knows how to correctly calculate risk. [Evidently, a controversy has been brewing about this interesting topic between the Board and the DOE.]

Board Chair Winokur continues: "The risk to the public of an accident occurring once in 2000 yr, with radiation released corresponding to a dose of 2000 Rem is very different than the risk to the public of an accident which occurs once a year and leads to a dose of 1 Rem each time!"

[Now, I think it worthwhile to point out a few facts about radiation dose; i.e., according to experts who have studied the effects of radiation dose on the human body:

Normally, exposure to radiation from environmental sources results in an accumulated annual dose of less than 1 Rem, for each individual; such a low dose is always inconsequential. Also, doses accumulated gradually (over the course of a year, say) are always less problematic than doses accumulated all at once. Although sudden doses of less than 50 Rem usually do not lead to observable physical effects, sudden doses of ~ 100 Rem or more are often physically damaging, and doses of 1000 Rem or greater are usually fatal. The DOE sets 5 Rem as the maximum allowed annual dose for a worker in the nuclear weapons industry.]

[Although Winokur did not say so explicitly, it seems clear that although a release of 2000 Rem might be a rare event, any person would experience it as a deadly event, if it happened to occur in his life-time, or at the end of his life-time; but otherwise not! Which is to say that it is essential not to be confused by the rarity of an event when estimating the risk of that event to an individual.]

Panel member Kevin Smith (DOE/NNSA manager) remarks that the Las Conchas wildfire was very different than the Cerro Grande wildfire in that the more recent wildfire moved much more rapidly (explosively, in fact) and consumed much more of the forest (~10X more.)

Panel member Anderson (DOE/NNSA manager) said that the Las Conchas wildfire "was very scary" and that "if the wind hadn't shifted when it did, LANL might have been consumed by fire."

Board Chair Winokur asked Anderson if, during the Las Conchas wildfire, he had been worried about LANL's Area G; i.e., since Area G stores aboveground and essentially unprotected against the ravages of wildfire many [~10,000] large metal drums, each drum filled with TRU waste [~10 PE Ci per drum]. Anderson said that he had not been particularly worried about Area G.

Board member Joseph Bader asked about accidents so severe that they exceeded the "design basis" threat level. DOE/NNSA's Dr. Stanford answered that "such extreme events will be practiced during upcoming exercises."

Board Chair Winokur remarked that, if one tried to "imagine accidents at LANL beyond the design basis, a large earthquake accompanied by a wildfire would qualify, and did not seem to him to be far-fetched."

Scare and Scare Again

2011-10-31T13:57:00.012-06:00

In an editorial, yesterday the New York Times spoke out sharply against any further care and feeding of the US nuclear weapons program; viz., "The Bloated Nuclear Weapons Budget." The Times opined that the upgrades to this program planned by the Obama Administration, to the tune of $600 billion to be spent over the next ten years, are unnecessary and a sharp reduction in the numbers of deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons in the US arsenal is now entirely in order.

Moreover, a cancellation of DOE/NNSA plans to build a new plutonium pit manufacturing facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (for ~$5 billion), and a new uranium parts fabrication facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (another ~$5 billion) should also ensue.

The Times argued that, since the Russian nuclear threat to America has vanished, or become "unthinkable", it is illogical for the US to continue to maintain an arsenal of nuclear weapons of a size perhaps appropriate during the cold war, but no longer.

But, in the same edition of the Times, a long news article entitled "Are We Ready for Bioterrorism?" appeared, purporting to describe the sorry state of the US bioweapons defense program. The Times reported that the major threats faced by the US today arise from weaponized forms of the smallpox and anthrax bacilli; but, no good vaccine has been developed to combat these two pathogens. Thus, the US may be standing naked before its enemies, who might be armed with scary bioweapons.

What the Times reporter failed to point out was that antrax has been successfully weaponized by the US and by the Russians, during the cold war, but by no one else. What's more, today the only live smallpox bacilli are residing in vaults at bioweapons laboratories in the US and in Russia. So then is the reporter just trying to scare us a bit, in keeping with the present season? Or is he really suggesting that we try to think more about the "unthinkable"?

Life Support for US Nuclear Weapons Program?

2011-09-30T17:49:00.020-06:00

The following information concerning the ongoing US nuclear weapons program has been taken from the DOE/NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSM) Summary for FY2011, issued May 2010.

The first page of this document includes a fragment from the April, 2009 "President's Vision" of a nuclear weapons free future: " ... we will take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same."

Then, in the Preface, Section 1 "National Policy and Strategy", Subsection 1B "International Treaty Obligations", reference is made to Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to which the USA is a signatory. This Treaty obliges the USA to "pursue nuclear disarmament." DOE/NNSA asserts that the USA "will make progress toward nuclear disarmament over the next decade", and that "NNSA will support these efforts by managing a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal without developing new weapons, conducting underground nuclear testing, or providing any new military capabilities to existing weapons systems."

The "effective nuclear arsenal", referred to above, is described in Sect 3.A. "Stockpile Composition" (p21):

B61-3/4 Non-strategic bomb for F-15, F-16, and other certified NATO aircraft; developed by LANL/SNL

B61-7 Strategic bomb for B-52 and B-2; developed by LANL/SNL

B61-11 Strategic bomb for B-2; developed by LANL/SNL

B83-1 Strategic bomb for B-52 and B-2; developed by LLNL/SNL

W78 ICBM warhead for MM III ICBM; developed by LANL/SNL

W87 ICBM warhead for MM III ICBM; developed by LLNL/SNL

W76-0/1 SLBM warhead for D5 Trident Sub; developed by LLANL/SNL

W88 SLBM warhead for D5 Trident Sub; developed by LANL/SNL

W80-0 TLAM/N for Attack Sub; developed by LLNL/SNL

W80-1 ALCM/ACM for B-52; developed by LLNL/SNL

With regard to costs, beginning on p23 of the Summary are three charts describing the projected costs (out to 2025) of the Life Extension Programs (LEP) for the W76 (a maximum of $300 million per year), the B61 (a maximum of $500 million per year), and the W78 (a maximum of $400 million per year.).

.....................................................................................................

A more recent follow-on to this document is the Stockpile Stewardship and Management (SSM) Plan for FY2012, issued April 15, 2011:

In this latest SSM Plan, the "President's Vision" of a nuclear weapons free future, an excerpt from which appeared on the first page of last year's SSM Plan, is ignored. And mention of the USA's obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which appeared in the Preface of last year's SSM Plan, is also ignored.

Nevertheless, of continuing interest to a concerned citizenry is a detailed description of the Life Extension Program, and its costs, as it will be applied to specific nuclear weapons systems. This begins on p75 under the heading "Weapon System Life Extensions and Services", wherein the W76, B61, W78, and W88 are each separately considered. Under the subheading "Experiments", separate strategies facilitating SSM are also addressed. These strategies involve use of DARHT (LANL), NIF (LLNL), the Contained Firing Facility, and the underground subcritical Test Facility (NNSS).

The ongoing CMRR-NF and the UPF construction projects are discussed beginning on p77. In Table 5, "Near Term Projects" (p79) the projected dollar costs of these projects is described; e.g., CMRR-NF ($3.7B - $5.9B), UPF ($4.2B - $6.5B), PF4 extension ($75M - $100M); HE pressing facility ($147M); TRU waste facility ($71M - $124M.)

On p81, in Table 6, appear estimates of total nuclear weapons expenditures, per year and by category, for the next ten years; viz., for 2012 the expected total cost is $7.6B; for 2021 the projected total cost will be $9.5B.

On p86, in Fig. 16, are the projected costs of performing a complete LEP on the W80 ALCM warhead. According to the existing plan, these costs will peak at $400M per year, beginning in 2026, and will maintain this level of spending through 2031.

On p88, in Fig. 20, appear estimates of the total cost (for the period 2003-2031) of each of the stockpiled nuclear weapons systems; viz., B61/$6.5B; W76/$5.5B, W78/$6.0B; W80/$4.5B; B83/$1.5B; W87/$2.5B; W88/$7.0B.

The nuclear weapons related Science Campaign accomplishments for 2010-2011 are described on p102-103, the Engineering campaign accomplishments are described on p106-107, and the ICF campaign accomplishments appear on p107-108.

.....................................................................................................

In June of 2011, the General Accounting Office released an analysis of the DOE's SSM plans, insofar as these plans reflect on the "Modernization and Refurbishment of the Nuclear Security Enterprise". GAO concluded that, although "NNSA estimated that it will require over $180B to operate and modernize the nuclear security enterprise over the next two decades (2012-2031)", projected costs of NNSA's activities have been understated. In particular, GAO points out that the costs of NNSA's modernization program does not cover its congressionally mandated Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program and its Naval reactor program.

GAO goes on to say that: "NNSA considers the $88B pledged by the Administration over the next decade as its operations and modernization baseline." Furthermore, GAO says that: "During FY2022-2031, NNSA estimates it will need another $92B to operate and modernize the nuclear security enterprise."

GAO mentions that there are now 12 ongoing NNSA line-item construction projects, including:

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear Facilty (CMRR-NF) (LANL)

Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12)

High Explosive Pressing facility (HEPF) at Pantex Plant (Pantex)

Test Capabilities Revitalization Phase 2 (SNL)

TA-55 Reinvestment Project Phase 2 (LANL)

Transuranic (TRU) Waste Facilities (LANL)

There are 7 line-item construction projects slated to start by 2016; among these are:

Radioactive Liquid waste Treatment Facility (LANL)

High Explosives ST&E Facility (Pantex)

High Explosives Packaging and Staging Facility (Pantex)

And, there are 35 new line-item construction projects planned to begin in the second decade of the modernization project. Among these are:

Weapons Manufacturing Support Facility (LANL)

Life Extension Program and Warhead Assessment facility (LLNL)

Data Center Consolidation Project (NNSS)

Weapons Engineering Facility (SNL)

Consolidated Manufacturing Complex (Y-12)

GAO has also documented NNSA's poor record of project and contract management; viz., GAO notes that, although the CMRR-NF and UPF projects comprise 85% of NNSA's planned construction funding for the next ten years, firm cost and scheduling baselines still do not exist.

.....................................................................................................

Commentary:

Since the inception of the American nuclear weapons program in 1943, its annual dollar costs have been large. And as discussed above, according to the latest SSM plans, the projected future DOE/NNSA costs of this program are also large. Moreover, DOE/NNSA's spending is only one component of the total cost of the US nuclear weapons program.

The DOD adds another important measure of spending to the nuclear weapons program. Just to consider the US fleet of nuclear powered missile carrying submarines: according to the US Navy website http://www.nvr.navy.mil/nvrships/, there are presently 18 Ohio class,nuclear powered, missile carrying submarines in service, the total production cost of which has been ~$100B; 14 of these submarines carry ballistic missiles and 4 (the 4 oldest) carry guided missiles. The USS Ohio (the oldest boat) will reach its design lifetime of 42 years in 2023, and the USS Louisiana (the youngest) is due to retire in 2039. Before, or soon after reaching their design lifetime, all of these boats will have to be replaced, at an average cost of >$10B per boat, or a total cost of ~$200B. Similarly, the Air Force's fleet of B-52s will also soon have to be replaced, and the cost of this replacement will be equally large.

It is often said that the US nuclear weapons program has been a deterrent to war, and although the cost of this deterrent has been large, it could not have been as large as the cost of another major war.

Perhaps; however, the dollar cost to the US of ten years of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan has already been >$1000B, and these two very expensive unconventional wars were not deterred by the US nuclear weapons program. Indeed, since the war in Afghanistan was a US response to the attack of 9/11, then both this attack and the subsequent war were not deterred. Similarly, and since the war in Iraq has been entirely a war of the US's choosing, existence of the US nuclear weapons program did not stop the US from attacking Iraq.

And, could anyone imagine that the US nuclear weapons program would stop a nuclear attack on the US by nonstate actors who might obtain access to nuclear weapons?

Las Conchas Wildfire & LANL Nuclear Waste

2011-08-20T16:34:00.006-06:00

The New Mexico Community Foundation (NMCF) sponsored another in its Forum for Environmental Education and Dialogue (FEED) series of meetings on Thursday, Aug 18, 2011, at the Pojoaque Elementary School Business Office, at 5:30 PM. The topic to be discussed was the aftermath of the recent Las Conchas wildfire, which burned ~250 square miles of forestland in the Jemez Mts. There were approximately 20 members of the general public in attendance at this meeting.

A panel of experts had been commissioned by NMCF to present an overview of the fire's aftermath. The panel consisted of: Manny L'Esperance, LANL manager in charge of fire preparedness and an expert in wildfire control; Mike McNaughton, LANL environmental scientist; Mike McInroy, LANL expert on stormwater runoff and its effects; Bill Bartels, an environmental specialist from NMED; Nita Bates, another environmental specialist from NMED.

Manny L'Esperance talked about the actual fighting of the Las Conchas fire; e.g., the extensive backburns that had been set in order to try to keep the wildfire from intruding onto LANL property (a success, he said); and the difficulty that had been experienced by firefighters in controlling a wildfire that, at the outset, had been moving at a very rapid pace through the forest (only a partial success.) It was perhaps partly due to the efforts of Mr. L'Esperance and partly due to dumb luck that the wildfire did not burn over TA-54, where 100's, if not 1000's, of 55 gallon drums containing TRU waste are being stored under fabric tents. ( As Joni Arends of CCNS has repeatedly pointed out.)

Mike McNaughton talked about several radioactive substances carried by the ash and smoke generated by the wildfire. He said that the radioactive contaminants of special concern to the public were plutonium-239 (originated from the planet Pluto, he thought), contained in the ash, and polonium-210 (of Polish origin, he had heard), contained in the smoke. He said that these two radionuclides could have been equally perilous to human health, if they had appeared in sufficiently large concentrations. Further, he said that although he believed that the ash, being poorly mobile, could not have constituted a danger to public health, he thought that the smoke might have been a matter for legitimate public concern. Nevertheless, he asserted that any radioactive materials that might have been found in the ash or the smoke were of natural origin, or associated with global fallout, and could not fairly be associated with present or past LANL operations. Even so, I thought he might admit that the building and testing of nuclear weapons, both past LANL operations and the sole purpose for which LANL was created in 1943, have greatly contributed to the last ~50 years of global fallout.

Bill Bartels talked about a small number of air quality monitoring stations that NMED had erected around the burning area, in order to spot-check the extensive air-quality monitoring data that LANL instruments were recording. Bartels said that no discrepancies between NMED and LANL data were discovered in the course of this exercise.

Nita Bates talked about the recent collection of air-quality data all around the state of New Mexico, not just to assess the effects of the Las Conchas wildfire, but also to enquire into the effects of the massive Wallow wildfire, which had burned along the Arizona - New Mexico border. She said that these effects were determined to be minimal; e.g., there was no elevation in ozone levels detected due to the two wildfires. She also asserted that Santa Fe had not experienced any appreciable degradation in its air-quality due to the Las Conchas wildfire.

Dave McInroy said that the occurrence of contamination in stormwater runoff was just beginning to be measured by LANL, and that the first data had just been assembled for stormwaters collected at a location upgradient of LANL operations. He anticipated that contamination in runoff would ultimately be found to be less than what had occurred 10 years earlier, following the Cerro Grande fire; i.e., because of interim improvements in drainage and the slowing down of sediment transport rates.

I brought along a copy of this first tranche of stormwater runoff contamination data to the FEED meeting. (The data had already been placed in the online RACER data-base.) I pointed out at the meeting that this data showed that the concentration of strontium-90 and plutonium-239,240 was occurring at ~50 times the drinking water standard, while americium-241, cesium-137, and uranium-238,234 had been measured at ~10 times the standard. Mike McNaughton then asserted that the drinking water standard was too stringent a comparison to invoke when attempting to assess the seriousness of the levels of these contaminants in stormwater runoff. He also insisted that these data were indicative of conditions occurring in the natural environment and not connected to LANL operations.

Open Detonation of Explosives Waste at LANL

2011-08-18T00:08:00.012-06:00

This week, on 16 Aug. between 5:30 - 7:30 PM, at Fuller Lodge in Los Alamos, LANL held a public meeting to describe their request of NMED for a Permit to detonate explosives waste at TA-36 and TA-39, in the open air.

Similar to last week's meeting regarding a new TRU waste treatment facility, there were ~35 people in attendance at Fuller Lodge; of these, ~25 were from LANL, 1 was from NMED, and ~10 were from the general public. Among the members of the general public were Joanie Arends (Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety), Scott and Susan Kovacs (Nuclear Watch of New Mexico), and myself. The meeting was facilitated by Bruce MacAllister, and there were two LANL presenters: Dave Funk (LANL explosives div. head), and Luciana Vigil-Holterman (ENV-RCRA specialist).

This newest request seeks a Permit from NMED to detonate up to 15,000 lbs of explosives waste in the open air, per year, at each of the two adjacent sites (TA-36 and TA-39). According to D. Funk, this is actually >10 times the weight of explosives waste currently being detonated in the open. He says that LANL is requesting a Permit to detonate so much more than is now necessary, "because future national security interests might require LANL to detonate a whole lot more explosives waste."

According to Mr. Funk, explosives waste is now being generated by LANL primarily from its work on nuclear weapons, both the R&D of nuclear weapons and the recertifying of stockpiled nuclear weapons; other explosives waste is the product of LANL's advanced explosives R&D, as well as its R&D being conducted on improvised explosives. Both Mr. Funk and Ms. Vigil-Holterman adamantly maintain that there is no off-site contamination now being produced by the open detonation of explosives waste at LANL.

Mr. Funk further opined that detonating explosives waste in specially constructive enclosures was much too expensive; i.e., as compared to detonations in the open air. Ms. Vigil-Holterman also pointed out that LANL has been detonating explosives waste in the open air continuously, since the 1950's, but without ever having had a formal Permit.

From the audience, LANL manager D. Hjeresen read a letter written to NMED by Rio Arriba County Commission Chair Felipe Martinez, saying that the RAC Commission was in favor of LANL recieving a permit for open detonation of explosives waste, since "We believe that detonations in the Laboratory's remote and secure areas are a better alternative to transporting these unstable, explosive wastes on the public roads through our communities. We further believe that a denial of open detonation capability would harm our
country's nation security without an appreciable benefit to the environment." During a later telephone conversation (on 8/22/11), Chairman Martinez told me that a continuation of the economic benefits being brought to the citizens of northern New Mexico, by DOE/LANL, were a matter of special concern to him.

In the past, it's been difficult for NMED to resist DOE/LANL's demands for additional permissions for hazardous activities not already covered under the Hazardous Waste Facility Permit (RCRA Permit). On 23 December, 2010 NMED outgoing Sec. Curry acceded to a LANL demand for an Open Burn Permit (of explosives residues) for TA-16. The OB Permit had only just been denied by NMED on 30 Nov, 2010, after weeks of public hearings presided over by Judge Joseph Alarid, who then issued his recommendation (evidently negative) to NMED. But, subsequently, NMED was bombarded by letters from local public officials attesting to the many benefits that open burning of explosives residues would have for the national interest; e.g., the mayor of Española who said that an OB Permit was "essential in order to protect our military and our nation's welfare."

LANL TRU Waste Permit Modification Request

2011-08-11T18:49:00.027-06:00

The Los Alamos National Laboratory TRansUranic (TRU) Waste Permit Modification Request Public Meeting was held on 10 Aug., 2011, between 5:30 - 7:30 PM, at Fuller Lodge in Los Alamos, NM. The intent of this meeting is to discuss a Permit Modification Request (PMR) being made to the New Mexico Environment Dept/ 's Hazardous Waste Bureau, which issued the original Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Hazardous Waste Facility Permit last year.

There were ~35 people in attendance at the PMR meeting; of these, ~25 were from LANL, 1 was from NMED, and ~10 were from the general public. Among the members of the general public were Joanie Arends (Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety), Scott and Susan Kovacs (Nuclear Watch of New Mexico), and myself. The meeting was facilitated by Bruce MacAllister, and there were 3 LANL presenters: Matt Nuckols (civil engineer), Greg Juerling (project manager), and Gian Bacigalupa (RCRA permitting process expert).

The PMR will be for one new LANL hazardous waste facility, in which up to 105,875 gallons of TRU waste will be characterized and stored, while awaiting shipment to the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP) site in Carlsbad, NM. The new facility will be located at TA-63. The present RCRA Permit allows for the characterization and storage of up to 4.5 million gallons of TRU waste, now being stored at TA-54.

As planned, the new facility at TA-63 will be adjacent to the plutonium facility at TA-55; this is the source of the majority of the TRU waste being generated now, and will continue to be so into the foreseeable future. Currently, the 2nd largest source of TRU waste is the old CMR building. If the CMRR-NF is eventually built, replacing CMR, it will probably be sited next to TA-55 and is expected to generate as much TRU waste as CMR. The 3rd largest amount of TRU waste now comes from the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility, which is also expected to continue to operate into the foreseeable future.

Each of the TRU waste generator sites (TA-55, CMR, and RLWTF) will package its own waste into numbered 55 gallon steel drums, the contents of each drum will be recorded and the drums will be sealed. The sealed drums will be transferred to TA-63 where their contents will be "characterized", and the drums stored while awaiting shipment to WIPP.

Characterization of the contents of each drum will consist of: radiography of the sealed drum, in order to ensure the absence of certain prohibited items (no liquids are being accepted at WIPP); measurement of the intensity of radiation (primarily neutrons and gammas) emanating from the sealed drum, in order to ensure that the dose rate, at the container wall, is less than 200 mrem/hr (which is the maximum allowed dose rate for so-called contact-handled TRU waste); and anaysis of the gases emanating from the HEPA filter terminating the vent attached to each sealed container, in order to ensure the absence of certain radioactive, poisonousness and/or corrosive gases.

The new facility will store TRU waste containers in 6 buildings, designed with fire suppresant systems, located at TA-63. This will be an improvement over the current situation at TA-54, where containers are stored on concrete pads covered by fabric domes. These domes are vulnerable to fire. It was only due to aggressive fire-fighting and to much good luck that these domes didn't burn during the recent Las Conchas wildfire (which.burned more than 244 square miles over 36 days in the mountains surrounding Los Alamos.) Ten years ago, the Cerro Grande wildfire also very seriously threatened LANL buildings.

During the PMR Meeting, it was stated by LANL staff that if any of the proposed TA-63 buildings were to burn in an uncontrolled manner, due to accident or wildfire, then TRU waste containers being held in storage could rupture, due to rapid expansion of the trapped gases inside the containers. A worst case scenario of this sort had been modeled, and it was thought that no more than ~5 rem would be absorbed by workers during such a catastrophic event. The annual dose allowed by the DOE for an employee working around radioactive materials is ~1 rem/year. Even so, a person or persons who absorbed a dose of ~1 rem within a period of minutes or hours would probably not experience any symptoms of radiation sickness. But, whether a maximum dose of 5 rem is realistic is another question. After all, the new facility will be permitted for 105,875 gallons (~425 m**3) of TRU waste which, if one accepts the DOE's estimate of the average activity of contact handled TRU waste as being 47 Ci/m**3, implies a total activity of ~19,900 Ci (mostly isotopes of Pu.) If this material should all be released into the facility's buildings, then this would be more than enough to compromise the health of anyone unfortunate enough to be present, even briefly, in those areas.

As was pointed out by Joanie Arends, DOE plans to close the WIPP site in ~2030. After that, and absent any new plans for waste disposition, TRU waste generated at LANL will stay at LANL.

DOE anticipates that by ~2030 WIPP will contain a total of ~9 million Curies (Ci) of TRU waste. This waste must "remain isolated from the biosphere" for a time much greater than 24 thousand years; i.e., the half-life of Pu239, the radionuclide making up ~10% of TRU waste, and the one with the longest half-life. By contrast, most of the TRU waste has a half-life of less than 100 years.

Future of Nuclear Power Plants Uncertain

2011-08-06T11:13:00.012-06:00

As reported today by BBC World News:

Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan has repeated a pledge to reduce reliance on nuclear power, as people mark the 66th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing.

Thousands gathered at the city's peace memorial to observe one minute's silence in memory of the 140,000 killed by the

atomic attack in 1945.

Mr Kan used the occasion to address the crisis caused by a tsunami wrecking the Fukushima Daiichi power plant in March.

He promised to challenge "conventional beliefs" that nuclear energy was safe.

The Fukushima plant continues to leak radioactive material, nearly five months after a 9.0 magnitude earthquake triggered the tsunami which caused the damage.

It was causing serious concerns not just in

Japan

but across the world, Mr Kan said.

"We will deeply reflect over the conventional belief that nuclear energy is safe, thoroughly look into the cause of the accident and - to secure safety - implement fundamental measures," he said.

About 30% of

Japan

's electricity was nuclear generated before the Fukushima crisis, and the country had previously targeted raising that figure to 53% by 2030.

But Mr Kan said: "I will reduce

Japan

's reliance on nuclear power, aiming at creating a society that will not rely on atomic power generation."

The prime minister spoke after laying a wreath of yellow flowers at Hiroshima Peace Memorial Park, where doves were released as a symbol of peace.

Japan

has long vowed never to make or possess nuclear weapons but had embraced nuclear power as it rebuilt after World War II.

However, referring to Fukushima, Hiroshima mayor Kazumi Matsui told those gathered: "The continuing radiation scare has made many people live in fear and undermined people's confidence in nuclear power.

"The Japanese government must quickly review the energy policy... to regain people's understanding and trust," added Mr Matsui, the son of an atomic bomb survivor.

Nuclear Power Plants, Sí! Nuclear Weapons, No!

2011-08-03T14:34:00.021-06:00

Yes, it seems to me to be altogether reasonable for a person to be against the continuation of American R&D on nuclear weapons, while encouraging the drive toward the eventual world-wide abolition of these absurdly horrific weapons, and simultaneously to be for the continued push to build and operate more nuclear power plants in America.

Last night (Aug. 2, 2011), on C-SPAN, I watched the Senate hearing on nuclear power plant safety, chaired by Sen. Boxer (Environment and Public Works Committee.) Four NRC commissioners were seated as witnesses, as well as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Chairman, Dr. Jaszco.

The following is the text of a note that I sent today to Sen. Boxer:

Senator Boxer, in the context of your review of concerns that were expressed recently by members of the general public regarding the disaster at Fukishima Daiichi, and its possible implications for nuclear power plant safety in the USA, I agree with the pertinence of the observation made last night by your colleague Sen. Alexander that "each year in the USA there are 38,000 auto-related deaths on the highways" (as well as 100,000's of serious injuries).

It is, therefore, astonishing to me that members of the general public, who would no more consider giving up driving their beloved cars (cars which, over a 50 year period of use could, demonstrably, lead to their death with probability ~0.01, and/or to their serious injury with probability ~0.1) than they would consider giving up eating tasty but unhealthy foods (foods which, when consumed over the course of a lifetime, could lead to serious health problems, and even early death, at predictable average rates); they, nevertheless will excitedly agitate over the possible dire consequences of radiation releases from nuclear power plants, power plants which, in their ~50 yearlong history of use, have never been shown to be the cause of a single human death in the USA.

Senator Boxer, it seems to me that you could be more of a leader than a follower on this issue, and could stop catering to the, in my view, irrational fears expressed by some members of the general public. You may be aware of the fact that, when the incandescent light bulb was first introduced into wide use, ~100 years ago, there were many urgent expressions of fear by members of the general public concerning the possible ill effects of the "unnatural glow" emitted by, what was then, a very unfamiliar light source.

Interestingly, nowadays, libertarian elements in our society complain bitterly about an incipient ban by the federal government on the sale of the now very familiar incandescent light bulb; i.e., to be banned by the feds because it is so inefficient, in terms of energy use, and because there are much better alternatives available in the form of plasma lamps and solid state illuminators. Evidently, while familiarity breeds contempt (or love, in the case of libertarians), unfamiliarity can breed suspicion and even fear.

Whatever! Or, as some say in California, New Mexico,and other places of diverse culture: "Cada loco por su tema."

What's Sig Hecker Up To?

2011-07-23T17:02:00.044-06:00

Appearing in the latest issue of Physics Today /July 2011 / is an article entitled “Adventures in scientific nuclear diplomacy’’, by past director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sigfried Hecker .

This may be nothing more than a straight-forward exercise in self-promotion. Or it may be a sincere attempt to encourage scientists and engineers, who might have an interest in public policy, to become more involved in the creation of that policy. Alternately, it may be part of an ongoing effort to cast doubt on the advisability of the United States federal government’s proceeding further along a road toward nuclear disarmament.

Headings in Hecker's Physics Today article include:

“From competition to collaboration”

“Lab-to-lab contact”

“Securing

Kazakhstan

”

“Collaboration with

China

”

“South Asia’s nuclear risks”

“The most difficult countries in the world”

“Scientists’ important role”

Under this last heading Hecker asserts that:

Twenty years after I started lab-to-lab contacts, I believe more firmly than ever that scientists can be an important part of international security diplomacy. Scientists look through different lenses than politicians and build different relationships – often deeply personal friendships. They speak a common language and usually respect each other, which makes it easier to build trust. Communications are more less formal, with email instead of diplomatic cables, and scientists can explore a broader spectrum of solutions than government officials can.

Fair enough; however, Hecker also includes a figure from his much earlier article entitled “A tale of two diagrams”, in Los Alamos Science 26, 244 (2000) (an issue devoted to plutonium metallurgy and chemistry, Hecker’s area of technical expertise.) The point of that article was to show that, prior to 2000, American understanding of plutonium metallurgy and chemistry was incomplete. An implication of this, although not stated explicitly, was that conclusions being drawn about the continued and long-term reliability of the American nuclear weapons stockpile should be regarded with some skepticism.

As I have remarked before in this blog (blogpost entitled “Nuke Enthusiasts Fight New Start Treaty”, November 21, 2010), Hecker was a signatory to a letter admonishing theObama administration that the latest Nuclear Posture Review unduly constrained the R&D of nuclear weapons at the nuclear weapons laboratories and, therefore, placed the US nuclear deterrent in jeopardy. I reprise these remarks below:

The New York Times today is running a William J Broad story about the New Start Treaty, and its relation to controversy over upgrading of the

nuclear deterrent, with corresponding costly nuke building programs at the DOE/NNSA's nuke labs, especially LANL and ORNL, but also the Kansas City Plant. In order to entice a few Republican Treaty ratification votes, Pres. Obama is offering more money for nuke program upgrades, but the Republican point man on this issue, Sen. Jon Kyl, still says no.

The Los Angeles Times contains a more comprehensive story about Hecker's trip to N Korea, pointing out that he traveled with Jack Pritchard, a former

ambassador to S Korea, and a current publicist for S Korean interests. According to the LAT, both Hecker and Pritchard will shortly give a talk about their trip to the Korean Economic Institute, Pritchard's organization. They had both also just finished briefing the Institute for Science and International Security, a group focused on world-wide nuclear proliferation matters.

Hecker, a past director of LANL and a strong proponent of continuing the American nuclear weapons program, was a signatory to a May 2010 letter by 10 former nuke lab directors criticizing the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The former directors asserted that the NPR restricts the creative freedom of scientists and engineers who work at the nuke labs, thus denying the nation the full benefit of its nuclear weapons designers' expertise, and placing the nation at unnecessary risk of a possible future nuclear attack.

One wonders about the timing of the release of information about Hecker's latest visit to N Korea, and the effect that this information might have on the New Start Treaty ratification process.
......

Perhaps it’s time for Dr. Hecker to give us all a clearer view of his true intentions. If these are benign, then a good next step might be to publicly renounce his support for the May 2010 letter criticizing the Nuclear Posture Review.

National Park Status for Nuke Labs?

2011-07-21T17:08:00.012-06:00

Since 2004, parts of the Department of Energy nuclear weapons R&D centers at Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Hanford Nuclear Reservation have been under consideration by the National Park Service, as candidates for NPS sites commemorating the creation of nuclear weapons.

Recently, in July, 2011, and after much study by the NPS, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar recommended to the US Congress that they proceed with the writing of legislation bestowing National Park Service status on these three sites. Materials relating to this NPS recommendation may be found at parkplanning.nps.gov/mapr.

A spokesperson for the NPS points out that there are many precedents for the incorporation of sites commemorating war related events into the NPS. Such sites have been in the form of National Monuments, National Memorials, and National Military Parks.

What is unusual is that the new NPS recommendation is for the creation of a National Park to commemorate the Manhattan Project. But, past national parks have been designated to protect and preserve, for the enjoyment of future generations, areas of surpassing natural beauty, not areas associated with the massacre of 100,000's of noncombatants, in the nuclear heat of past battles.

It seems to be true, however, that some advances in military science and/or practice may always be deemed by some military enthusiasts to be worthy of some public recognition in perpetuity.

And, this may be a problem for President Barack Obama, who strives to limit the rate of spread of nuclear weapons technology, and promotes the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons, but also must placate the most militaristic members of the US Senate.

After all, how better to move toward the abolition of nuclear weapons than to try to marginalize ideas of their military usefulness while also attempting to stigmatize the role that they play in the formation of national policy? But it is difficult to imagine stigmatizing the holding and R&D of nuclear weapons, while at the same time celebrating their creation. That is, it is difficult to imagine celebrating the creation of nuclear weapons without also celebrating their continued existence. Difficult but, I suppose, not impossible. So, good luck with that Mr. President!

Finally, as a contribution to the general bemusement, I recapitulate here remarks made during the finale of the US Senate debate on the New Start Treaty (recorded in the US Senate on 12-22-10). These remarks were in the nature of heartfelt objections to the Treaty by Sen. Jeff Sessions of Alabama. According to the cherubic Sen. Sessions:

1) The Treaty is a step on the road toward President Obama's goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons, which is a leftist goal and a dangerous fantasy.

2) The notion that the Treaty will make Russia more cooperative in its relations with the US is false. Russia has shown itself to be uninterested in cooperation with the US since it blocked United Nations Security Council attempts to condemn North Korea and, in 2008, attacked its neighbor Georgia.

3) The Obama Administration has unilaterally given away US missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic, thus, showing itself to be insufficiently committed to missile defense.

4) The US Senate should state clearly that the goal of zero nuclear weapons is undesirable and even impossible.

5) The goal of zero nuclear weapons is a cock-a-mammy and dangerous idea.

6) The idea of a world without nuclear weapons is ominous and chilling.

7) In the Nuclear Posture Review of this past spring, Pres. Obama made clear that his goal is a world without nuclear weapons. However, ex-Sec. of Defense Schlesinger has said that he believes that a world without nuclear weapons is a utopian idea.

8) The maintenance of a large US arsenal of nuclear weapons is the best way to encourage the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. If the US continues to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in its arsenal, this will lead other nations, which don't now have nuclear weapons, to develop their own.

9) The Obama Administration has made it clear that the New Start Treaty is a step on the road toward its goal of a world without nuclear weapons. But, to me this is not a dream, it's a nightmare!

10) By reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the US is relinquishing its leadership role in the world.

More recently, and also from Alabama, the following story has emerged, as reprinted by The Tennessean and The Tuscaloosa News from an Associated Press report, dated July 20, 2011, and datelined Mountain Creek, Alabama:

"The last of the more than 60,000 Confederate veterans who came home to Alabama after the Civil War died generations ago, yet residents are still paying a tax that supported the neediest among them."

"Despite fire-and-brimstone opposition to taxes among many in a state that still has 'Heart of Dixie' on its license plates, officials never stopped collecting a property tax that once funded the Alabama Confederate Soldiers' Home, which closed 72 years ago. The tax now pays for Confederate Memorial Park [Park Director Bill Rambo], which sits on the same 102-acre tract where elderly veterans used to stroll."

LANL Data Mushrooms into Cloud

2011-06-08T11:56:00.009-06:00

Cities of Gold Hotel and Casino, Pojoaque, NM/ June 7, 2011, 5:30 PM-7:30 PM:

The RACER environmental database team, and the New Mexico Community Foundation (NMCF), held a public meeting to describe the results of a recent audit of RACER data, and to introduce the planned use of cloud computing technology as an enhancement to the RACER database.

The audit was designed and conducted by the Risk Assessment Corporation (RAC), the original creator of RACER, under contract to Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Agency (DOE/NNSA). DOE/NNSA is currently the sole support of RACER and also funds ~10% of ongoing NMCF operations. A RAC employee presented the audit findings to an assembly of Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) personnel, along with a few members of the general public. Altogether, approximately 30 people were in attendance. The purpose of RACER is ostensibly to make LANL and NMED environmental data accessible to the general public.

The audit uncovered numerous discrepancies contained in RACER data, when compared to data supplied by LANL to the auditors. Because of these discrepancies, the RAC presenter judged the current interface through which LANL has been supplying data to RACER to be a "failure".

However, in the next presentation a LANL staff member described reasons for these discrepancies, and the strategy which soon would be employed to correct them.

A second LANL staff member then elaborated on the planned use of cloud computing technology to enhance the RACER database.

During the course of this last presentation, and as a result of the question and answer session which followed, it became clear that the DOE intends to replace its LANL environmental database, now being held redundantly on servers at LANL and by RACER, with data residing only in the Cloud; i.e., on public access servers owned by the Locus Corporation, and provided under a new DOE/NNSA contract. For future users of this data, Locus will also supply display software surpassing in versatility what is now being offered by RACER.

That the DOE may wish to cut costs by contracting out the management of its environmental data seems unexceptional. Indeed, the ability of LANL staff to make use of its environmental data may well be facilitated by a more efficient data management scheme. Whether or not this new arrangement will facilitate or inhibit use of LANL environmental data by the general public is another question.

It appears to me that, at present, there are very few users of this data among the general public; viz., few or almost none, as judged by tallies reported by the RACER site-meter. Will the invocation of a more versatile data display tool encourage more use of LANL environmental data by the general public? Judging by my own experience with RACER, and with display software generally, I'm dubious of such a theory.

Unless, that is, one has in mind the use of environmental data as a new form of entertainment (perhaps a 3D environmental movie hosted by a sexy captain DOE-America?) ... and a distraction for the general public from its worries about the real nuclear weapons R&D going on at LANL, with all of its likely accompanying environmental contamination.

CMRR-NF SEIS Hearings in New Mexico

2011-05-29T15:51:00.021-06:00

Public hearings were recently held by DOE/NNSA, in which comments were solicited from the general public on the Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) of April, 2011, regarding proposed construction of the ~$6 billion facility for plutonium R&D at LANL. These hearings were a part of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, mandated by the U. S. Congress, and were held on the evenings of May 23-26, 2011 in Albuquerque, Los Alamos, Española, and Santa Fe, NM.

The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) discussed is being designed to replace a similar, but said to be outmoded building (CMR) constructed in the 1950's. If constructed as planned, the CMRR-NF will enable DOE/NNSA/LANL's continuation of the performance of nuclear weapons R&D at Los Alamos for approximately the next 50 years; in particular, R&D activities related to plutonium chemistry and metallurgy. These activities would have applications to stockpile stewardship, as presently understood; i.e., to the production of new plutonium triggers to replace weapons that have been damaged or destroyed during active surveillance.

However, the CMRR-NF is also a keystone of DOE/NNSA's plans for the continuation of the U. S. nuclear weapons program for the next 50 years. An essential part of these plans is the centralization of all plutonium related activities at LANL, with the collection and storage of weapons grade plutonium in underground vaults at CMRR-NF. The CMRR-NF could also support the large-scale production of plutonium pits, or triggers, of new and untested designs if DOE/NNSA should ever convince a future U. S. Congress to revive the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.

It is interesting to recall that plutonium pits, or triggers, are really only essential for the detonation of miniaturized thermonuclear weapons which, although small in dimension, can be designed to be weapons of almost limitless explosive power. A single very powerful thermonuclear weapon exploded over a major metropolis could result in the deaths of tens of millions of people. Thus, in our current political environment, in which the role of nuclear weapons in national policy is being down-played, and in which the contemplation of the use of any weapon of mass destruction is being stigmatized, thermonuclear weapons would seem to be of little value.

On the other hand, weapons of more limited power, such as atomic weapons, can be fashioned from uranium alone. The atomic weapon dropped on Hiroshima in 1945 was just such a weapon, and its design was so simple that it did not even need to be tested before use. As is well known, however, the design of the plutonium based device dropped on Nagasaki did require testing before use, since its design was fraught with difficult engineering challenges. Thus, if there were to be any future for nuclear weapons, based say on their presumed deterrence value, then uranium weapons might easily suffice. In fact, initial concepts of the RRW were for just such a uranium based atomic weapon. However, in this, advocates for the "more is better" approach seem to have prevailed.

I attended the last 3 of the public meetings held to encourage public comment on construction of the proposed CMRR-NF. The emphasis in comments made by the public was different in each of these 3 meetings.

The Los Alamos meeting was rather small: 7 comments were pro-LANL and pro-construction; 3 comments were anti-LANL. The pro-LANL comments asserted the importance of the proposed construction to the local economy, as well as the importance of LANL to the local economy, generally. A few patriotic themes were also struck by the pro-LANL speakers.

The Española meeting was larger: there were 4 pro-LANL comments, 2 of which were by the same individuals who had spoken at the Los Alamos meeting; and there were 34 anti-LANL comments. The anti-LANL commenters mostly expressed outrage at the environmental contamination which they believed LANL operations were causing and which, they implied, activities at the CMRR-NF would worsen.

The Santa Fe meeting was equally large: there were 2 pro-LANL comments, but by the same 2 individuals who had spoken at the previous meetings; again there were 34 anti-LANL comments, of which only 4 were by people who had spoken in Española. The anti-LANL sentiments were now largely centered on moral concerns; i.e., the immorality of continuing with the U. S. nuclear weapons enterprise.

Thus, it appears that the local community is much more motivated to express opposition to the proposed CMRR-NF construction project than it is willing to express support for the smathering of new jobs that the project will produce; viz., over all, 65 citizens opposed the project while 8 expressed support.

The period for written public comment on construction of the CMRR-NF building extends to June 28, 2011, and citizens may email DOE/NNSA at NEPALASO@doeal.gov (Attn: Mr. John Tegtmeier, CMRR–NF SEIS Document Manager) expressing their views on this controversial matter. Copies of such communications should be forwarded to the offices of Rep. Ben Ray Lujan and to Senators Bingaman and Udall.

Comments on LANL Draft Community Relations Plan

2011-05-27T20:49:00.006-06:00

The Draft LANL Community Relations Plan of May, 2011 (LA-UR-11-10608), the "Plan", was mandated by Sect. 1.12 of the LANL Hazardous waste Facility Permit, issued by NMED for the state of New Mexico on December 28, 2010 (RCRA Renewal Permit, the "Permit")

The Permit mandates that LANL create a Plan which will:

1) Establish an open working relationship with the public

2) Establish a productive government to government relationship with the tribes

3) Keep the public informed about Permit actions of interest

4) Minimize disputes and resolve differences with the public

5) Provide a mechanism for dissemination of information to the public

6) Provide a mechanism for public input to the Permittees

The Plan asserts compliance with Permit mandates because:

1) LANL hazardous activities have become more transparent and responsive to the public

a) As measured by the annual survey of attitudes of local community leaders toward LANL, and the evolution toward more positive attitudes over the last several years

b) Mechanisms facilitating exchange of information and opinions with the public have been set up; e.g., an email address at envoutreach@lanl.gov; information repositories, electronic at www.lanl.gov and printed media at LANL's Oppenheimer Center; a schedule of formal meetings and briefings; tours of LANL facilities; the NNMCAB.

2) Government to government relations with the tribes are being promoted

3) Professional facilitators are being employed to conduct public meetings

........................................................................

However, I believe that the Plan is inadequate for the following reasons:

It seems that all of the cited Plan elements have been ongoing for many years. Thus, the Plan is a collection of previously existing programs; no programs were created specifically to comply with the mandates of the Permit. As to the individual Plan elements:

1a) The annual surveys of the attitudes of local community leaders toward LANL is insufficient to convincingly demonstrate approval, or disapproval, by the local community of LANL behavior. A better means of determining the opinions of local community members would be to survey these opinions directly. Moreover, the annual survey of local community leaders has been ongoing for several years and could hardly be counted as a part of a new plan to improve relations with the general public.

1b) All of the mechanisms and entities mentioned here by LANL have been in existence for many years and cannot be considered a part of a new community relations plan.

2) Government to government relations with the tribes have long been promoted by the DOE and are also nothing new.

3) It has long been DOE policy to employ professional facilitators to keep order at public meetings. Therefore, this element is also not new.

Furthermore, the enumerated Plan elements do not even include all of the existing LANL community relations programs. For example:

A.) The Plan makes no mention of the RACER electronic database. RACER is an online record of measurements made by LANL and NMED of the concentrations of a large number of contaminants of groundwater and soil all around the Pajarito Plateau over a period of many decades. RACER was created with DOE money, and the accumulation of its important environmental data is an ongoing process.

B.) The Plan makes no mention of the New Mexico Community Foundation and its commitment to providing a regular forum for the exchange of information and opinions between LANL personnel and members of the general public. The NMCF has recently been funded by the DOE to accomplish this important task and it's hard to understand why LANL's Plan does not claim part ownership of this group. After all, LANL includes the NNMCAB in its Plan. Yet the NNMCAB is wholly a DOE creation.

C.) The Plan makes no mention of the NEWNET air quality data available, online and in real time, to the general public.

D.) The Plan makes no mention of the Bradbury Museum, an important part of LANL ongoing community relations. Perhaps this is because the Bradbury invites contributions from the general public, for which it provides exhibit space. Some of these contributions are very critical of LANL operations, past and present.

E.) The Plan makes no mention of the many other materials available through the existing LANL Community Programs Office.

Worse, the Plan's authors have made no attempt to accommodate the demands of local citizens, presented during the public RCRA Hazardous Waste Permit hearings:

A.) There is no mention of the extensive information on environmental contamination compiled by the LAHDRA project, which was funded by the DOE, and is available online in the LAHDRA final report.

B.) No attempt has been made to create a repository of historical records describing the involvement of DOE/LANL in the lives of local citizens and in the life of the surrounding communities. It was suggested that such a repository of historical records should be established at Northern New Mexico College.

American Physical Society and Nuclear Arms Control

2011-05-16T13:53:00.003-06:00

American Physical Society April 2011 meeting (Saturday, April 30, 2011 - Tuesday, May 3, 2011) Hyatt Regency Hotel, Garden Grove, CA

This meeting was mostly about cosmology, astrophysics, and particle physics; however, there were two short sessions devoted to matters of nuclear arms control.

The first of these sessions was entitled "Nuclear Weapons" and was chaired by Patricia M. Lewis of the Monterrey Institute of International Studies. The first speaker, Rebecca Johnson of the Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy; was not actually present but addressed the attendees through Skype. RJ is a staunch advocate for nuclear disarmament, and presented some well thought out positions in support of her cause. The next speaker was Jay Davis, the first director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA, formerly the National Security Agency), and a knowledgeable apologist for the NW industry. JD seems to advocate for the notion that, as the number of nukes in the US arsenal is reduced, the amount of work required to ensure deterrence increases. He further suggests that, if the number of nukes in the US nuclear arsenal were to approach zero, then the work required to ensure deterrence would approach infinity. (Zeno's paradox). During the question and answer period I asked JD if he could say why it might not be possible to "stigmatize" NWs in the same way that chemical and biological weapons had been stigmatized (as had been pointed out by RJ, during her talk), thus short-circuiting the tortuous build-down process that he implied might require an infinite amount of effort to complete. He answered that chemical and biological weapons had never been of much strategic significance, in contrast to NWs.

The 2^nd session was entitled "The Status of Arms Control". The 1st speaker was S. Drell of SLAC who spoke about "What happens to deterrence as nuclear weapons decrease toward zero." He made several points which I recorded as: 1) It was understood at the height of the Cold War that nukes could not be defended against (Star Wars schemes did not work or were unreliable, he said), so that Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) became the only viable policy. 2) Rejecting MAD, the task of US nuclear weapons policy is presently to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. 3) Between 1940 and 1990, the number of nuclear weapons capable states had increased at the rate of one every 5 years. 4) Since 1986, US policy became increasingly one of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. 5) He wonders, however, if nuclear deterrence can be effective without nuclear weapons. In answer to my question about the importance of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), he said that he believed it to be very important, and if the US failed to ratify this treaty, then the rest of the world would not trust us. At no time during his talk did he address the apparently self-serving quality of current US efforts to "rid the world of nuclear weapons".

The next talk was by Marvin Adams of Texas A&M (formerly of LLNL, LANL and the JASONs) entitled "Confidence in nuclear weapons as numbers decrease and time since testing increases". MA is a buffed looking, carefully spoken, and studiedly reasonable guy. He waxed on, in a seemingly well-informed way, about the travails faced by the poor nuclear weapons labs as they struggle to perform their critical mission (whatever that is) in the face of the threat posed by reductions in the numbers of nukes in the US nuclear arsenal.

The last talk in this session was by Edward Levine a staff member of the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations entitled "Securing support from a skeptical Senate for further strategic arms controls". EL is a well-spoken Democratic Senate staffer who talked about the difficulty of getting reluctant Republican senators to agree to any controls on US nuclear weapons. During the question and answer period I asked him why he thought that the 3 present weapons Labs directors had publicly supported the Obama Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review, while 6-8 former weapons Labs directors had condemned it. He said that he believed that this was because the 3 present directors were all members of the new generation of Lab weapons physicists who were comfortable with Stockpile Stewardship whereas the former directors were members of the older generation, unfamiliar with SS. I said that I thought it more likely that the present directors, working as they did for an executive branch agency, felt themselves to be personally vulnerable and were circumspect in the expression of their opinions. He responded that he thought that this was a cynical point-of-view.

China Competes

2011-01-03T18:33:00.000-07:00

Yesterday the New York Times editorialized about the threat to US security being posed by China's recent improvements to the design of one of their intermediate range ballistic missiles. The NYT implied that this improved missile might pose a threat to US carrier battle groups prowling the waters of the western Pacific Ocean.

“Beijing’s drive to extend its military and territorial reach is making America’s close allies in the region nervous and raising legitimate questions about American diplomacy and future military procurement. The commander of America’s Pacific forces recently revealed that China could soon deploy a ballistic missile capable of threatening American aircraft carriers in the region.”

The Times also expressed concern about China's long-term naval strategy in the region.

“The Pentagon has a long history of hyping the Chinese threat to justify expensive weapons purchases, and sinking well-defended ships with ballistic missiles is notoriously hard. But what should rightly concern American military planners is not so much the missile but the new Chinese naval strategy behind it.”

“China seems increasingly intent on challenging United States naval supremacy in the Western Pacific. At the same time it is aggressively pressing its claims to disputed offshore islands in the East and South China Seas. Washington must respond, carefully but firmly.”

Therefore, said the Times editor, in order to better resist an apparent Chinese desire for more freedom-of-action in the western Pacific (its own backyard).

“The Pentagon must accelerate efforts to make American naval forces in Asia less vulnerable to Chinese missile threats by giving them the means to project their deterrent power from farther offshore.”

But, let's be reasonable, said the editor.

“The Obama administration must also redouble its diplomatic efforts to persuade Beijing that great power cooperation is far better than a costly and dangerous military rivalry. Dealing with a rising China could be Washington’s biggest challenge in the decades ahead. The United States has no interest in heightening tensions. A rapidly developing China has better uses for its new wealth than weapons. But when China pushes, as it is doing now, America needs to push back with a creative mix of diplomatic suppleness and military steadfastness.”

Hmm! Didn't the Times editor opine that: "A rapidly developing China has better uses for its new wealth than weapons." But, what about the US? Doesn't it have better uses for its wealth than weapons? Well, apparently not!

According to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute): During 2009, the US led the world in weapons expenditures, having paid out $663 billion in national wealth, present as well as future ( or 4.3% of GDP), at a annual rate of $2141 per capita. Somewhat amazingly, this American investment amounted to 43% of the total military expenditure for the entire world. The next largest military expenditure was indeed that of China, with $99 billion (2.0% of GDP), but at an annual rate of only $75 per capita. As a fraction of the total world military expenditure, the Chinese contribution was just 7%.

The Times editor suggested that China's "new" wealth might find a better use than military expenditures. But, in terms of a wealth of cultural experience, who's the real parvenu here? Modern Chinese culture extends back to the Xia dynasty of ~2000 BC, while American culture extends back to ... the Declaration of Independence of 1776? the first settlement at Jamestown in 1607? the founding of St. Augustine in 1565? Perhaps a better measure of the rate of military expenditure might be dollars spent annually, per year of accumulated cultural experience?

Anyway, what's the problem here? Is China just moving its shoulders around in order to gain more breathing space, while the US insists on continuing in its role of unrivaled hegemonic superpower? Or is it that China aspires to be a superpower, but at the expense of an all too well-meaning and altruistic America?

For more on this theme see: "The Big (Military) Taboo"

By Nicholas D. Kristof

NYT December 25, 2010

For a related lesson in real-politik see: "How to Stay Friends With China"

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

NYT January 2, 2011

America Vencedor! Obama Vencedor!

2010-12-22T20:17:00.018-07:00

Wednesday, 12-22-10, 3:00 PM EST/ The United States Senate ratified the New Start Treaty (strategic nuclear arms reduction treaty with the Russians) by a vote of 71 to 26; 13 Senate Republicans and all 58 Democrats voted in the affirmative. For those who missed today’s CSPAN-2 broadcast of the Senate hearing, here is my personal summary:

Initially, two amendments to the Treaty, offered by Republicans, were passed by unanimous consent of the Senate; these were in the nature of signing statements, and should not require that the Treaty be renegotiated with the Russians. (Yesterday, several other amendments to the text of the Treaty had been offered by the Republicans; but, these were all voted down by margins of 2 to 1.)

The accepted amendments were:

1) The Kyl amendment, which stipulates that the President should expedite funding for upgrades to the nuclear weapons laboratories. In particular, funding for the plutonium R&D facility (CMRR building) at LANL, and the enriched uranium R&D facility at ORNL should be expedited.

2) The Corker-McCain-Lieberman amendment, which stipulates that the Preamble to the Treaty is non-binding on the United States. In particular, the US will continue with development of its missile defense systems and such development will not be seen by the US as an acceptable reason for any future Russian withdrawal from the Treaty.

At this point, it was made clear by the majority leader Sen. Harry Reid, and the head of the Foreign Relations Committee Sen. John Kerry, that no further amendments would be allowed. Nevertheless, senators continued to expatiate regarding the Treaty.

Sen. Byron Dorgan (Dem. of South Dakota) pointed out that the federal budget for nuclear weapons R&D had increased by 10% a year, over the past two years, and that there was no reason to suspect that there had been any foot-dragging in this area by the Obama Administration. Dorgan also noted that architectural designs for the CMRR building at LANL were currently only 45% complete and, therefore, there was no reason to expedite funding for construction of that facility.

Sen. Jeff Sessions (Rep. of Alabama) spoke for 20 minutes about his fervent denunciation of the Treaty. Sessions said that "the Treaty would make the US less safe", and should be rejected by the Senate. He complained that:

1) The Treaty was a step on the road toward "President Obama's goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons", which was a "leftist goal" and a "dangerous fantasy".

2) The notion that the Treaty will make Russia "more cooperative" in its relations with the US was false. He stated that Russia had shown itself to be uninterested in cooperation with the US since it had blocked United Nations Security Council attempts to condemn North Korea and, in 2008, had attacked its neighbor Georgia.

3) The Obama Administration had "unilaterally given away US missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic", thus, showing itself to be "insufficiently committed to missile defense".

4) The US Senate should state clearly that the "goal of zero nuclear weapons is undesirable and even impossible".

5) "The goal of zero nuclear weapons is a cockamamy and dangerous idea".

6) "The idea of a world without nuclear weapons is ominous and chilling".

7) In the Nuclear Posture Review of this past spring, Pres. Obama made clear that "his goal is a world without nuclear weapons". However, ex-Sec. of Defense Schlesinger has said that he believes that "a world without nuclear weapons is a utopian idea".

8) "The maintenance of a large US arsenal of nuclear weapons is the best way to encourage the non-proliferation" of nuclear weapons. "If the US continues to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons in its arsenal, this will lead other nations, which don't now have nuclear weapons, to develop their own".

9) "The Obama Administration has made it clear that the New Start Treaty is a step on the road toward its goal of a world without nuclear weapons. But, to me this is not a dream, it's a nightmare!"

10) "By reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in its arsenal, the US is relinquishing its leadership role in the world."

Thus, the world according to a rosy-cheeked and smiling Sen. Jeff Sessions of Alabama.

Sen. Kay Hutchinson (Rep. of Texas) then spent 10 minutes talking about why she would vote to reject the Treaty:

1) The original Kyl amendment, and the original Corker amendment, which would have required renegotiation of the Treaty, and were rejected yesterday by the Senate, should have been approved.

2) An amendment by Sen. Inhofe aimed at stengthening the Treaty's verification regimen, which would have required Treaty renegotiation and which was also rejected, should have been approved.

3) The threat of attack on the US by nuclear tipped missiles from Iran, Venezuela, and North Korea is very worrisome, and should lead to the rejection of the Treaty, as written.

Sen. Dorgan spent 10 minutes rebutting the remarks of Sen. Sessions. He noted that the Treaty is not a unilateral statement of intent by the US to reduce the size of its nuclear weapons arsenal, but a schedule of reductions that had been negotiated with Russia. He mocked the idea that a world with fewer nuclear weapons is a more dangerous world. Rather, he said, that "the Treaty is a step on the road toward a less dangerous world".

Sen. Mark Kirk (Rep. of Illinois) took 10 minutes to talk about his beliefs that:

1) "While the present leadership of Russia is rational, and does not threaten the US by attack with nuclear weapons, the leadership of Iran and North Korea is irrational."

2) "It is the sacred mission of the democracies to maintain readiness to confront attacks with nuclear weapons by irrational states."

3) "The New Start Treaty limits our ability to develop missile defense and is, therefore, irrational".

4) "The Obama Administration has cancelled plans for missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, and has downgraded missile defense systems in Alaska".

5) "The Preamble to the Treaty was written to curry favor with the Russians".

6) "The Treaty's verification regimen is inadequate".

7) "Russia has fueled the Bushehr reactor in Iran, and will also supply an air-defense system to Iran".

8) "Mutual Assured Destruction is a strategy from the past which is inappropriate as a means of dealing with modern threats".

Sen. Kyl (Rep. of Arizona) spent 20 minutes talking about his reasons for advising that the Treaty be rejected, and complaining about the way in which Senate business was being conducted:

1) "The majority leader, has packed the Senate agenda in order to jam Republicans in the lame-duck session."

2) "Not enough time has been allowed for debate on the Treaty". "Republicans were not allowed to change language in the Treaty, thus, preventing them from exercising their advise and consent role."

3) "If the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is brought before the Senate next year, then that Treaty will be very closely examined."

4) "The most important issue confronting the US is that of non-proliferation, and not the sizes of the arsenals of the US and Russia."

5) "Another very important issue is how the US is going to modernize its arsenal of nuclear weapons."

6) "It is also very important that "the US continue to modernize each leg of the triad of its strategic nuclear weapon delivery system."

Sen. Kerry (Dem. of Massachusetts), head of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, devoted 10 minutes to summarizing the Treaty debate. He pointed out that:

1) "Disagreements over Treaty details should not dissuade senators from voting to ratify, since the Treaty is of utmost importance for national security, and for helping to move the world out from the dark shadow of the nuclear nightmare."

2) J. Robert Oppenheimer said that, in a world with nuclear weapons, "people must unite or perish".

3) Pope John Paul II said, while on a pilgrmage to Hiroshima, that "man, who wages war, can also make peace".

4) Sen. Daniel Webster of Massachusetts said, 150 years ago that, with respect to slavery, "he spoke not just as a man from Massachusetts, but as an American".

Sen. Lugar (Rep. of Indiana), ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, also spent 5 minutes summing up issues touched on during the Treaty debate:

1) "The original Start Treaty, negotiated under Pres. Reagan and signed by Pres. George H. W. Bush, was very successful in that it drastically reduced the numbers of nuclear weapons deployed on each side."

2) "The importance of such treaties is also in helping to build trust between the two sides".

3) "The Treaty would help to reduce future expenditures for nuclear weapons, a matter of especial importance now, as we are faced with such difficult long-term financial problems".

US Vice President, and President of the US Senate, Joe Biden, took the presiding officer's chair and called for a vote on the Treaty; ~30 minutes was consumed by the voting process, following which Biden declared that the Treaty had been ratified by a vote of 71 to 26.

As it turned out, members of the Kyl faction, made up loosely of Sens. Kyl, Cornyn, Inhofe, McCain, etc, voted unanimously to reject the Treaty, in spite of the Obama Administrations having offered them many incentives, in the form of more funding for upgrades to the US nuclear weapons complex. Nevertheless, 13 Republicans were counted among those who voted to ratify the Treaty. Those were: Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, George V. Voinovich of Ohio, Scott Brown of Massachusetts, Olympia J. Snowe and Susan Collins of Maine, Lamar Alexander and Bob Corker of Tennessee, Johnny Isakson of Georgia, Lisa Murkowski of Alaska, Thad Cochran of Mississippi, Bob Bennett of Utah, Judd Gregg of New Hampshire, and Mike Johanns of Nebraska.

According to a CNN/Opinion Research Corp. national poll released Tuesday, 73 % of respondents said that the Senate should ratify the Treaty, while 24 % said that it should be rejected. That is, Americans support ratification of the Treaty by a 3 to 1 majority.

As contentious as the ratification process has been, the Treaty itself mandates only a modest reduction in the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, and strategic delivery vehicles, by the United States and Russia; viz., from the present 2200 deployed weapons to 1550, and to a total of 700 delivery vehicles. A verification regimen is also stipulated by the Treaty.

However, many thousands of strategic nuclear weapons have been placed in storage by both sides, and large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons are also still deployed and remain in storage. Although none of these very dangerous assets have been considered by the Treaty, they may become the subject of some future negotiation. One imagines the world awaiting this future negotiation with bated breath.

Meanwhile, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continues to be problematic for President Obama. It does seem unlikely that Senate Republicans, soon to be reinforced by 6 new members, will allow that treaty to go forward during the remaining two years of this Administration. After all, this is a treaty which is much opposed by the nuclear weapons industry!

New Start Treaty Blocked by Republicans

2010-12-03T14:24:00.006-07:00

In recent weeks a controversy has erupted between supporters of the New Start Treaty and those opposed to the Treaty. The New Start Treaty is a negotiated agreement between the United States and Russia to continue with reductions in the size of the arsenals of nuclear weapons held by each side. It would renew a treaty (Start Treaty) which was proposed by Pres. Ronald Reagan in 1982, signed by Pres. George H. W. Bush in 1991, and entered into force in 1994.

The New Start Treaty has already been signed by Pres. Obama, but still must be ratified by the US Senate.

In the US, those who are advocating a "trust but verify" attitude towards the Russian nuclear weapons program, are being opposed by those who would promote a strategy of American "strength above all".

Advocates of the Treaty point to the importance of reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons being held in Russian and American arsenals, both as a means of limiting the danger of accidental nuclear war and as an important part of ongoing efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear weapon proliferation. They also point out that the Treaty continues with an essential regimen of mutual inspections of nuclear weapons sites.

Those who are opposed to the Treaty believe that it is generally disadvantageous for the United States to enter into arms control agreements with Russia, since Russia is by far the weaker power, both militarily and economically.

On the one hand is a group of Democrats led by Pres. Barack Obama. This group is supported by US Defense Sec. Gates and top brass in the Pentagon, by NATO member states and commanders, and by Russian President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin.

The opposition group is made up of Republican senators led by Jon Kyl of Arizona, and apparently by North Korean leaders and by Sigfried Hecker, a past Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Pres. Obama appears to believe that the New Start Treaty is an essential step along the road toward eventual world-wide nuclear disarmament. In this regard, he would say that it is not only necessary to continue to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons held in the arsenals of the US and Russia, and this in a matched and verifiable way, but also to continue to disincentivize attempts by presently non-nuclear states to develop their own nuclear weapons.

Sen. Kyl appears to feel that it is essential for the US to maintain a vast military superiority over Russia, and for this reason it is necessary to force from the US Congress guarantees of increased spending for the US nuclear weapons program. He also seems to be generally suspicious of any attempt to enter into arms control agreements with Russia.

Meanwhile, militaristic and paranoid North Korean leaders continue to grow their nuclear weapons program and to boast to the world about their accomplishments in this area. Recently, they invited American nuclear weapons expert Sig. Hecker to inspect their new uranium enrichment plant, which they proudly displayed to him. Having been duly impressed, Hecker returned to the US and launched into a media tour in which he presented himself as being astounded at the scale of the North Korean achievement. However, Hecker is a perennial advocate of more money for the American nuclear weapons program and the recent signatory of a letter criticizing American attempts to limit the size of developments to that program.

Nuke Enthusiasts Fight New Start Treaty

2010-11-21T17:29:00.000-07:00

The newspapers this morning are filled with reports and discussions of matters relating to the New Start Treaty:

The New York Times is running a William J Broad story about the Treaty, and its relation to controversy over upgrading of the US nuclear deterrent, with corresponding costly nuke building programs at the DOE/NNSA's nuke labs, especially LANL and ORNL, but also the Kansas City Plant. In order to entice a few Republican Treaty ratification votes, Pres. Obama is offering more money for nuke program upgrades, but the Republican point man on this issue, Sen. Jon Kyl, still says no.

The NYT runs a Maureen Dowd spoof of Pres. Obama's New Start Treaty political problems.

The NYT also runs a story about Sig Hecker's trip to N Korea, and his "discovery" there of a new facility for uranium enrichment.

The Los Angeles Times contains a more comprehensive story about Hecker's trip to N Korea, pointing out that he traveled with Jack Pritchard, a former US ambassador to S Korea, and a current publicist for S Korean interests. According to the LAT, both Hecker and Pritchard will shortly give a talk about their trip to the Korean Economic Institute, Pritchard's organization. They had both also just finished briefing the Institute for Science and International Security, a group focused on world-wide nuclear proliferation matters.

Hecker, a past director of LANL and a strong proponent of continuing the American nuclear weapons program, was a signatory to a May 2010 letter by 10 former nuke lab directors criticizing the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review. The former directors asserted that the NPR restricts the creative freedom of scientists and engineers who work at the nuke labs, thus denying the nation the full benefit of its nuclear weapons designers' expertise, and placing the nation at unnecessary risk of a possible future nuclear attack.

One wonders about the timing of the release of information about Hecker's latest visit to N Korea, and the effect that this information might have on the New Start Treaty ratification process.

Fate of New Start Treaty?

2010-11-12T01:10:00.000-07:00

Messieurs John Bolton and John Yoo, two former Bush administration stalwarts, reprised their fundamentalist approach to the formulation of US foreign and domestic policy, in a 11-10-10 Op Ed piece for the New York Times.

It is now clear, they said, that "Voters want government brought closer to the vision the framers outlined in the Constitution, and the first test could be the fate of the flawed New Start arms control treaty, which was signed by President Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev of Russia last spring but awaits ratification. The Senate should heed the will of the voters and either reject the treaty or amend it so that it doesn’t weaken our national defense."

They asserted further that: "New Start’s faults are legion. The low limits it would place on nuclear warheads ignore the enormous disparities between American and Russian global responsibilities and the importance of America’s 'nuclear umbrella' in maintaining international security."

They then opined: "To prevent New Start from gravely impairing America’s nuclear capacity, the Senate must .... demand changes to the treaty itself. .... Congress should pass a new law financing the testing and development of new warhead designs before approving New Start."

In support, they offered up a historical precedent: "All this is within the Senate’s powers. When it approved the Jay Treaty in the 1790s, which resolved outstanding disputes with Britain, the Senate consented only on condition that President George Washington delete a specific provision on trade. Washington and Britain agreed to the amendment, and the treaty entered into force."

Hence, we see here what may be the opening sally, from a cabal of nuclear stone-agers, in the about to be renewed struggle to ratify the New Start Treaty (nuclear arms control treaty between the US and Russia) in the US Senate.

A key player in this struggle may be Sen. Jon Kyl of Ariz., whose opposition to the treaty is well-known, although for months he has held out the possibility of a compromise. In particular, Kyl has appeared to pin his eventual "support for the treaty to a boost in funding to modernize the U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons", according to the Associated Press yesterday.

Perhaps the Administration hopes to turn Kyl's opposition into eventual support by offering up additional sweeteners; viz., in the form of guarantees of increased funding for the nuclear weapons program, or even by agreeing to proceed with the development of new nuclear weapons designs.

Of course, the Administration's Nuclear Posture Review of this past spring was explicit in its refusal to permit work on any new warhead designs. And, the current heads of the three nuclear weapons laboratories wrote letters in support of the NPR, albeit not without some grumbling.

For example, as reported by David Kramer in Physics Today, issue of July 24, 2010:
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) director Michael Anastasio told a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on 15 July that lab managers have "both the authority and the responsibility" to replace aging weapons components "on a case-by-case basis" if that is judged to be the best approach. While admitting he would prefer having no restrictions put on the labs’ options for extending warhead lifetimes, Anastasio said language in the administration’s April Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provides "an adequate level of flexibility to carry out our mission.”

Similarly, while expressing reservations, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory director George Miller pronounced the NPR restriction "workable," and said it "would permit his weapons designers to bring forward all the options for consideration."
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
However, a group of ten former heads of the three nuke labs were moved to denounce important parts of the NPR. In the same Physics Today story we find that:
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
In a May letter to Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, the 10 former directors said the NPR "imposes unnecessary constraints on our engineers and scientists when it states that 'the United States will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse’ and that the replacement of nuclear components ‘would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the President and approved by Congress.'”

The former lab directors warned that the "higher bar" set by the NPR for replacement of components will "stifle the creative and imaginative thinking that typifies the excellent
history of progress and development at the national laboratories, and indeed will inhibit the NPR’s goal of honing the specialized skills needed to sustain the current deterrent."
They added that the NPR restrictions will add to the risk that the country has taken on by not testing its nuclear weapons.

In their letter, the former directors also fretted that science, engineering, non-nuclear testing, and other laboratory programs will be starved to pay for cost overruns that have become inevitable during the construction of the facilities needed to clean up the Department of Energy’s cold war weapons production complex. And they warned that the administration’s budget projections for the construction of a multibillion-dollar plutonium research and pit production facility at LANL, and for a new uranium processing facility at Oak Ridge, TN, are inadequate.

“While we are encouraged by your commitments, we are deeply concerned that most of the significant investments promised are not available until the out-years of the plan," the directors wrote. "We are concerned, having received commitments of support before, that Congress and the President will once again promise a great deal today, and then quickly forget about the nuclear weapons enterprise until something breaks.”

Signing the letter were former LANL directors Harold Agnew, Siegfried Hecker, John Browne, Pete Nanos, Robert Kuckuck, and Donald Kerr; former LLNL directors John Nuckolls, John Foster, and Michael May; and former Sandia National Laboratory director C. Paul Robinson.

But Roy Schwitters, a physics professor at the University of Texas at Austin, told senators he disagreed with the former directors' statements, arguing that there are enough technical and scientific challenges within the scope of the NPR to provide opportunities for staffs to grow professionally. Schwitters chaired a sub-panel of JASON, the self-perpetuating scientific advisory committee, that last year reviewed the NNSA’s technical plan for extending the life of the stockpile. That review found no evidence that an accumulation of changes incurred from aging or from earlier life extension programs has increased the risk that deployed warheads won’t work as they’re supposed to. It also advised that the lifetimes of the weapons could be extended for decades with no loss in confidence. But Schwitters noted how one life extension program currently underway, the W-76 warhead for Trident missiles, actually employs a combination of refurbishment, reuse, and replacement.
……………………………………………………………………………………………………
So who's right and who's wrong here? Well, the "experts" seem to be divided along lines, at least partly, of self-interest. By this I mean that:

Out of self-interest, current nuke lab directors would be expected to accede, generally, to the administration's point-of-view. Thus, theirs is an unconvincing endorsement of the administration's position.

On the other hand, although former directors can more freely express themselves, they speak from an experience steeped in the culture of nuclear weapons design, and the interests of nuclear weapons designers. We will return to this point in an moment.

What about the opinions of Prof. Schwitters? Well, as a member of the JASON's, his views may be conditioned by connections both to the nuclear weapons industry and to the military and civilian political establishments, but in unknown proportions. Nevertheless, it would seem to be in the interests of a JASON for his judgment to appear to be unbiased and straightforward. So, after all, his view may be the most credible.

Finally, coming back to the ten former nuke lab directors, it is clear enough to me that their complaints were based upon parochial concerns.

For example, they warned that the NPR will "stifle the creative and imaginative thinking that typifies the excellent history of progress and development at the national laboratories, and indeed will inhibit the NPR’s goal of honing the specialized skills needed to sustain the current deterrent." But, the creative and imaginative thinking to which they referred could really only not be stifled if the goals of the nuclear weapons program themselves were not stifled. Such was the situation in the fifties and early sixties, at the height of the cold war, but no longer!

Moreover, they said that "the NPR restrictions will add to the risk that the country has taken on by not testing its nuclear weapons." Admittedly, such a risk would be difficult to quantify, or even estimate, but they've made no attempt whatsoever to do so. It seems to me that they were just fear-mongering.

Furthermore, as reported in Physics Today "the former directors also fretted that science, engineering, non-nuclear testing, and other laboratory programs will be starved to pay for cost overruns that have become inevitable during the construction of the facilities needed to clean up the Department of Energy’s cold war weapons production complex." But, the cleanup of toxic waste, accumulated from the nuclear weapons program over a period of more than fifty years, and now costing ~$6 billion annually, is necessary for the safety and well-being of all Americans. It does not seem to be a fitting subject for public lamentation by former nuke lab directors.

"And they warned that the administration’s budget projections for the construction of a multibillion-dollar plutonium research and pit production facility at LANL, and for a new uranium processing facility at Oak Ridge, TN, are inadequate." Indeed! The next phase of construction of the CMRR at Los Alamos is projected to cost in excess of $4 billion, with a similar amount slated for Oak Ridge. But, whether or not any of this new construction will actually ever serve the national interest is still an open question. It is clear, however, that the continuation of this project would be in the pecuniary interest of those who are wedded to ongoing nuclear weapons operations at Los Alamos, and Oak Ridge, and to the nuclear weapons industry, generally.

-----

Today, 11-18-10, I'm returning to this blogpost to take note of the latest development. Two days ago Sen. Kyl made clear that he is unwilling to proceed farther down the path toward ratification of the New Start Treaty, until the next Congress is seated, in January.

After all, I suppose, why should the Kyl group accept half a package of Treaty concessions from Pres. Obama now, when they might expect to get a full package by waiting just two more months? And, if they can't get the concessions that they want, then they could instead vote the Treaty down. Scuttling the Treaty would be in accord with the Kyl group notion that arms-control treaties between Russia and the United States act to limit the actions of the US, by far the stronger of the two parties, unnecessarily. Such treaties, they would argue, cannot be in the interest of the US.

It seems that the President must resort to the bully pulpit to explain clearly, and forcefully, to the entire nation, the importance of immediately ratifying the New Start Treaty.

Nukes Very Lucrative

2010-11-02T19:48:00.000-06:00

A recent article in the Los Alamos Monitor underlined the fact that New Mexico is currently number five among the 50 states in terms of per capita annual income recieved from the federal government. For every $1 in federal taxes paid by New Mexicans, Washington returns $2 to New Mexico.

Federal dollars come from the sources of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, as well as from the DOE's nuclear weapons activities in NM: viz., the approximately $4 billion spent in fiscal 2010, for work at LANL, SNL, and the WIPP site.

In and around Los Alamos County, local economies are particularly dependent on federal largess. However, in recent years, this largess has been skewing toward the most highly paid Lab managers.

In this context, consider this brief history:

In 2005, after the DOE had decided to end its sixty year-long UC/LANL connection, it issued a Request for Proposal to an eager group of would-be new contractors. Among these, M. Anastasio led a team of entrepreneurs backed by the well-heeled Bechtel in creating a successful bid for the new LANL contract. No neophyte he, for several years prior to that time Anastasio had been the Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).

Although partly selected by DOE for its promise to bring a new efficient management style to LANL, LANS-LLC is still a for-profit management group. It is not surprising then, that in the first year of the new contract at LANL (2006-2007), the new LANL Director took home a salary plus bonus of $1.25 million. This was approximately four times what the previous LANL Director had earned in his last year under the old UC contract.

In fiscal year 2009, LANS-LLC declared a profit from its management of LANL operations of $72 million. Legally, the Limited Liability Copmpany (LLC) is obliged to distribute, each year, all of its profits to its owner-managers.

(As an aside, in a somewhat memorable early 2006 presentation to staff of LANL's X-Division, the then X-Div Head, Paul Hommert, proclaimed that the new contract was being written in such a way as to ensure an increase in the number of managers and, therefore, an increase in the amount of money that many LANL employees could expect to be taking home, in the very near future. Immediately after the start of the new contract, Hommert, who was not a member of the new management team, was moved to a temporary post at UC Headquarters in San Francisco. Today, four years later, the perspicacious Hommert is the new President of Lockheed-Martin's Sandia Corporation, manager of Sandia National Laboratory (SNL), and the new Director of SNL. The previous President of the Sandia Corp. and SNL Director T. Hunter took home ~$1.75 million annually.)

In 2007, a similar process ensued at LLNL. The then LLNL Director, George Miller, led a team of manager entrepreneurs, again backed by Bechtel, calling themselves Lawrence Livermore National Security-LLC, who successfully bid for the new LLNL contract. On October 1, 2007, Miller became the new LLNL Director, under the new LLNS-LLC contract. Presumably, he too enjoyed a greatly increased pay package.

At about the same time, a team of nuclear weapons enthusiasts led by Stephen Younger, backed by Northrop-Grumman, and calling themselves National Security Technologies LLC, succeeded in winning a new contract from DOE for management of the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Younger had earlier been an Associate Laboratory Director at LANL, and was a past Director of the DOD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Thus, the nuclear weapons industry became much more remunerative for its managers, especially its senior managers. However, even some non-management personnel obtained substantial benefits. For example, when the contract changed at LANL from UC to LANS-LLC, in June 0f 2006, DOE gave all LANL employees the opportunity to retire as UC/LANL staff while continuing as new full-time LANS-LLC/LANL employees. Senior staff could draw full UC/LANL pensions, in some cases amounting to nearly 100% of their previous LANL salary, while continuing to collect their regular full-time LANS-LLC/LANL salaries. This was double-dipping with a vengeance.

CMRR Being Scrutinized

2010-10-30T17:45:00.000-06:00

NNSA hosted two public "scoping" meetings during the week of October 18, 2010, in northern New Mexico, in order to gather input on what should be studied in a new environmental impact statement for the CMRR facility.

The first meeting was held on Tuesday, October 19, at the White Rock Town Hall, 139 Longview Drive, in Los Alamos, the second on Wednesday, October 20, at the Cities of Gold Hotel in Pojoaque. Both meetings began at 4 PM and ended at 7 PM.

LANL employees had the right to participate, but their comments were to be submitted as private citizens rather than on behalf of the Lab.

Written comments could be submitted, by November 1, to:

Mr. John Tegtmeier
CMRR–NF SEIS Document Manager
U.S. Department of Energy
National Nuclear Security Administration, Los Alamos Site Office
3747 West Jemez Road
TA–3 Building 1410
Los Alamos, New Mexico, 87544

KL attended the Wednesday meeting, in which the first hour and one-half was devoted to poster presentations by NNSA staff. In these presentations, citizens were informed of the latest complications in the Nuclear Facility (NF) portion of the CMRR project. The projected cost of the NF, for which plans have not yet been completed, has now risen to beyond $4 billion. The next hour was occupied by public comment.

Approximately 20 comments were presented by local citizens. Of these, only one was pro-Lab and pro-weapons development; that was the comment by Mike Loya, owner-operator of a local construction company. After the public comment period, a representative from Senator Udall's office thanked the NNSA for hosting the meeting, pointedly stating that the Senator wanted it to be known that NNSA had hosted the meeting entirely on its own initiative.

Two weeks prior to these meetings, however, on October 6, 2010, a hearing had been held in Los Alamos, at the Hilltop House, at which local citizens also discussed with NNSA officials matters of concern relating to the CMRR project. This was the second hearing on this topic to be held this year. Such biannual hearings have been going on since March, 2006, and are a part of a court facilitated agreement between local citizens groups and NNSA. At these hearings, NNSA is legally obliged to engage with local citizens.

Neither these two meetings, nor this hearing, were well-publicized.

WIPP Permit Hearing Summary

2010-08-13T20:00:00.000-06:00

Monday, August 9, 2010, 9:00 AM; WIPP Permit Renewal Hearing began in the "Board Room" at Santa Fe Community College. It was expected to run for two days.

Thirteen "principals" were seated at the front table: these were, from left to right viewing from the front: Joseph Alarid, the Hearing Officer, a retired NM State Court Judge; Don Hancock, of Southwest Research Information Center (SRIC); Scott Kovacs, of Nuclear Watch New Mexico (NWNM); Cristopher Timm, of Pecos Management Services (PMS); Mr. ?, a DOE lawyer on-site at WIPP; Mr. ?, Mr. Woodward, and Mr. Head, three Texas lawyers contracting services to WIPP; Mr. ?, a Washington TRU Solutions (WTS) lawyer on-site at WIPP; Mr. Bearzi, Chief of NMED/HWB; Lindsay Lovejoy, a Santa Fe lawyer contracting services to NMED/HWB; Steve Zappe, an NMED/HWB manager assigned to WIPP business; Ms. ?, a NMED staff lawyer assisting Mr. Zappe.

The first witness to be sworn was WIPP's Robert Kerman, manager and engineer, who remarked as follows:

A controversy has grown up between WIPP and NMED/HWB regarding the maximum allowable values for the concentrations of certain Volatile Organic Contaminants (VOCs) in the air circulating in particular underground spaces at the WIPP-site. A VOC of special concern has been CCl4, a recognized carcinogen and volatile solvent copiously emitted by containerized mixed TRU waste; i.e., waste sent to WIPP for storage from other DOE sites. Evidently, TRU waste containers have not been "air-tight", and solvent-contaminated materials inside these containers have out-gassed into underground storage spaces at WIPP.

Although the WIPP ventilation system has filtered the contaminated air circulating in the underground spaces, thereby removing some of the contamination, air vented into the open atmosphere above the WIPP-site was still found to have been impure. Thus, emissions from the ventilation system, contaminated by CCl4 to some measurable degree, have been free to circulate around and diffuse into the air being breathed by the nearby residents of Carlsbad, NM.
It has then been a technical exercise for WIPP and NMED engineers to estimate the health risk posed to local residents by the average levels of CCl4 in their air. The standard applied stipulated that the risk to the surrounding population due to all VOCs (not just CCl4) emitted from WIPP should not exceed one excess cancer death per 100,000 individuals. Needless to say, however, any such estimation of risk would be very uncertain, and any translation of such estimated risk into a value for the maximum allowable concentration of a particular VOC in the underground spaces would be even more uncertain.

Nevertheless, acting as if the connection between the concentrations of a suite of VOCs in the underground, and the estimated risk to local populations due to these VOCs was well-understood and precise, WIPP managers such as Mr. Kerman, and WIPP lawyers such as Mr. Woodward, argued that WIPP should be permitted to allow VOC concentrations in the underground to rise to levels such that estimations of excess cancer deaths in local populations would be exactly 1.00 death per 100,000, and not some slightly smaller number, say 0.75 deaths per 100,000.

Moreover, the estimate of 1.00 excess cancer deaths per 100,000 persons was to be applied to a time-dependent mixture of VOCs in the underground spaces, the hazard due to each one of these VOCs carrying with it its own significant degree of uncertainty. It seems that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in accordance with the best evidence available, stipulates a maximum tolerable risk for each VOC. But, this number is itself a moving target. And, in fact, the EPA recently changed its value of the tolerable risk due to chronic exposure to CCl4 in air, reducing this by a factor of 2.5. WIPP engineers translated this reduced risk factor into an increased value for the maximum allowable concentration of CCl4 in underground air, multiplying the previous value of 165 ppbv by 2.5 to obtain a new value of 412.5 ppbv.

Being prodded by NMED/HWB's lawyer Lovejoy to clearly explain how this change could be justified, WIPP managers and lawyers responded with two days of obfuscation.

The second witness to be sworn was WIPP manager John Garcia, who presented viewgraphs describing the processing of Contact Handled (CH) and Remote Handled (RH) waste at WIPP; e.g., from acceptance of the waste at the facility entrance to its emplacement into permanent underground storage. He mentioned that a provision for the establishment of a temporary overflow, or "surge", storage space at WIPP had been agreed upon by WIPP management and NMED in the past, and that such an overflow space had now been created. However, this space had not yet been used. Under cross-examination by Mr. Hancock, it was revealed that no waste-streams were anticipated for the future which would necessitate the use of surge storage. However, both Mr. Garcia and Mr. Kerman defended the maintainence of surge space as being an example of "just good management practice."

At 2:15 PM the Hearing was adjourned until 9:00 AM tomorrow.

Tuesday, August 10, 2010, 9:00 AM; the Hearing resumed. James Bearzi, NMED/HWB Chief, was sworn in as the first witness for NMED. He began by talking about public participation in the regulatory process. Specifically, NMED is now requiring of WIPP that it create an electronic information repository to inform the general public about those parts of WIPP business that are regulated by NMED/HWB. He said that WIPP is being encouraged to work with members of the general public in order to ensure that this repository truly serves the public; to this effect, WIPP should devise and implement a public communications plan. Mr. Bearzi then talked briefly about: a) a perceived WTS conflict-of-interest; b) "acceptable knowledge" criteria conditioning NMED's willingness to forego radiography and/or chemical testing aimed at detecting prohibited items within containers shipped to WIPP.

The next witness to be sworn was Steve Zappe, a NMED/HWB manager. Mr. Zappe spoke for ~2 hrs about 11 matters of concern to NMED. A significant portion of this time was spent talking, inconclusively, about the increase in the allowed concentration of CCl4 in the underground spaces by a factor of 2.5. Cross-examination of the witness then extended for ~1 hr. Apparently, no new issues were raised.

Following a lunch break, at 1:00 PM, a period was allowed for public comment. The first commenter was NM State Rep. John Heaton, from Carlsbad, NM. Mr. Heaton talked about the joy of ownership that he and the citizens of Carlsbad feel when they contemplate the presence of the WIPP dumpsite in their neighborhood. Hr. Heaton was followed by Linda Borrego, another Carlsbad resident. She may have outdone Mr. Heaton in her enthusiastic support for the dumping of radioactive waste at WIPP; waste that was being dumped in close proximity to her home and to her children. She spoke earnestly about her feelings of complete safety, and about the great importance of WIPP to the local economy.

At 1:10 PM public comments ended. Next, PMS presented its testimony, offered by Jerry Fox, followed by Cris Timm. These two worthies advise NMED/HWB as it moves through the Permit renewal process. Their presentation seemed shaky, appearing to suffer from a lack of familiarity with the Hearing process itself. Nevertheless, a central feature of their testimony referred to their belief that the draft Permit showed some "inconsistencies", and they considered these inconsistencies to be a significant failing. During cross-examination, their view was vehemently contested by Mr. Head, a WIPP contract lawyer. Mr. Head, in an apparent effort to cow the PMS witnesses, even referred to the 13 individuals seated at the front table as "The Tribunal"; as in, "Do you mean to suggest to this tribunal that ... ?" Mr. Timm, perhaps chastened, allowed that PMS supported the draft Permit, as a whole, but had a few suggestions for improvements.

At 2:40 PM Mr. Bearzi presented rebuttal to Ms. Joni Arends written opinion that the draft Permit had no provision for any public appeal of certain "fee-payment structures". Mr. Bearzi disagreed.

At 2:45 PM a recess was declared. At 3:30 PM the Hearing resumed and Mr. Kerman presented rebuttal to the widely expressed view that WIPP's multiplication of the maximum allowed concentration of CCl4 in underground air by a factor of 2.5 may have been unfounded. Mr. Kerman presented the summary of a WIPP calculation which, he claimed, supported their procedure, and attempted to place it into evidence. Much disputation ensued; the Hearing Officer finally ruled that the rebuttal was improper and the calculation summary could not be placed in evidence, but that it could be entered into the Hearing record as a comment. He said that as he later wrote up his Hearing recommendations he would pay attention equally to evidence and to comment.

At 4:20 PM the Hearing adjourned until 6:00 PM, when public comment would be again invited.

[I have blogged previously about the "WIPP Hazardous Waste Permit Renewal Process." (Blogdate: Sunday, May 23, 2010.) "The draft Permit includes several conditions that are newly imposed on WIPP but have been included in other hazardous waste facility permits issued by NMED; viz., 1) Community relations plan; 2) information repository; 3) minimization of future waste volume."]

Hiroshima Commemorative

2010-08-06T11:30:00.000-06:00

For the first time, today, on the 65th anniversary of the catastrophe at Hiroshima, representatives of the United States government attended commemorative ceremonies being held at Peace Park, in Hiroshima. John Roos, current U. S. ambassador to Japan, deposited a wreath "in memory of all of the victims of WW II." His presence in Hiroshima may have reflected the support that U. S. President Barack Obama has shown for world-wide nuclear disarmament; i. e., Roos said that it would be "for the good of future generations if we continued working together to create a world free of nuclear weapons." Also, for the first time, England and France sent representatives to these well-known annual ceremonies. [As reported today by much of the international press.]

Both the Hiroshima bomb (Little-Boy) and the bomb dropped three days later on Nagasaki (Fat-Man) were designed, during a hectic two-year period, at the top-secret military R&D facility set up at Los Alamos, NM, in early 1943. This facility, known today as Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) has grown and operated continuously for the last 67 years. For more than half a century, technical staff at LANL have designed, and conducted R&D on processes important to the design of, a large number of nuclear and thermonuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Today several of these designs account for approximately half of the thousands of WMD still being deployed (for immediate action) and stored (for future use) by the USA.
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As a related matter, the New York Times noted on Aug. 3, 2010 that: Ratification of the New Start Treaty, signed at Prague on April 8, 2010 by United States President Barack Obama and President of the Russian Federation Dimitri Medvedev, is stalling in the U. S. Senate. At Republican request, further consideration of the Treaty has been delayed by Senate Armed Services Committee Chair, Sen. John Kerry, until Sept. 15 or 16. Later still, a vote of the full Senate will require at least 8 Republican yes votes to reach the 2/3 vote needed for Treaty approval. Meanwhile, advocates for more and better nuclear weapons, combined with fewer constraints on U. S. nuclear weapons policy, work to promote a no vote; viz., Sen. Jon Kyl (Repub., Ariz.), Sen. Larry Inhofe (Repub., Okla.), and Sen. Jim DeMint (Repub., S. Car.) Evidently, any attempt by the Obama Administration to bring the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to a vote in the Senate will now be delayed until after the November election.
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On Monday, Aug. 9, 2010, at 9:00 AM, the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED) begins a public hearing at the Santa Fe Community College, in Santa Fe, NM. The hearing will explore issues related to the proposed granting, by NMED, of a new Hazardous Waste Permit for continuing operations of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, NM. NMED first granted a Permit to WIPP in 1999 so that this new Permit, if granted, will be in the nature of a renewal, with modifications. WIPP has been charged by the United States Congress to store permanently, in an underground repository, so-called TRansUranic (TRU) waste. This is a part of the waste accumulated, over the last 67 years, from the U. S. nuclear weapons program. Such waste is largely still stored at the DOE's nuclear weapons laboratories and production facilities, located all around the continental United States.

Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future a Mixed Bag.

2010-07-14T13:52:00.000-06:00

July 12, 2010: The DOE's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, Reactor and Fuel Cycle Subcommittee, held a public meeting today at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL), in Idaho Falls, ID.

The meeting was co-chaired by Prof. Per Peterson, from UC Berkeley's Dept. of Nuclear Eng., and ex-United States Senator Pete Domenici, from New Mexico. Its start was delayed for two hours, until 10:30 AM, because of a local electrical power failure.

Six formal talks had been scheduled for the day, ranging from the first, "Nuclear Energy R&D Roadmap Overview", by the DOE's Ass't Sec., Office of Nuclear Energy, Warren "Pete" Miller, to the last, "Transmutation R&D", by ANL's Bob Hill. A live video webcast was provided for internet viewers. Viewgraph summaries of all the talks are available online at www.brc.gov/RFCT_Subcommittee.html. The Blue Ribbon Commission is sponsoring two other subcommittees; viz., Disposal Subcommittee, which met publicly on July 7, 2010 in Washington, DC; Transportation Storage Subcommittee, which has not yet scheduled a public meeting.

In contrast to talks presented five days ago at the Disposal Subcommittee, talks today at the Reactor and Fuel Cycle Subcommittee meeting were entirely technical in content. The absence of any socially relevant content from these talks was remarked upon approvingly by several private citizens during the Public Comment Period. It was even suggested by more than one commenter that the most important issues of nuclear power in America today were technical or scientific in nature; that the desirability of nuclear power as a future energy source was now a settled question, with an overwhelming majority of US citizens having a positive view; and that any attempts to mix "political" concerns into future discussions of nuclear power in America should be resisted.

Of course, opinions such as these are themselves political in nature.

Then, politics coming again to the fore, in the final moments of the meeting ex-Senator Domenici remarked that the talks which had just been presented were testament to the high quality of work being performed today by certain [for-profit] groups and .... (partly inaudible) [evidence that today's for-profit DOE management contractors were vastly superior to yesterday's not-for-profits.]
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More interesting to me were the presentations made five days ago at the Disposal Subcommittee meeting; viz., www.brc.gov/Disposal_Subcommittee.html. Approximately three quarters of those talks were given by representatives of local government entities, either in Nevada or New Mexico. Typical of these presenters was John Gervers, Consultant to Clark County, Nevada's Nuclear Waste Division. Mr. Gervers said:

"While good science and technical proficiency are the keys to successful development of a nuclear waste disposal system, the siting of a nuclear waste facility depends equally on public confidence in the safety of the facility and the competence of the managing agency. Technical expertise cannot substitute for lack of public confidence. Both are essential components of a nuclear waste disposal system, and require equal attention from policymakers, planners and implementers of such a system. The key lesson to be learned from the Nevada experience is that public acceptance of a siting process is an essential ingredient for success of any nuclear waste storage or disposal system."

"There are three elements of a successful relationship with a potential host community.
1. Respect for the concerns of the community
2. Acknowledgement of the potential health and safety risks of the facility
3. Acknowledgement of the potential economic risks or benefits from the facility"

"Surveys by the State of Nevada and Clark County have consistently revealed that over 70 percent of Nevada citizens are opposed to the siting of a nuclear waste facility at Yucca Mountain."

These words of Mr. Gervers are a cogent expression of a point-of-view which holds that the public must be fully involved in the making of future decisions relating to the siting of nuclear waste disposal facilities. It seems to me that there is also no good reason why the public should not be more involved in making key decisions about the future of nuclear power in America, generally. Such socially relevant considerations were absent, however, from the meeting in Idaho Falls, on July 12.

LANL Licks More NWT Lolly

2010-06-18T18:32:00.000-06:00

It's a predilection built upon habit as Los Alamos National Laboratory continues to devote itself to the R&D of Nuclear Weapons Technology. The NWT lolly is hard to resist for many, if not most, of those fortunate enough to qualify for a LANL job. Indeed, the lure of work at LANL brings technical staff to New Mexico from all over the United States, while the citizens of Northern New Mexico have become stuck on the generous pay checks that DOE/LANL supplies.

The game is about to become still more lucrative. The Santa Fe New Mexican reported on June 15, 2010 that LANL expects to hire ~1000 new employees to build and staff the next, and largest, phase of the Chemical, Metallurgical & Radiological Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF); the construction cost alone is expected to rise to several billion dollars. Presently, LANL employees number over 11,000.

As NM State Senator Jeanette Wallace, R-Los Alamos County, is reported to have said: "The economic impact of the work will spread beyond the local community. This is good not just for Los Alamos but for all of Northern New Mexico. We need the jobs, especially in the economy as down as it is right now."

LANL Deputy Director Isaac Richardson asserted that the existing building (CMR) is from the 1950s and needs to be updated. "If we were to not build this building, we would not be able to attract the talent to do all the other things we need to do at LANL," he said.

Of course, the CMRR-NF Facility is an integral part of DOE/NNSA's grand scheme for the future of the United States Nuclear Weapons Complex; e.g., according to which, LANL will become the national center for plutonium R&D, as well as the sole site for plutonium pit production.

There is still much controversy about this reorganization of the NW Complex, and it is uncertain to what extent Congress will continue to fund the program. See the recent article entitled, "Bunker mentality: Is NNSA digging itself into a hole at Los Alamos?" by Greg Mello, dated 26 May, 2010, in The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists.

As Mello says: "CMRR-NF is a highly complex and utterly unique project. Preliminary design has taken seven years so far and isn't done. The U.S. has not successfully built a plutonium facility since 1978, when PF-4 opened its doors [at LANL]. An attempt to do so at Rocky Flats in the mid-1980s failed spectacularly. Despite all this, despite NNSA's poor project management record, and despite what appears to be a lack of convincing mission need, CMRR-NF is being managed as a concurrent design-build project. Under that approach, between one-half and $1 billion will have been spent on the project before preliminary design, cost estimates, and schedules have been completed."

"Pyrrhic design: The 270,000-square-foot CMRR-NF would add only 22,500-square-feet of additional plutonium processing and lab space to LANL's existing 59,600-square-feet of comparable space in PF-4, a 38 percent increase. The new labs would comprise just 8 percent of the CMRR-NF floor area. Most of the building would be occupied by utilities, ventilation, safety equipment, and by the heavy structure itself."

"The current cost of CMRR-NF lab space works out to $151,000 per square foot, or $1,049 per square inch. PF-4 cost $75 million to build in 1978 ($213 million in 2009 construction dollars). Thus, in constant dollars, CMRR-NF lab space would cost 42 times as much as LANL's existing plutonium labs did, assuming costs do not increase further."

"If you find yourself in a hole, stop digging. For the past few years, the CMRR-NF project has struggled to adequately respond to 'new' seismic and safety issues. Actually, these issues were appreciated by NNSA senior management from the beginning of the project to some degree, but they were not officially accepted as applicable. LANL is underlain by a fault system that has produced three earthquakes measuring 6.5 to 7.0 on the Richter scale in the last 11,000 years. These 'new' seismic issues, along with requirements for so-called safety-class ventilation equipment that was also not initially accepted by LANL, have dramatically increased CMRR costs and are not yet fully resolved."

Meanwhile, the situation for science at LANL is not improving. As reported in the June, 2010 issue of the American Physical Society News, under the heading, "It’s a Bumpy Ride to Private Management at Los Alamos and Livermore" by Michael Lucibella and Alaina G. Levine:

"When the management of the historic Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was transferred from the University of California to two private companies [in 2006 and 2007, respectively], many officials hailed the move as the turning over of a new leaf for the Labs. The goal of the transfer was to introduce private sector accountability into a management system seen by many in Congress and the Department of Energy as broken. However four years on, costs have swelled, red tape endures, and questions persist as to whether the transfer has benefited the Labs in the long run."

“'When I heard a company was going to run (LANL), I thought they would do it efficiently. I thought it would be good for us,' said a long-time member of the technical staff of LANL. 'But it used to be that science drove this place and everyone knew it…Now that’s gone.'”

"Interviews with current and former employees of both laboratories show shared concerns that since the facilities have become managed by a for-profit entity, science is no longer the top priority; rather, the emphasis is on generating profits through a climate of intense risk aversion. Many of those who still work with the Lab have asked to remain anonymous because of concerns of repercussions from their employers."

"One of the Lab’s former directors said that the system of governance at LANL in particular was broken in 1997 and since then has become more so. Siegfried S. Hecker served as the Director of LANL from 1986 to 1997 and is currently a research professor in the Department of Management Science and Engineering, and the co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. He said the excessive security concerns, the creation of an extra level of bureaucracy, the National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA), and the fact that the contract to run the lab was given to a for-profit entity, all led to the greater emphasis on risk avoidance."

“'It was difficult to get work done in 1997, and now it’s simply so difficult to get work done that it gets difficult to attract the best and brightest to the facility,' he said, 'It’s gone downhill for some time and we failed to fix it with the creation of the NNSA and the new management structure.' He added that people are now more afraid to make mistakes, contributing to the difficulty of conducting scientific work."

But then, the R&D of Nuclear Weapons Technology may not really be science at all.

WIPP's Future Unsure

2010-06-16T13:25:00.000-06:00

As the period for public comment winds down on NMED's proposed renewal Permit for the WIPP site (the last day of the comment period is June 28, 2010), it may be of interest to recall that the United States Government is now also contemplating a future expansion of both WIPP's size and WIPP's mandate. The following material is related to this potentially unsettling (for citizens of New Mexico) topic:

Excerpted from, "Advice for the Blue Ribbon Commission"
By Robert Alvarez | The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists | 24 March 2010

"President Barack Obama's Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future will have its first meeting this week. The commission, formed after Obama cancelled the Yucca Mountain spent nuclear fuel repository in January, is tasked with rebooting the country's five-decade-plus effort to manage its high-level radioactive waste."

"The 15-member commission includes representatives from industry, government, and academia and is co-chaired by former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft and former Indiana Democratic Cong. Lee Hamilton. It's scheduled to provide interim recommendations in 18 months and a final report within the next 24 months. It will review the government's management of the nuclear fuel cycle and consider all alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of used nuclear fuel, high-level waste, and materials derived from nuclear activities."

[One such problematic issue is that of the disposition of high-level military waste.] "Since World War II, the production of plutonium and other nuclear material has generated about 100 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste that is stored in 237 gigantic underground tanks in South Carolina, Washington, Idaho, and New York. In 1985 the government mandated that such wastes be commingled and stored with civilian spent fuel at Yucca Mountain. With Yucca closed, community and political leaders near Washington's Hanford and South Carolina's Savannah River nuclear weapon sites are now suing to reopen Yucca and force the government to take the material. There is growing interest in placing the waste in the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP), a geologic disposal site in a salt formation near Carlsbad, New Mexico that opened in 1998 for plutonium-contaminated military waste. Predictably, New Mexico's elected officials are not supportive of the idea."

"Despite local political opposition, there may be merit to exploring the potential for defense high-level waste disposal at WIPP. Unlike commercial spent fuel, more than 98 percent of the long-lived radioactive material in defense wastes, such as plutonium, has been removed. It's also roughly 10 times less radioactive and thus produces less decay heat than commercial reactor spent fuel--an important factor because decay heat can corrode waste containers and impact the geological stability of the site. That said, more research is necessary to determine if placing wastes in WIPP is a viable option."

Opinion Published in Albuquerque Journal | April 08, 2010

"WIPP Not a 'Storage' Place"
By Ron Curry, Cabinet Secretary, New Mexico Environment Department

"In response to the editorial in your paper on March 30, 'Time Right To Look at WIPP for Greater Uses,' we assert that New Mexico, more than any other state, has done its part in disposing of our nation's nuclear waste. But, changing the mission at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant near Carlsbad by allowing high level nuclear waste at the site runs contrary to the federal government's promise to New Mexicans more than a decade ago. That promise was that the facility should dispose only of transuranic waste created by production of nuclear weapons. But, permanent disposal of the nation's nuclear waste is a national issue and the responsibility for such disposal should not be placed solely on our state."

"The editorial mentions that a federal Blue Ribbon Commission is tasked with recommending to the Department of Energy solutions for nuclear waste disposal. This commission's purpose, stated in its charter, is not to recommend locations for disposal. Although former Sen. Domenici agrees with that and states he is not advocating for any location, it is clear where he stands on this issue when he offers that "field hearings" be held at WIPP. If field hearings are conducted at WIPP, shouldn't they also be held at locations where defense-related nuclear waste was created — such as Hanford in Washington and Savannah River in South Carolina — and at commercial nuclear power plants?"

"WIPP is not a ‘storage’ site. WIPP is in fact a disposal site, and disposal is forever. However, some of the high-level waste under consideration by the commission might be more amenable to a non-permanent ‘storage’ option. For example, the solution for spent nuclear fuel must include the ability to retrieve and potentially reprocess that source, if that is the direction the United States pursues. Under that scenario, dry-cask storage at sites where waste is created may be a reasonable alternative to ‘storage’ in a repository. Options for high level waste, on the other hand, must consider permanent disposal with no intent of retrieval."

"The editorial claims that 'it's time for scientific research to have the upper hand over political considerations.' We believe science and the will of the people must be considered equally. Further, we don't agree that nuclear power necessarily weans us from foreign energy interests. The main nuclear power consortium that builds most plants worldwide is a French state-supported company with a long history of cost and schedule overruns."

WIPP Hazardous Waste Permit Renewal Process

2010-05-23T17:10:00.000-06:00

As of April 27, 2010 a two-month period began for public comment on renewal of the WIPP Hazardous Waste Permit, recently proposed and issued in draft form by HWB/NMED. When finalized, the renewed Permit will allow for lawful continuation by the WIPP site, for a period of ten years, of the acceptance and storage of mixed chemical and transuranic (TRU) wastes, resulting from the DOE's nuclear weapons program.

Documents relating to the renewal process may be found on NMED's public website. Among these documents is a copy of the proposed renewal Permit and a WIPP Fact Sheet describing the Permit history, as well as a summary of the points at which the proposed renewal Permit differs from the previous version. These differences are partly the result of Permittee requests, and partly owing to NMED's desire for consistency. According to NMED:

"The draft Permit includes several conditions that are newly imposed on WIPP, but have been included in other hazardous waste facility Permits issued by NMED."

1) "Community Relations Plan: The draft Permit directs the Permittees to establish and carry out a community relations plan to inform the nearby communities and members of the public of permit-related activities. In addition, the plan will give these entities a means to give feedback and input to the Permittees and will seek to minimize disputes and resolve differences between the Permittees and interested parties."

2) "Information Repository: The draft Permit requires the Permittees to establish an information repository (IR) containing specific documents concerning the issuance and operation of the Permit. The Department requires that the IR be located either as a virtual or electronic repository, at a physical location, or both. The Department considers an electronic IR available through the internet to be more readily accessible and therefore more utilized. The Department considers the requirement to include particular documents in an electronic IR to be easier to enforce because the Department can access an internet based repository at any time. The Department’s experience with physical IRs is that they are often incomplete and that they create a burden on third parties to ensure that documents are not removed or altered. The Department encourages the Permittees to collaborate with interested parties to determine an effective and reasonable IR. In any event, the Department maintains a physical copy of information in the IR in its Administrative Record."

3) "Waste minimization: The draft Permit requires a waste minimization program to
reduce the volume and toxicity of hazardous wastes generated at WIPP. The regulations at 40 CFR §264.73(b)(9) require an annual certification by the Permittees that they have in place a program to reduce the volume and toxicity of hazardous waste generated. In this section the Department has included specific program requirements to make the condition enforceable and protective. EPA is encouraging states to enforce the waste minimization requirements at 40 CFR §264.73(b)(9). These requirements were previously contained in Module VII. The Department requires that the waste minimization program be a forward looking document for planning purposes to integrate the waste minimization program into WIPP’s operating principles."

Of particular interest here is NMED's new requirement (2) for WIPP to establish an "information repository", in electronic and/or physical form, "containing specific documents concerning the issuance and operation of the Permit". This is similar to what will likely be required of NNSA/LANS, in the soon to be issued Hazardous Waste Permit, for operations conducted at LANL.

In the recently concluded Hearing, in which issues relating to that new Permit were extensively discussed, Mr. Bearzi, the HWB/NMED head, allowed that the establishment of an information repository would be required of NNSA/LANS, but only if such would be authorized by NMED’s Secretary Ron Curry.

Citizens groups have asked that a physical information repository, reflecting issues relating to the Hazardous Waste Permit for LANL, be set up at Northern New Mexico College (NNMC). NNMC will soon also be the home of the RACER data project. RACER is a vehicle for bringing precise information relating to the detection and characterization of environmental contaminants, resulting from LANL operations, to the general public.

Open Burning at TA-16: What's Up With That?

2010-05-03T14:31:00.000-06:00

The Hazardous Waste Permit Hearing, underway for the last two weeks in venues all around northern New Mexico, was held on Friday, April 23, 2010, in Los Alamos on the campus of UNM-LA. To date, the Hearing has featured several issues of compelling interest to: 1) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), its owner, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and its present management contractor, Los Alamos National Security - Limited Liability Company (LANS); 2) the Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB), an arm of the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED); 3) a coalition of citizens’ activist groups led by Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety (CCNS).

One such issue has been the question of whether or not HWB/NMED would grant a permit to NNSA/LANS to continue the Open Burning (OB) of explosives residues at TA-16. Evidently, the OB of explosives residues has been a common practice at LANL, dating back to the 1940’s.

The citizens’ groups have contended that OB, as practiced at TA-16, is unsafe to human health and to the environment. It appears to this observer that some evidence of this has been presented at the Hearing, during the last two weeks, albeit small. Also, NMED has seemed to me to be impressed by this evidence, although just barely. Nevertheless, NMED had proposed, prior to the Hearing, to deny the OB permit for TA-16. This had been, they said, principally because of the volume of citizens’ protests they had received about this matter.

NNSA/LANS has been fighting back. Prior to the Hearing they induced both the Española City Council and the Rio Arriba Board of County Commissioners to write letters about OB operations at TA-16. These letters, available for perusal on NMED’s public website, are supportive of NNSA/LANS operations, generally, and of Open Burning at TA-16, in particular. Interestingly, in both of these letters, patriotic themes are struck with much vigor.

Indeed, patriotic themes were also struck resoundingly at the Hearing on Friday by LANS managers and by private citizens making public statements supportive of NNSA/LANS and its OB practices at TA-16.

It is often fruitless to speculate about motivations. Nevertheless, one is inclined to wonder about what is driving this campaign of NNSA/LANS to “have its way” at TA-16. Could it be that there is more going on at TA-16 than meets the eye? Why have LANS managers maintained so doggedly that there are no materials contaminated by dioxins and furans being burned at TA-16? No one from either NMED or the citizens’ groups has claimed otherwise. And why have NNSA bosses stated so emphatically that there are no materials contaminated by radioactive substances being burned at TA-16? None of the other parties at this Hearing has even hinted that this was so. No one, that is, but Joni Arends of CCNS who, on Friday, when queried by LANS staff if she would like to go on a guided tour of TA-16 asked, “can I bring my radiation detector?”

Comment Presented at Haz. Waste Permit Hearing

2010-04-17T09:45:00.000-06:00

This comment was was presented at the NMED/LANL Hazardous Waste Permit Hearing, held on Friday, April 16, 2010 in the Pojoaque Cities of Gold Hotel Conference Center. The Hearing was then in its tenth full day.

I am a PhD physicist, retired for the last four years, following twenty years of employment at Los Alamos National Laboratory, in the Applied Physics Division (X-Division). Prior to my LANL years, I worked for seven years as a Research Associate Professor of physics at the University of Connecticut. I have lived in Española, NM for seventeen years.

During the past two years I volunteered my time to the DOE’s Northern New Mexico Citizens Advisory Board (NNMCAB), where I became familiar with issues concerning hazardous waste generation, storage, and treatment at LANL. While with the NNMCAB I also learned about the sometimes difficult relations between the present regulator, the Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB), an arm of the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED), and LANL’s present owner, the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), as well as LANL’s current management contractor, Los Alamos National Security Limited Liability Company (LANS-LLC). I also learned about the role played in these relations by local citizens groups such as Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety (CCNS), Nuclear Watch of Northern New Mexico (NWNNM), and Citizens Action of Albuquerque (CAA), as well as local pueblos, especially those allied into the Eight Northern Pueblos; e.g., Pojoaque, Santa Clara, Ohkay Ohwingeh, San Idelfonso, Tesuque, Nambe, Taos, and Picuris.

It was with much interest that I heard testimony presented at this hearing. I have also listened with interest to comments presented by many private citizens.

I have been particularly struck by the emphasis placed by private citizens on the call for an information repository, to be located on the campus of Northern New Mexico College (NNMC). As conceived, this repository would be for the purpose of accumulating and making available to local residents information relating to the history of the generation, storage, and treatment of hazardous waste at LANL, as well as relating to the history of relations between the local communities and the DOE, the NNSA, and LANS-LLC, and to relations with the previous management contractor, the University of California (UC).

It appears that NMED is well aware of a desire on the part of local citizens for such an information repository. In fact, Mr. James Bearzi, head of the HWB/NMED, addressed this issue in Sect. IV. D. of his written testimony. However, he said in that testimony that it is the opinion of NMED that an electronic information repository should suffice.

Even so, he also says in his written testimony (Sect. IV. C.) that NMED is attempting to adhere to Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concerns for the promotion of environmental justice among local communities. Such concerns require that local communities be provided with all possible opportunities to participate in decisions related to local environmental matters; e.g., matters resulting from the actions of government in New Mexico, especially the federal government.

In this regard, environmental justice concerns would be better met, in my opinion, by the establishment of a permanent information repository at NNMC, than with a simple electronic repository. In my view, if such a repository is to serve the purpose for which it is intended, it must have an on-site staff, trained in its maintenance, and able to assist local citizens in their quest for information.

Mr. Bearzi also refers to the RACER database in his written testimony (Sect. IV. G.) He points out that RACER is a compendium, in electronic form, of environmental data recorded in and around the Pajarito Plateau. He notes too that this database is already fully accessible to the general public (at least that part of the general public that has access to a PC and a high-speed data link) and is being well-maintained by the Los Alamos Community Foundation. He does not mention that it is currently a part of the RACER plan that RACER shall eventually be maintained by a staff located at NNMC.

I would like also to recall a critical public comment made at this Hearing, this past Tuesday, regarding the influence of LANL on the local economy. In this remark it was suggested that an unfortunate dependency had been created in the local community on the economic benefits brought here by LANL, over the last sixty years.

It is in this context that I would like to speak briefly about the last few months of my two years of service on the DOE’s NNMCAB. It was during this time that I first recognized the presence of a tension between Board members who believed that economic benefits brought by LANL to the local communities were always of paramount concern, when dealing with regulatory matters, and other Board members who felt that health matters were much more important. In an attempt to quantify the strength of such opposing opinions, and the degree to which such opposed opinions were wide-spread in the local community, I conducted a public opinion survey.

This survey was conducted in the fall of 2009 in the towns of Santa Fe and Española, and accumulated responses from 225 persons. The questions in the survey were written, the survey administered, and the results analyzed entirely by myself. In an effort to obtain, some technical guidance in this matter, I did consult briefly with a staff member from Research and Polling, Inc. of Albuquerque.

The results of the survey can be perused in my attached report. In quick summary, these results show that there are indeed two strong attitudes about LANL to be found within the local community. One attitude is of appreciation for the economic benefits brought here by LANL. The other attitude is one of worry about possible environmental hazards arising from the type of work done at LANL. This second attitude is combined with an uneasiness about the nature of that work itself; i.e., the R&D of nuclear weapons.

Simplifying somewhat, approximately 25% of respondents felt that the economic benefits brought by LANL were great, while environmental hazards were of little concern, and uneasiness about nuclear weapons R&D was just not a factor. Approximately 25% of respondents felt just the opposite; i.e., while economic benefits did not impress them, the threat arising from environmental hazard was great, and the culture of nuclear weapons was rejected strongly. Interestingly, ~50% of respondents displayed both attitudes simultaneously. For these conflicted individuals, there was an awareness of a clear economic benefit brought by LANL to the local community. At the same time, however, worry about possible environmental hazards due to the business of LANL, and uneasiness about the nuclear weapons industry was also great.

In closing, I make the claim that it is the effect of LANL’s business on the local community which should be the subject of further study. Evidently, this effect is perceived to be wholly positive by some, and wholly negative by others but, generally, both positive and negative effects are experienced simultaneously by at least half the members of the local community.

Thank you for your attention.

Ken LaGattuta

(My "Community Survey Report for Northern New Mexico" appears as the first post in this blog.)

NMED/LANL Hazardous Waste Permit Hearing

2010-04-10T18:42:00.001-06:00

9:00 AM (Monday, April 5, 2010)
The NMED/LANL Hazardous Waste Permit Hearing began this morning in the Jemez Room at Santa Fe Community College, in Santa Fe, NM. Approximately 50 people were in attendance. Among the attendees were representatives of the three main parties and their supporters, as well as members of the general public. The parties were: 1) Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and its owner the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), an arm of the United States Department of Energy (USDOE), and its current management contractor Los Alamos National Security Limited Liability Company (LANS-LLC); 2) the Hazardous Waste Bureau (HWB), an arm of the New Mexico Environment Department (NMED); 3) a coalition of citizen activists' groups and citizen activists; viz., Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety (CCNS), Nuclear Watch of New Mexico (NWNM), Citizens Action of New Mexico (CANM), Honor Our Pueblo Existence (HOPE), Southwest Information Research Center (SIRC), and Robert Gilkeson, a registered geologist.

Lawyers in attendance, representing the three parties, were: 1) Pete Domenici, Jr. for NNSA/LANS-LLC; 2) Mr. Lovejoy and Mr. DeSaillan for HWB/NMED; 3) Joni Arends, the head of CCNS, and Dave McCoy, the head of CANM.

The presiding judge was Joseph Alarid, Jr., a retired New Mexico Court of Appeals judge, and experienced hearing officer. According to Judge Alarid's self-assessment, he has no particular scientific or engineering expertise, but does have an extensive legal experience.

The Hearing will be conducted according to standard rules of evidence. Testimony will be presented by witnesses for the parties, one party at a time. NNSA/LANS-LLC will go first, followed by HWB/NMED, and the citizens groups will be last. Testimony will be presented for each party by panels of witnesses, and each panel will focus on a particular matter at issue. A witness' testimony may be elicited directly by a lawyer for the witness' party; i.e., the lawyer may ask the witness a series of leading questions. Following testimony, witnesses may be cross-examined by lawyers for the opposing parties; redirect examination will then be solicited, led by the lawyers for the party testifying. Recross-examination will then occur. Evidence may be submitted for the record, provided no objection to the submission is sustained by the judge. Questions during cross, redirect, and recross exmaination are all subject to the objections of opposing counsel.

The Hearing, as scheduled, will last two or more weeks, after which the hearing officer will issue a ruling on all matters at issue. That ruling will only be advisory. Evidently, the Hearing was originally requested by Joni Arends and Robert Gilkeson in a letter to NMED dated Feb. 1, 2008; the letter may be found on NMED's public website.

Matters at issue relate to a Hazardous Waste Permit, which HWB/NMED proposes to issue to LANL/NNSA/LANS-LLC for work being done at LANL. The Hazardous Waste Permit will regulate the handling and above-ground storage of hazardous waste at 24 separated above-ground waste storage facilities at LANL. Presently, a draft permit exists.

An hazardous waste permit was first issued by HWB/NMED in 1989, and was valid for a period of ten years. However, since late-1990, when application for a renewal permit was denied, the handling and above-ground storage of hazardous waste at LANL has been permitted by HWB/NMED only on an interim basis.

The issuing of a Hazardous Waste Permit by HWB/NMED, for NNSA/LANS-LLC hazardous waste operations at LANL, is allowed by federal statute; viz., the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) of 1976. Moreover, NNSA/LANS-LLC hazardous waste operations at LANL are also explicitly permitted by RCRA.

RCRA was originally enacted by Congress in 1976, and is currently a law of the United States, codified in the US Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The goals of RCRA are to: protect the public from harm caused by waste disposal; encourage reuse, reduction, and recycling of waste materials; clean up spilled or improperly stored wastes. RCRA was enacted as an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965, and was intended to regulate waste handling from cradle-to-grave. Unlike the superfund act (CERCLA), RCRA only regulates the handling of wastes at active sites, (sites which continue to receive waste) but not at historical or legacy sites.

There are numerous matters at issue here, all to be explored during the course of the Hearing. These are controversial matters to be contended between: 1) LANL and HWB; 2) LANL and the citizens groups; 3) HWB and the citizens groups. A sampling of these matters is as follows:

1) a) HWB/NMED is aggrieved by a past tendency of NNSA/LANS-LLC to underfund cleanup tasks at LANL, the schedule and pace of which was previously agreed upon by HWB/NMED and NNSA/LANS-LLC, but only after an arduous year-long negotiation. The agreement took the form of a Consent Order, issued on March 1, 2005. The underfunding, typically by a factor of ~2, has continued over the last several years; i.e., essentially since the inception of the CO. HWB/NMED would like the new Hazardous Waste Permit to contain a financial assurance clause which would help, they say, to guarantee future NNSA/LANS-LLC budgets for LANL cleanup. In contrast, NNSA claims that its budgets are guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the federal government and need no further guarantee. Indeed, they say, the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) stipulates that government entities cannot be subjected to financial assurance constraints.

1) b) HWB/NMED has also stated that it intends to deny NNSA/LANS-LLC's application for an Open Burn (OB) permit, a small part of the proposed new Hazardous Waste Permit; i.e., for the open burning of explosives residues at TA-16. NNSA/LANS-LLC is incensed by this threatened denial of an OB permit, and will contest the matter vigorously.

2) a) The citizens groups are sure that the OB permit should be denied, because of alleged dangers to the health of surrounding communities, and they support HWB/NMED in its intent to deny the OB permit.

2) b) The citizens groups would very much like to see a financial assurance clause included in the proposed new Hazardous Waste Permit.

2) c) The citizens groups will argue that NNSA/LANS-LLC is not in full compliance with the 1992 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) rules governing the treatment and storage of hazardous waste. The citizens groups will argue that the Consent Order(CO)is now being used by HWB/NMED to regulate the treatment and storage of hazardous waste at LANL, although the RCRA rules should have precedence. They will further argue that the CO is not legally binding since it: a) was negotiated without input from the general public; b) should not supercede the RCRA rules.

3) a) The citizens groups are upset that HWB/NMED has withheld hundreds of documents from the general public which relate to cleanup at LANL. Apparently, many of these documents bear on the question of whether LANL is in compliance with the RCRA rules, especially as they pertain to groundwater monitoring.

3) b) The citizens groups will argue that the LANL groundwater monitoring program is inadequate scientifically, and that HWB/NMED has failed to censure NNSA/LANS-LLC for this failure. The citizens groups will point out that problems with LANL's groundwater monitoring program have been described over the past several years both in reports by the National Academy of Sciences and by the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA)Kerr Lab, and should be well-known to HWB/NMED.

Opening statements were invited from lawyers for the parties by Judge Alarid. Pete Domenici, Jr. spoke for NNSA/LANS-LLC: He began by talking about the legal basis upon which the hearing rests, and upon which the authority of NMED to regulate LANL's treatment and storage of hazardous waste depends; i.e., the RCRA rules and regulations, and the New Mexico Hazardous Waste Act. He continued by asserting that much, if not most, of the language in the proposed new Hazardous Waste Permit was agreed upon by HWB/NMED and NNSA/LANS-LLC, and that there were only a limited number of areas of disagreement. One such area involved the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility (RLWTF) at TA-50., which will be partly regulated by language in the proposed new Hazardous Waste Permit. Domenici contended that the RLWTF should not be so regulated since waste water outfalls from this facility are already being regulated by EPA under the Clean Water Act. He also claimed that the planned Destruction and Demolition (D&D) of certain buildings at LANL should not be regulated by the propoosed new Hazardous Waste Permit. He opined that the primary business of the Hazardous Waste Permit should be only to regulate the above-ground storage of certain "mixed waste"; e.g., part RCRA regulated waste and part radioactive waste. He pointed out that such mixed waste was already being stored at many DOE sites throughout the country. He also stated that "an important goal of this hearing will be to reassure the general public that NNSA/LANS-LLC will adhere to the scheduled cleanup and closure schedule for TA-54, as set forth in the 2005 Consent Order". He was emphatic that language in the proposed new Hazardous Waste Permit "should not be duplicative of that in the Consent Order". Hence, he said, "closure and corrective actions at MDA's and SMU's should be allowed to proceed unimpeded under the CO and should not be further regulated by the Hazardous Waste Permit". He also asserted that the Hazardous Waste Permit should not contain financial assurance language, binding upon LANS-LLC. He claimed that "a Maintenance and Operations (M&O) contractor such as LANS-LLC has never before been required to provide financial assurance for work supported by the federal government". Finally, he expanded at length upon the claim being made by NNSA/LANS-LLC that there is no danger to human health or the environment arising from open burning at TA-16.

When queried by Judge Alarid, HWB/NMED declined to make an opening statement.

The second opening statement was offered by Dave McCoy of Citizens Action of New Mexico (CANM). McCoy began by saying that the wastes being stored at LANL "contain the potential for genocide", and that "possible seismic activity would threaten nearby residents with catastrophe". He went on to say that the CO seemed to over-ride existing federal regulations governing closure, post-closure, and the groundwater monitoring of hazardous waste sites, but that the CO had no firm legal basis, and was unenforceable. He said further that the CO could not be an enforceable document because the general public was never offered an opportunity to particpate in negotiations leading up to its creation; this was a violation, he said, of federal law. He finished by stating that "21 million cubic feet of stored hazardous waste at LANL is an illegal operation".

The third opening statement was made by Bob Gilkeson, a licensed geologist working in concert with CCNS. Gilkeson began by stating his opposition to sections of the proposed new Hazardous Waste Permit dealing with groundwater protection practices at LANL. He also noted the recent discovery of a volcanic vent, and a volcanic dike, beneath Area G (TA-54) which, he said, "presents a serious threat to surrounding communities".

The fourth opening statement was made by Marian Naranjo from Santa Clara Pueblo. Ms. Naranjo pointed out that "Area G is the site of an ancestral Santa Clara kiva which was dug up and replaced with a toxic waste dump".

The fifth opening statement was made by Don Hancock of SIRC. Hancock stated that the proposed new Hazardous Waste Permit "must protect the environment from future LANL operations". Such future operations, he said, "may include pit production".

1:35 PM (Monday, April 5, 2010; still the first day) -

The first of six LANL panels of witnesses was seated, and their testimony began.
This panel of witnesses described the history of the permitting process at LANL, starting with the first Hazardous Waste Permit in 1989.

The second LANL panel of witnesses was seated. They described the structure of the present proposed new Hazardous Waste Permit. Emergency opearations and fire protection managers then described the capabilites of their areas of responsibility, and their relevance to the Hazardous Waste Permit. Finally, an expert on the geology of the Pajarito Plateau talked at length about newly discovered underground faulting which, however, she said, did not constitute a hazard to LANL operations.

2:00 PM (Tuesday, April 6, 2010; the second full day began at 9:00 AM; I arrived late today in the hearing room) -

The third of six LANL panels of witnesses was in progress. This panel was describing issues relating to the RLWTF, and presenting reasons why the RLWTF should not be regulated by the Hazardous Waste Permit.

The remaining three LANL panels will deal with the issues of: a) closure of permitted facilities; b) financial assurance for future cleanup operations; c) open burning of explosives residues at TA-16.

(Wednesday, April 7, 2010; the third full day; I was absent for this entire day) -

2:00 PM (Thursday, April 8, 2010; the fourth full day began at 9:00 AM; I arrived late in the hearing room) -

The fourth LANL panel had testified about closure and post-closure matters and was undergoing cross-examination. Danny Katzman, LANL manager for groundwater monitoring programs, was being queried by Dave McCoy about the adequacy of these programs, and the extent to which they complied with RCRA rules. This was a vey extensive cross-examination.

11:00 AM (Friday, April 9, 2010; the fifth full day began at 9:00 AM; I arrived late in the hearing room) -

The fifth LANL panel had finished testifying about financial assurance matters and was undergoing cross-examination. Dave McCoy asked LANL witness Mr.Turner if the CO addresses financial assurance matters, and Turner said emphatically that it did not.

1:15 PM (Friday) Following a lunch break the hearing resumed with a period of comments solicited from the general public.

Penny McMullen, member of the Sisters of Loretto, asked that a public information center be set up somewhere in the Espanola Valley. She said that such a center would be to ensure better access for local residents to information relating to LANL's work for the DOE, both past and present. [Later, in a private conversation with Marian Naranjo, I learned that this information center was being proposed by CCNS, to be located at Northern New Mexico College, and would complement the RACER data base, which would eventually also be located at NNMC.]

1:30 PM (Friday) The sixth and final LANL panel of witnesses was seated. This panel would address the open burning of explosives residues at TA-16, as well as the intent of HWB/NMED to deny NNSA/LANS-LLC's application for an OB permit. Initial testimony attempted to persuade that the OB permit was essential to the performance at LANL of R&D required by the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan; viz., by the need for greater knowledge of techniques employed in the fabrication and use of Improvised Explosives Devices (IEDs). Subsequently, testimony was provided about the generation of dioxins and furans during the open burning of explosives residues at TA-16. These were the chemicals about which both HWB/NMED and the citizens groups have expressed concern, and because of which the OB permit may be denied. The LANL witness asserted that dioxins and furans could only be generated if: a) the material being burned contained chlorine; b) the material was burned in an oxygen poor atmosphere; c) the material was burned at temperatures between 400 and 1400 degrees Fahrenheit. The witness further asserted that none of these conditions held for the explosives residues being burned at TA-16 which: a) did not contain chlorine; b) were burned in an oxygen rich atmosphere; were burned at temperatures above 1800 degrees Fahrenheit.

(Monday, April 12, 2010; the sixth full day; I was absent for this entire day) -

Evidently, cross-examination of witnesses for NNSA/LANS-LLC continued into Monday morning. Then testimony of James Bearzi, head of HWB/NMED began. His testimony was expected to continue into tomorrow, Tuesday.

3:20 PM (Tuesday, April 13, 2010; the seventh full day began at 9:00 AM; the hearing has been moved for today to the Ohkay Owingeh Conference Center in Española; I arrived late in the hearing room) -

Evidently, Mr. Bearzi's testimony continued all through this morning. However, Mr. Bearzi was unable to be present this afternoon, so that his testimony and/or cross-examination, will be put off until Wednesday.

A period for comments by the general public has been alloted, to run from 2:00 PM to 4:00 PM. The leader of the Embudo Valley Environmental Monitoring Group (EVEMG) is speaking. She endorsed the information center being proposed for NNMC; i.e., a center in which information describing the business of LANL, and the history of that business, would be provided for perusal by the general public. These comments were followed by those of a private citizen who lamented the growth of greed and consumerism in Northern New Mexico, which had resulted, she said, from the flood of money that had been dumped by LANL into the local economy. She also said that this flood of money had caused the local economy to become dependent on LANL, in such a way as to inhibit the development of a normal mix of local businesses.

4:15 PM Testimony of HWB/NMED witness Steve Pulen began, facilitated by leading questions posed by Mr. Lovejoy, lawyer for NMED. This testimony related to instances of language in the proposed new Hazardous Waste Permit which is being disputed by NNSA/LANS-LLC. Mr. Pulen is the first of eight NMED witnesses scheduled to present testimiony in the coming days.

5:00 PM Testimony ends for today, and will resume tomorrow at 9:00 AM, back in the Jemez Room at SFCC.

(Wednesday, April 15, 2010; the eighth full day; I was absent for this entire day) -

However, I received by email this morning, from John Kieling of HWB/NMED, a copy of James Bearzi's 80 page written testimony; I perused this document with much interest. The Summary section (on pages 4 and 5) displays the following topic headings; the topics are addressed later in the document:

"III. Factual background"

"A. Regulatory structure; B. Permit history; C. Units to be permitted; D. Open detonation units; E. Permit organization; F. Permit terms; G. Enforcement history."

"IV. Issues at this hearing"

"A. Relation of Proposed Permit to Consent Order; B. Outreach and community participation in the permitting process; C. Community relations and environmental justice; D. Information repository; E. E-mail notification; F. Community relations plan; G. RACER; H. Seismic location standards; I. Radioactive liquid Waste Treatment Facility regulation; J. Risk level for closure and corrective action; K. The "enforceable document" regulations; L. Closure provisions for regulated units and surface units - post-closure care; M. Closure of regulated units - specific issues; N. Groundwater monitoring; O. Financial assurance; P. Open burning at TA-16 - notice of intent to deny; Q. Closure plans for TA-16 open burn units."

1:30 PM (Thursday, April 15, 2010; the ninth full day began at 9:00 AM; I arrived late in the hearing room) -

Public comments were proceeding. A woman who introduced herself as a librarian endorsed the idea that there be a physical repository for information relating to the Permit, and that this be set up at NNMC. Then James Bearzi was reseated as a witness for HWB/NMED , and his cross-examination by Dave McCoy continued. Referring to 40 CFR 264.90F, DM said that this rule allowed for the replacement of the RCRA rules appearing in 40 CFR 264.(90-100) by other "enforceable rules". He also said that JB assumed that the CO was an enforceable document and used it to replace the RCRA rules. JB said "that is not an assumption, it is a fact." Cross-examination by DM was followed by Scott Kovacs, for NWNM, and Bob Gilkeson, for CCNS. At 3:00 PM, JB was excused and John Ahlquist, a private citizen was allowed to give testimony. Mr. Ahlquist, a retired LANL health physicist, stated that he believed the hearing to be a waste of time and money, and that LANL's cleanup should be allowed to proceed unimpeded by such administrative wrangling. At 4:00 PM, Rebecca Cram, a HWB/NMED witness, began her testimony. She talked about the 24 closure plans that will regulate the closure of the 24 LANL facilities subjected to the Proposed Permit.

2:00 PM (Friday, April 16, 2010; the tenth full day began at 9:00 AM; I arrived late in the hearing room) -

A public comment period began. I submitted an oral comment which: a) endorsed the idea of an information repository to be located at NNMC; b) endorsed a previous comment suggesting that economic benefits brought to the local community by LANL dollars was not an unalloyed benefit. I also submitted a written version of my comment, and a written copy of my "Community Survey Report for Northern New Mexico", for the hearing record. My written comment also appears in the next post in this blog (dated April 17, 2010); my "Community Survey Report for Northern New Mexico" appears as the very first post in this blog (dated Dec., 2009).

A series of public comments then followed, until 3:00 PM, when Mr. Bearzi was reseated and his cross-examination continued (until 6:15 PM).

2:00 PM (Friday, April 23, 2010; the eleventh full day began at 9:00 AM; I arrived late in the hearing room. The Hearing was held today on the campus of UNM-LA, in Room 230) -

During the ensuing public comment period, ~15 comments were presented by current LANS-LLC employees, by LANL-UC retirees, and by Los Alamos residents unafilliated with LANL, or with LANS-LLC. These comments were all very supportive of LANL and its doings. This group of commenters was also uniformly indignant about the intent of NMED to deny LANL an Open Burning Permit for its work at TA-15, several commenters striking patriotic themes in their effort to convince the Hearing Officer of the righteousness of their views.

Other comments were presented by citizens who had no economic ties to LANS-LLC, or to LANL, and who did not live in Los Alamos. These comments were uniformly critical of LANL, and expressed much uneasiness about the potential for negative human health and environmental impacts due to Open Burning at TA-16.

I then presented a comment in which I first reminded listeners of my "Community Survey Report for Northern New Mexico", described at last Friday's Hearing, during the comment session. I then pointed out that, although we had just heard many comments that could fairly be summarized as lying on a bimodal distribution of opinion, in fact, in Northern New Mexico a much more smoothly varying spectrum of opinion existed. That is, as my survey of 225 individuals had shown, while ~25% of responders had strong positive opinions about LANL, and ~25% had strong negative opinions, there was a near-majority of ~50% who held both strong positive and strong negative opinions about LANL.

[On April 20, 2010 a compendium of public comments appeared on NMED's public website. Among these were copies of letters from the Española City Council (by Alice Lucero, Mayor) and the Rio Arriba County Commission (by Alfredo Montoya, Chair) strongly condemning NMED's proposed denial of an OB Permit for LANL, and striking very patriotic themes.]

After the comment period ended, James A. Werner, an expert witness for NMED began his testimony. Mr. Werner described the qualifications which supported his claim to special knowledge about "financial assurance" matters, especially as regarded private contractors working for government agencies, on RCRA regulated projects, or on projects that were partly RCRA regulated and partly state regulated. This is a matter of importance to NMED, which intends to require financial assurance from LANS-LLC, for work to be completed under the Consent Order. On the other hand, LANS-LLC wishes to continue to be free of financial assurance requirements, as these will increase its cost of doing business.

The testimony of Mr. Werner, as facilitated by Mr. DeSaillan, counsel for NMED, seemed to make a plausible case for the legality of requiring financial assurance from LANS-LLC. However, the following cross-examination by Mr. Domenici, counsel for LANS-LLC, did seem somewhat to undermine this case. Not so successful was Domenici's attempt to argue that assignment of a financial assurance requirement to LANS-LLC was illegal because there were federal statutes explicitly forbidding such requirements; e.g., for contractors operating the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP)and Sandia National Laboratory (SNL). However, these two statutes had been created, and their passage through Congress engineered, by Pete Domenici, Sr. as a way of forestalling legal attempts by the State of New Mexico to obtain financial assurance from these contractors.

This cross-examination continued until 6:45 PM, when the Hearing was adjourned for the day.

(Monday, April 26, 2010; the twelfth full day; the Hearing was held at Smith Brasher Hall, 717 University NE, in Albuquerque; I was absent for this entire day) -

11:15 AM (Wednesday, May 5, 2010; the thirteenth full day began at 9:00 AM; I arrived late in the hearing room. The Hearing was held today in the Courtyard at Marriott, 3347 Cerrillos Rd, Santa Fe, NM) -

[This morning, Ralph Hayes of El Dorado Engineering spoke by telephone about alternatives to open burning of wastes. He asserted that confined burning is a well-developed and accepted technique used by many industries, in a variety of circumstances, which is now replacing open burning. Although I was not present for Mr. Hayes' remarks, I was informed about them by several people who were present.]

When I arrived this morning, Mr. Kulis, a witness for NMED, was finishing his testimony. Mr. Culis is a regulator at HWB/NMED, involved with overseeing the installation of wells at LANL. Mr. McCoy cross-examined Mr. Kulis. McCoy asked about the use of the word "shall" in the RCRA rules, coded in the CFR, asking Mr. Kulis to reflect upon the fact that, in his written testimony, Mr. Kulis used the word "should" when describing that section of the RCRA rules. Mr. McCoy suggested that "should" was less determinant than "shall". Mr. McCoy then asked if Stainless steel casing might not be subject to corrosion by the mixed waste present at MDA G, H, and L, and whether titanium might not be a better choice for the construction of well-screens. Kulis answered that corrosion would be a product of geochemical conditions, but would not result from any mixed waste that might be present at depth underground. He said too that he was unaware of any use or testing of titanium for well-screens, and that titanium might have worse absorptive properties than stainless-steel. Mr. McCoy then asserted that Mr. Kulis had not considered other possible materials for the construction of well-screens. Mr. Kulis answered that he had indeed considered many other materials, and that these were listed, along with their propoerties, in his report. He continued by saying that he judged all of these other materials to be unsuitable for the construction of well-screens, for a variety of reasons. Mr. McCoy ended his cross and Mr. Gilkeson began.

Mr. Gilkeson asked about the acceptability of pipe-based systems for well-screens. Mr. Kulis answered that pipe-based systems may be acceptable under certain circumstances. However, the use of pipe-based well-screens was not allowed under the Permit for the construction of new wells; wells already in place which use pipe-based screens may be retained. Mr. Gilkeson then asked if the use of no-purge Westbay sampling systems must no longer be used anywhere at LANL. Mr. Kulis answered that this was not true, but that the usefulness of data obtained from Westbay systems would be determined on a case-by-case basis by comparison with data taken from nearby wells fitted with purgeable Baskhi sampling ssytems. Mr. Gilkeson then asked if the Permit requires that background water-quality data be determined from upgradient site-specific wells. Mr. Kulis said that he was uncertain if such was the case.

1:00 PM; public comment period began. First speaker said that he had a PhD in linguistics, and that he was concerned by the trickery displayed by vested interests in defense of LANL, and in the minimization of citizens' concerns about toxic waste generated by LANL operations. Second speaker expressed concern about Pu in groundwater near the Buckman Diversion Project, especially in regard to modern standards for maximum allowed levels of contaminants; these standards are being continually reduced, as time goes on. Third speaker talked about the existence of elevated levels of cancers occurring throughout northern New Mexico; i.e., downwind of LANL. Fourth speaker expressed concern about OB at LANL, and said that the Sisters of Loretto had collected more than 500 signatures on a petition asking for confined burn at TA-16. The fifth speaker reads the text of that petition, and said that local residents wanted the security of knowing that they were not being poisoned by emissions from LANL operations. The sixth speaker talked about the chemical properties of PU, and referred to recent work which seemed to show that Pu was more mobile in soils than had previously been thought to be the case. The seventh speaker criticized NMED for not following its own Mission Statement, and for being dominated by a culture of secrecy. He described the successful lawsuit that Mr. McCoy and CANM filed against NMED, which resulted in the release of documents held secret by NMED; these related to the treatment of hazardous waste generated at LANL. He then said that the 21 million cubic feet of hazardous waste stored at LANL had the potential to create a worse environmental disaster than the current oil-spill off the coast of Louisiana. He further stated that the lack of a closure plan for hazardous waste dumps at LANL was a serious violation of NMED's mandate. the eighth speaker was a resident of Ojo Sarco who expressed concern about the elevated level of cancers in northern New Mexico. The ninth speaker was a retired St. John's College teacher. She expressed her concern that the involvement of private citizens in decision-making with regard to the treatment of hazardous waste at LANL was made difficult by the lack of an intelligible overview of the related problems. She emphasized that it was not sufficient to have relevant information be physically accessible to the public, but that it must also be intellectually accessible. The tenth speaker presents a petition with 7500 signatures asking for a confined burn facility at LANL, to replace their present OB facility at TA-16. The eleventh speaker is a writer from Santa fe who expressed her feelings of heart-break when presented with knowledge of the volume of hazardous waste being generated at LANL, from its nuclear weapons operations.

2:15PM; public comment period ends; Mr. Gilkeson resumed his cross of Mr. Kulis, who then admitted that the Permit did require that background data be collected at LANL from site-specific monitoring wells. Mr. Gilkeson then asked if it was true that water-quality studies underway at LANL would only determine if water-quality samples taken from no-purge wells were comparable to those taken from purgeable wells, and would not determine if such samples were representative of water in the surrounding formations. Mr. Kulis agreed that this was true. Mr. Gilkeson then asked if under-inflated packers installed between screens in Baskhi system wells might not allow water to pass between the regions surrounding the two screens, thus contaminating the lower region. Mr. Kulis said that this was a possible problem which was being addressed. Mr. Gilkeson then asked if the use of oragnic foams to expedite the drilling process might not result in a contamination of the regional aquifer. Mr. Kulis said that this might occur, but that it was a problem which was limited by the fact that current methods required that such foams not be used below a point that was 100 ft above the surface of the regional aquifer. Moreover, any foam which did leak down into the aquifer could be mostly removed during the subsequent well-develoment process, and that the remainder was, in any case, biodegradable. Mr. Gilkeson ended his cross and Joni Arends began.

Ms. Arends asked if casing advance techniques could not be used to replace the use of oragnic foams; i.e., as a method of keeping the upper parts of the bore-hole open during drilling, so that the drill string would not be captured by the bore-hole, which would then have to be abandoned. Mr. Kulis said that, generally, this was not possible since then the presence of perched water could not be detected; and it was important to learn about the presence of perched water. [I spoke to Mr. Gilkeson privately about this question. He said that the detection of perched water would also be impeded by the use of high pressure water as a drilling aid, something which was being done routinely by the well-drillers at LANL. He said further that the presence of perched water was NOT something that was being actively sought at LANL. The reason that perched water was not being sought, he said, was that the discovery of perched water would just mean more monitoring work for an already overworked monitoring staff. (Mr. Gilkeson has elaborated further on these themes in his written comment submitted to NMED on May 9, 2010.)]

5:25 PM; NMED rested their case. Dave McCoy began testimony. Mr. McCoy reprised views that he had already expressed during this Hearing. He was cross-examined by Mr. Domenici for LANL, Mr. DeSailian for NMED, and Ms. Arends for CCNS.

7:00 PM; I leave for the day.

2:15 PM (Thursday, May 6, 2010; the fourteenth full day began at 9:00 AM; I arrived late in the hearing room. The Hearing was held again today in the Courtyard at Marriott, 3347 Cerrillos Rd, Santa Fe, NM) -

LANL called Richard Joseph Miranda, a rebuttal witness. Mr. Miranda attempted to explain recent changes in a report, previously submitted as evidence but before any changes had been made, detailing effects of OB residues (dioxins and furans) on the local deer-mouse population. Evidently, LANL was attempting to submit this revised report in lieu of the the previous unrevised report. Objections to this aattempted replacement were made by NMED, by Mr. McCoy and by Ms. Arends. During cross-examination of Mr. Miranda, Mr. McCoy asked about methods being used to survey the deer-mouse population, apparently with a view to determining whether or not those methods were humane, and whether or not those methods minimized the expenditure of public money. 3:50 PM; I leave for the day.

1:00 PM (Friday, May 7, 2010; the fifteenth and last day began at 1:00 PM. The Hearing was held again today in the Courtyard at Marriott, 3347 Cerrillos Rd, Santa Fe, NM) -

The Hearing began today with a public comment period. The first speaker was a ~25 year old male who spoke in favor of LANL operations, and of the OB Permit. He pointed out the imporatnce of LANL operations to the economy of northern New Mexico. The second speaker was a woman from Llano, NM. she blamed her diagnosed cancer on LANL's hazardous waste. She asked that LANL provide medical insurance to all of the residents of northern New Mexico, and that LANL also test all of the fruits and vegetables being grown in this area for the presence of hazardous chemicals.

1:20 PM; public comment period ended and J. Bearzi, rebuttal witness for NMED, was reseated. His testimony related to the financial assurance controversy which has been much discussed at this Hearing. Much of what he had to say was objected to by opposing counsel. Mr. Bearzi then talked about disputed data submitted by LANL relating to the temperatures of burners measured at TA-16 OB units. There were also many objections to this rebuttal testimony.

Mr. Bearzi then talked about the need to include new language in the proposed Permit to ensure that LANS/NNSA, in a timely fashion, would establish a physical repository for information relating to the Hazardous Waste Permit, and would establish a educational center aimed at improving public understanding of issues relating to the Permit, both (perhaps) at Northern New Mexico College; i.e., if Secretary Curry would see fit to approve of such a measure. He said that a period of six months would be specified in the proposed Permit, following the entry into force of the Permit itself, during which all arrangements for the establishment of such a physical information repository and educational center would have to be completed by LANS/NNSA.

Launching into another topic, Mr. Bearzi then stated emphatically that if Area G (TA-54) was to be closed, then all deposition of new low-level radioactive waste at this site would have to end immediately. Mr. Domenici asked if it was true that NMED has no mandate to regulate low-level radioactive waste, generally, and that the proposed Permit does not forbid the storage of new low-level radiaoactive waste at Area G. Mr. Bearzi admitted that this was true. Mr. Domenici then asked Mr. Bearzi if he was aware that the burners at TA-16 unit 388 were designed to burn at over 1400 degrees Fahnrenheit. (There is evidence that, above this temperature, dioxins and furans are consumed.) Mr. Bearzi answered that he did not contest the design of the burners.

5:10 PM; the NMED/LANL Hazardous Waste Permit Hearing ends!

Nuclear Posture Review 2010 Emerges

2010-04-07T10:46:00.000-06:00

Finally, the Nuclear Posture Review for 2010 has emerged from the bowels of the Defense Dept. On Tuesday April 6,2010. Secretary Robert Gates, speaking for the Obama Administration, introduced the new NPR in a brief cover letter; it can all be found on the DOD's public website. In his letter, Gates notes that the $5 billion of new funding for the nuclear weapons complex, to be spread over the next ten years, and which was announced recently by the Obama Admin., is actually to come from the Defense Dept.; i.e., some DOD monies are to be transferred slowly to DOE coffers.

Now, hitting just a few of the high points from the NPR Executive Summary, under the heading "Sustaining a Safe, Secure, and Effective Nuclear Arsenal", several interesting features appear, from which I quote:

"The United States will not conduct nuclear testing and will pursue ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty."

"The United States will not develop new nuclear warheads. Life Extension Programs (LEPs) will use only nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and will not support new military missions or provide for new military capabilites."

"The United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components."

"In any decision to proceed to engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United States will give strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could not otherwise be met, amd if specifically authorized by the President and approved by Congress."

Further, the new NPR asserts that:

"The science, technology and engineering base, vital for stockpile stewardship
as well as providing insights for non-proliferation, must be strengthened."

"Increased investments in the nuclear weapons complex of facilities and personnel are required to ensure the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal. New facilities will be sized to support the requirements of the stockpile stewardship and management plan being developed by the National Nuclear Security Administration."

"Increased funding is needed for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory to replace the existing 50-year old facility. and to develop a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennesee."

There is also a description in the NPR of a new policy of "no use of nuclear weapons", by the United States, against nations not possessing nuclear weapons, if such nations were to be also "in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation responsibilities". This new policy would not apply, however, to nuclear weapons armed states; i.e., for these, the previous policy which does not restrict use, or even first use, would continue in effect.

There are also remarks in the new NPR reminding us of the intention of the Obama Administration to enter into a new agreement with Russia, reducing by a small amount the size of the deployed nuclear arsenals on both sides, as well as reducing the number of allowed delivery vehicles.

Thus, and according to its own estimation, the Obama Administration moves forward toward its long-term goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. One would have to observe, however, that any motion along this line will not be so quick as to seriously discommode any of the important political players in Washington.

For more information on this topic, see my previous post entitled, "JASON's Report on LEP Strategies Revisited".

JASON's Report on LEP Stategies Revisited

2010-03-30T22:09:00.000-06:00

As the Obama Administration moves slowly toward the formulation of a Nuclear Posture Review, for the past year the nation's nuclear weapons planners have lacked this important NPR guidance. Perhaps one shouldn't blame the Obama Administration too much for its tardiness. Weighty matters of national security are certainly involved here, but ones which could hardly have been at the forefront of the attention of a President who was, only one year ago, just a junior US senator from Illinois.

But, the matter becomes more pressing! Recently, Rep. Michael Turner (Republican, OH) released letters from the directors of the three nuclear weapons laboratories, containing their views of a report by the Jasons, dated Sept., 2009. This was a report of a study commissioned by the NNSA asking for an assessment of the likely future of the Life Extension Program; i.e., the LEP to revitalize the aging nuclear weapons in the US nuclear arsenal.

In the unclassified executive summary accompanying the full classified JASON report, the JASONs say that they believe the LEP to have been successful and that it most likely will continue to be successful. They then point out several problem areas which do need some attention. They do not say, however, that the LEP may fail sometime in the future if these problems are not solved.

Rep. Turner claims to have discovered that the unclassified executive summary to the JASON report is inconsistent with the classified full JASON report. Of course, this is not a claim which can be verfied by those not having access to the classified report. Rep. Turner has asked the Dirs. of the three nuclear weapons labs to offer their opinions on this matter, and of the JASON report generally. In January, 2010 the three Lab Dirs. responded, but Rep. Turner kept their responses confidential until just a few days ago when he released them to the public.

The three Lab Dirs. have somewhat different perspectives on this matter, which may arise from the different mandates of the three labs:

1) The job of SNL has been to develop, test, and produce all of the engineering devices necessary for the operation of all of the nuclear weapons in the US nuclear arsenal. The approach of SNL toward nuclear weapons is a systems engineering approach; SNL has nothing to do with the design, fabrication, assembly and testing of the so-called nuclear explosives package.

2) The job of LLNL has been to design, fabricate, assemble and test the nuclear explosives package part of approximately half of all of the nuclear weapons in the US nuclear arsenal.

3) The job of LANL has also been to design, fabricate, assemble and test the nuclear explosives package part of approximately half of all of the nuclear weapons in the US nuclear arsenal.

4) Whereas the job of SNL remains today as it has always been, the jobs of LLNL and LANL are changing. LLNL is becoming more of a pure research facility, albeit research into areas relating to the science of nuclear weapons. LANL is becoming a facility more attuned to practical matters of pit production, warhead refurbishment, and the furtherance of Pu science and technology.

(Once tested successfully, nuclear weapons are manufactured at separate DOE facilities, but not at SNL, LLNL, or LANL; at least, not so far.)

In his short letter to Rep. Turner, SNL's Dir. T. Hunter pointed out that the JASON report was focussed almost entirely on the nuclear explosives package and did not pertain to matters central to the business of SNL.

In his letter to Rep. Turner, LLNL's Dir. G. Miller suggested that the language of the unclassified executive summary to the JASON report was reasonably well clarified by the material contained in the classified full JASON report. He pointed out too that the LEP program had already experienced serious difficulties, an example of which was the inability to easily remanufacture the critical Fogbank material, necessary for the refurbishment of the W76 warhead. However, he also offered as his opinion that the LEP program had been successful to date and that, as a part of the ongoing stockpile-stewardship program, it would probably continue to be so.

In his letter to Rep. Turner, LANL's M. Anastasio stated that he believed that the unclassified executive summary to the JASON report did not fairly represent the classified full JASON report. He had quite a lot else to say too. He was particularly insistent that, until now, the LEP had only made use of refurbishment strategies, and only these strategies had been tested through actual use. Even so, refurbishment was not always straightforward, as had been well-learned during the W76 refurbishment. Moreover, he said, the important LEP strategies of reuse and replacement had really not yet been attempted and, therefore, had not yet been tested through use. He then described those parts of the LEP, important to him, which had not yet been attempted on any warhead; all of these LEP parts would involve reuse or replacement strategies, at least to some degree. He also quoted material from the classified full JASON report which could be construed as supporting the controversial RRW concept, and which did not offer support of the LEP. Unfortunately, one can not be sure of the meaning of this short quote, because the surrounding contextual material was absent. Finally, Anastasio opined that, although refurbishment had so far been an acceptable LEP strategy, its future was unknowable.

It would seem that Pres. Obama had better take this Nuclear Posture Review bull by the horns. Otherwise, enthusiasts like Rep. Turner may soon begin to accumulate some momentum for their view that only the Reliable Replacement Warhead program makes sense for the future of America's nuclear weapons program.

[Follow-up to this post on April 7, 2010: The new NPR has emerged! See the following post for comments.]

[Follow-up to the follow-up on April 11, 2010: The Los Alamos Monitor carries a joint statement of acceptance of the new NPR from from the three nuclear weapons lab directors, which reads:

“A key responsibility of the three Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Laboratories – Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories – is to provide technical underpinnings that ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of the United States’ nuclear deterrent. The recently released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) provides the administration’s policy framework and path forward for ensuring that ‘the nation’s nuclear weapons remain safe, secure and effective.’

“We believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of life extension options (refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk. We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the recognition of the importance of supporting ‘a modern physical infrastructure – comprised of the national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities – and a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent.”

Tom Hunter, SNL Director
George Miller, LLNL Director
Michael Anastasio, LANL Director

The statement also appears on LANL's public website at www.lanl.gov.

NMED Sec. Curry Asks DOE for Help

2010-03-28T17:39:00.000-06:00

In a letter, recently, to Department of Energy headquarters, New Mexico Environment Department Secretary Ron Curry forcefully suggested that DOE remove the National Nuclear Security Administration from the chain-of-command, between NMED and DOE's Environmental Management unit, whenever issues regarding the cleanup of so-called legacy wastes were concerned.

Sec. Curry has previously expressed anger and frustration with NNSA. At a 7-30-08 meeting of the Northern New Mexico Citizens Advisory Board, in Santa Fe, Sec. Curry proposed that NNMCAB support his demand that DOE and NNSA not fund any new programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory until first making up for accumulated shortfalls in the multi-year budgets, assigned for the cleanup of legacy wastes. The size of these budgets had been stipulated in the 2002 Consent Order, agreed to by the State of New Mexico and DOE, and were legally binding upon the parties. In fact, the NNMCAB passed a resolution (#2008-09) supporting Sec. Curry and submitted it to DOE for their approval. But, DOE did not approve!

In spite of substantial economic benefits that NNSA/DOE, and their predecessor federal agencies, have brought to New Mexico, it is necessary to keep in mind the legacy of toxic waste that 60 years of nuclear weapons operations has left behind, especially at LANL. Now, 21 years after the end of the cold-war, we need to dispose of these wastes, once-and-for-all. I am pleased to recall here that Lieut. Gov. Diane Denish has declared herself to be in favor of vigorously enforcing the Consent Order.

LANL Applies for Open Burn Permit

2010-03-24T22:28:00.000-06:00

Following past practices, LANL/DOE continues to try to exploit the economic vulnerabilities of local New Mexico communities, in order to be better able to proceed with its business as usual.

As a part of LANL’s current application to NMED for an extension of its RCRA mandated Hazardous Waste Permit, LANL is asking to be allowed to continue with its policy of Open Burning (OB) of high-explosives residues at two burn-sites located at TA-16.

The period for public comment on LANL’s application, and on NMED’s proposed rejection of LANL’s desire to engage in OB at TA-16, will end in mid-April, following a public hearing, to begin on April 5, 2010 at Santa Fe Community College.

After measurements were made of contaminant levels in soils at TA-16, as well as related modeling exercises performed, NMED decided that LANL’s OB of explosives residues had probably resulted in the release into the atmosphere of potentially hazardous concentrations of the toxic chemicals, dioxin and furan; i.e., hazards were predicted to exist for certain sensitive local fauna.

In order to counter this view, LANL launched a public relations campaign, asking members of LANL-friendly groups from the local communities to send comments to NMED, in support of LANL’s OB application. On Monday of this week, the VFW post in Los Alamos was visited and VFW members were presented with a talk entitled, “LANL Hazardous Waste Permit: National Security Impacts”.

Yesterday (2-23-10), the Española City Council heard a talk from LANL’s Dennis Hejersen entitled, “Protecting the Environment while Continuing National Security Missions”. Upon completion of this talk, the new mayor of Española, Alice Lucero, volunteered to say that the City Council would write a letter to NMED in support of LANL’s OB application. She also expanded happily upon the economic advantage that LANL’s operations bring to Española.

At this time, LANL asserts that the continuation of its OB practices at TA-16 are essential to national security, and make possible the testing of explosives for use by the USA in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the testing of certain improvised explosives which might be of interest to insurgents. A statement of these LANL claims appears online at www.lanl.gov/environment/waste/rcra.shtml. For NMED’s point-of-view, along with related materials, see www.nmenv.state.nm.us/hwb/lanlperm.html.

It may be, however, that LANL’s efforts to tie its current explosives testing activities solely to recent US military activities in the Middle East, and to related threats from insurgents, is an attempt to craft a message having special appeal to local communities. In this regard, one needs to keep in mind that the controversy surrounding the OB of explosives residues at LANL is not new, but goes back at least to 1998. An exposition of LANL’s position on OB at TA-16, circa 2006, which makes no mention of any USA initiated wars in the Middle East, but refers only to high-explosives residues arising from tests related to LANL’s part of the NNSA’s Stockpile Stewardship Program, may be found in the LANL publication LA-UR-06-6913, available online at www.lanl.gov. In this document, a history of the OB of explosives residues is described, dating back to 1998.

It seems to me unfortunate that LANL persists in its attempts to exploit the vulnerabilities of local communities. Fear of the toxic waste that LANL generates, emits and stores, and uncertainties about LANL’s nuclear weapons mission are both real in these communities, but are minimized by appeals to patriotism and reminders of the economic benefits brought by continued local LANL/DOE operations. This is a theme which I’ve addressed earlier in this blog; viz., “Community Survey Report for Northern New Mexico”, and “Concerns of Northern New Mexico Citizens Probed”.

Nuke Control Issues Today

2010-02-19T18:33:00.000-07:00

Early in February, 2010, the Obama Administration announced its intention to pump more $billions into the NW program; thus, approximately doubling what had been NNSA's expected NW budget for 2011. A commitment was also made to the continuation of these large increases into the foreseeable future. It has been speculated that these monies will constitute a quid-pro-quo for obtaining the support of key NW friendly senators when the CTBT is submitted for ratification, as well as for their help in gaining Senate approval of a new version of the recently defunct Start treaty. In the following, I wax on a bit about these, and related, matters.

First, a few comments on "Nuclear weapons at a crossroads as Obama enters office", from the Issues and Events section of the January 2009 issue of Physics Today:

1) The extent and type of modernization of the Russian and Chinese NW programs is still not widely known to the general public. However, the case of the USA is certainly different. In this regard,it seems clear that the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), that has engaged the DOE since ~1995, can be construed as a type of NW modernization program, albeit one largely accessible only to the USA; i.e., since, presumably, neither Russia nor China can compete successfully with the USA in the SSP arena! DOE's SSP includes the construction of ever larger and faster computer systems at LLNL, LANL, and SNL for the simulation of NW performance, as well as the construction of the NIF at LLNL, the DAHRT facility at LANL, and the sub-critical test facility at NTS. An integral part of the SSP has also been the design of the RRW, and NNSA's plans for modernization of the nation-wide NW complex.

2) Yes, the USA has yielded the "high ground", with respect to the control of NW's, since it failed to ratify the CTBT, but also since it elected not to abide by the strictures of the NPT's Article VI. In particular, the USA continues to behave as if the continued possession of NW's is a key element of its national defense policy. In this regard, the promotion of the SSP also appears as a key to the USA's ongoing NW modernization program.

3) While the subject of more funding for the national laboratories is being broached, it seems worthwhile to recall that, in the first year (2005-2006) of the for-profit LANS-LLC's new contract to manage LANL, the LANL Director and LANS-LLC CEO received a salary of ~$400K, plus a bonus of ~$1000K. Thus, the LANL Director's take-home pay effectively tripled; i.e., when compared to the previous Director's salary, which had been set by the not-for-profit UC. LANS-LLC also increased the number of middle managers at LANL while reducing the number of non-managerial staff. But, overall salary expenditures at LANL still increased. Descending farther down the pay scale,in June, 2005, ~300 senior LANL employees, almost all involved in NW work of one sort or other, were allowed by DOE to start collecting their full UC pensions while continuing to receive their full LANS-LLC salaries; i.e., an example of so-called double-dipping. Thus, for such LANL employees, after June 2005, personal income from NW work approximately doubled. (Although DOE initially appeared to resist the double-dipping, they quickly caved when NM's senior senator intervened.) In this way, NW work at LANL has become more remunerative for some employees, lucrative for the owners of LANS-LLC, and more costly for US tax-payers.
................................................................................

And now, a quick look at what some others have been saying about NW control:

Reducing the nuclear threat: The argument for public safety [EXCERPTS]
By Richard Rhodes /The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists /14 December 2009

Article Highlights:

1) Public health, a discipline that organizes science-based systems of surveillance and prevention, has been primarily responsible for controlling the effects of infectious disease.

2) A similar campaign around public safety could help end the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons.

3) Such a push would help create unity in common security and a fundamental transformation in relationships between nations.

In 1999, for the first time in human history, infectious diseases no longer ranked first among causes of death worldwide. Public health, a discipline which organizes science-based systems of surveillance and prevention, was primarily responsible for that millennial change in human mortality. One-half of all the increases in life expectancy in recorded history occurred within the twentieth century. Most of the
worldwide increase was accomplished in the first half of the century, and it was almost entirely the result of public health measures directed to primary prevention. Better nutrition, sewage treatment, water purification, the pasteurization of milk, and the immunization of children extended human life; i.e., not surgeons cutting or doctors dispensing pills.

Public health is medicine's greatest success story and a powerful model for a parallel discipline, which I propose to call public safety.

Where nuclear weapons--the largest-scale instruments of man-made death--are concerned, the elements of such public safety have already begun to appear: fissile materials control and accounting, cooperative threat reduction, security guarantees, nuclear arms control agreements and treaties, surveillance and inspection, sanctions, and forceful disarming if all else fails.

Reducing and finally eliminating the world's nuclear arsenals may be delayed. just as progress was stalled during the George W. Bush administration by those who argued that there were good nuclear powers and evil nuclear powers and who sought to disarm powers considered to be evil. But, nuclear weapons operate beyond good and evil. They destroy without discrimination and Whether one lives or dies is entirely a matter of
distance from ground zero. The complement of that destructiveness must then be unity in common security, just as it was with smallpox, and a fundamental transformation in relationships between nations.
.....................................................................................

The Obama disarmament paradox [EXCERPTS]
By Greg Mello /The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists /4 February 2010

Article Highlights:

1) The latest federal budget request includes a large increase in spending for nuclear weapons.

2) Such an increase contradicts President Obama's speech in Prague last April, during which he seemed to signal a commitment to significant nuclear disarmament.

3) Now it's a question of whether Congress will reject the Obama budget request--a strategy it used to keep President George W. Bush from pursuing new nuclear weapon programs.

Last April in Prague, President Barack Obama gave a speech that many have interpreted as a commitment to significant nuclear disarmament.

Now, however, the White House is requesting one of the larger increases in warhead spending history. If its request is fully funded, warhead spending would rise 10 percent in a single year, with further increases promised for the future. Los Alamos National Laboratory, the biggest target of the Obama largesse, would see a 22 percent budget increase, its largest since 1944. In particular, funding for a new plutonium "pit" factory complex there would more than double, signaling a commitment to produce new nuclear weapons a decade hence.

So how is the president's budget compatible with his disarmament vision?

The answer is simple: There is no evidence that Obama has, or ever had, any such vision. He said nothing to that effect in Prague. There, he merely spoke of his commitment "to seek . . . a world without nuclear weapons," a vague aspiration and hardly a novel one at that level of abstraction. He said that in the meantime the United States "will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and to guarantee that same defense to our allies."
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Reducing the role of nuclear weapons [EXCERPTS]
By Joshua Pollack /The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists /30 October 2009

In his April 5, 2009 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama pledged to "take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons." In particular, he promised to "reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same." This was not merely an idealistic gesture. Bounding the role of the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal will be essential to the administration's efforts to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The most straightforward expression of a U.S. nuclear defensive policy--pure deterrence, with no element of coercion--would be 'no-first-use' guidance, deciding that nuclear weapons are only to be used in response to nuclear attack against the United States, its allies, or its forward-deployed forces."In principle, the Bush administration also sought to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons. Nevertheless,
the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review found nuclear deterrence to be broadly applicable to a range of threats, including "large-scale conventional military force." Moreover, the review, whose list of potential adversaries included several without known nuclear arsenals, concluded that the "unique properties" of nuclear forces could enable the United States to "hold at risk classes of targets important to achieve
strategic and political objectives." This ambiguous formula was just as suggestive of coercion as of deterrence. The Bush administration also struggled to persuade other countries to follow its lead on nonproliferation, as evidenced by the failure of the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference.

This outcome wasn't entirely coincidental.

How Americans conceive the role of nuclear weapons illuminates the role of nonproliferation in the eyes of a skeptical world. If Washington considers its nuclear arsenal suitable for coercing potential adversaries, then stopping the spread of nuclear weapons becomes an adjunct to the already considerable power of the United States. If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons come to play a strictly defensive role
for the United States and its allies, then nonproliferation can be more readily appreciated as broadly in the common interest of humanity.

Given the prominence of the United States in the international system, the role of U.S. nuclear weapons will strongly influence the Obama administration's chances of finding support for strengthened nonproliferation measures at the May 2010 NPT Review Conference in New York. If U.S. nuclear weapons are flaunted as instruments of coercion and emblems of might, then the states that have failed to observe the NPT's rules--North Korea and Iran--are likely to receive more sympathy from the "non-aligned" camp than otherwise would be the case. Their illicit activities will seem like natural responses to an overweening superpower that behaves as if it were a dissatisfied actor.

But if it is known that U.S. nuclear weapons exist only for deterrence, then the U.S. case stands to receive the more understanding reception. Less is likely to be made of the failure of the recognized nuclear weapon states to move rapidly toward disarmament. As the de facto guarantor of security, prosperity, and the status quo across a globe-spanning network of alliances, the United States in particular could not be expected to drop its defenses while potential adversaries are seeking nuclear
weapon capabilities of their own.

The Obama administration's own Nuclear Posture Review, to be delivered before the NPT Review Conference, offers a timely opportunity to deliver on the president's promise to constrain the role of U.S. nuclear forces. The fulfillment of that pledge cannot rest too much on actual changes in force structure, since bureaucratic and political realities always weigh heavily upon formal review processes. (The inertia is compounded by the timing of U.S.-Russian nuclear diplomacy, which is currently focused on renewal of arms control mechanisms rather than seeking profound shifts in force posture.) Instead, the administration can alter the role of nuclear weapons by issuing a clear and authoritative definition of their purposes. We shouldn't consider this step merely a matter of "declaratory policy," as if it were solely for external
consumption; rather, it should be taken as a basic choice of defense policy, the point of departure for future guidance to planners.

Naturally, the most straightforward expression of a defensive policy--pure deterrence, with no element of coercion--would be "no-first-use" guidance, deciding that nuclear weapons are only to be used in response to nuclear attack against the United States, its allies, or its forward-deployed forces. The United States refrained from making no-first-use pledges during the Cold War because of the need to counteract Soviet conventional superiority. Subsequently, it adopted a policy of "calculated ambiguity," explained by the need to deter chemical or biological attacks with nuclear weapons. Despite the implausibility of such a disproportionate retaliatory threat, this concern remains the primary obstacle to a nuclear no-first-use policy. Even so, it does not prevent a deterrence-only policy.

If the Obama administration determines that conventional forces and defensive systems suffice to deter or neutralize chemical or biological attack, then it can readily adopt a nuclear no-first-use policy. Or, if the administration determines that nuclear weapons should continue to play a role in deterring chemical or
biological attack--notwithstanding their lack of credibility for this purpose--then it can take the advocates of calculated ambiguity at their word, establishing a policy of no first use of weapons of mass destruction. The appropriate statement could be issued as an Executive Order, giving it the force of policy.

Either nuclear no-first-use or the second-best alternative will face opposition from advocates of traditionalism in nuclear strategy, which prizes flexibility over all other considerations. But neither idea would face insurmountable obstacles. Certainly, if the role of nuclear weapons cannot be constrained by issuing an authoritative policy statement, then seemingly very little can be achieved in this area at all.
.............................................................................

For a look at the current status of the world's nuclear forces consult the Federation of American Scientists web-site:
http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/nukes/nuclearweapons/nukestatus.html
http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/index.html

For non-proliferation issues consult the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/npp/

For short film clips of actual US nuclear weapons tests:
http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/films/testfilms.aspx

Metals in Groundwater and RACER

2010-01-12T10:33:00.000-07:00

In this post I follow up on a question introduced earlier; viz., how likely is it that RACER will help the citizens of Northern New Mexico to check up on LANL's stewardship of the local environment?

In attempting again to answer this question, I first reproduce here a history of high metal concentrations in the groundwater at LANL's Technical Area 49 (TA-49), as revealed by the Water Quality Data Base. Although this history was presented in the fall of 2008 at meetings of the Northern New Mexico Citizens Advisory Board, no formal response by LANL to the problems revealed here has ever been offered.

Introduction

In two earlier white-papers I discussed (in the summer of 2008) data excerpted from the Radionuclides in Groundwater section of LANL’s online Water Quality Data Base (WQDB). These short papers were intended to serve as non-technical introductions to the WQDB for members of the Northern New Mexico Citizens Advisory Board (NNMCAB).

In this latest of an ongoing series, I describe data from the Metals in Groundwater section of the WQDB. After a few general remarks, I discuss the high levels of chromium(3) being measured in Regional Well 28 (R-28), and then react to a recent study, by geologist Bob Gilkeson, in which past high levels of lead(4) in deep wells at TA-49 were considered.

General Remarks

The data tabulated in the Metals in Groundwater section of LANL’s online Water Quality Data Base describe the results of measurements of the concentrations of approximately 24 non-radioactive metals, made at about 430 locations distributed over the DOE/LANL site, and in its immediate vicinity, during the past 40 years.

These data are a record of the concentrations of metals, measured at wells or springs, in units of mg/l (micrograms per liter). In contrast to the case of Radionuclides in Groundwater, discussed earlier(1,2), uncertainties in the measured values of metal concentrations in groundwater are not tabulated, nor are values for the estimated Minimum Detectable Amount (MDA). Even so, measured concentrations are often accompanied by a < sign, perhaps denoting that the data recorded is, in some sense, a “non-detect”(5). However, in no case do values of measured concentrations appear with a minus sign, which would indicate that the sample value was less than the value of a corresponding blank(6). In the following, we will not refer to tabulated data, if it is preceded by a < sign.

A user of the WQDB might wonder how measured values for the concentrations of individual metals translate into estimations of health risks.

In order to address this question, we consulted the EPA’s online standard for metals in drinking water, and found the following EPA benchmark information relating to health risks; i.e., the Primary Drinking water Standards(7), for metals in groundwater. These standards set values for the Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) as:

Metal MCL (mg/L) ...... Metal MCL(mg/L)

Antimony 6 ............... Copper 1300
Arsenic 10 ................. Lead 15
Barium 2000 ............. Mercury 2
Beryllium 4 ................ Selenium 50
Cadmium 5 ................ Thallium 2
Chromium 100 ........... Uranium 30

Also, EPA’s Secondary Drinking Water Standards(8) for metals in groundwater are:

Metal MCL (mg/L) ...... Metal MCL(mg/L)

Aluminum 50 ............. Manganese 50
Copper 1000 .............. Silver 100
Iron 300 ................... Zinc 5000

Chromium (Cr)

The subject of chromium in groundwater at LANL is interesting because it appears to be almost unique. It seems that chromium may be one of only a few substances contaminating the aquifer beneath the Pajarito Plateau, for which LANL aggressively assigns itself the blame(3, 9-11). Moreover, until recently, it seems that this contamination had been found to exist, primarily, in only one deep well.

The well in question, R-28, was drilled into the regional aquifer below Mortandad Canyon at the end of 2003, and a single well-screen was installed(12). This screen was intended to sample the groundwater at depths between 934 ft and 958 ft bgs, near the top of the underlying aquifer.

The first data from this well(13) was collected on 5-20-05 and, while showing essentially normal values for the concentrations of most metals, showed a dissolved chromium (Cr(VI)) concentration of 375 mg/L, which was roughly four times the EPA’s MCL. Previously, at other deep wells located all over LANL, levels of dissolved chromium were usually no more than ~5 mg/L, and had never been found to exceed ~20 mg/L. Evidently, this data from R-28 was a very surprising circumstance, since it led, seven months later, to a report from LANL to NMED, and ten months later to a LANL(9) public announcement.

At that time, it was said that the probable source of this contamination was effluent water from a cooling tower, attached to a power plant, formerly situated at the head of Sandia Canyon. It seems that this water had contained dissolved chromate (Cr(VI)), added as a corrosion inhibitor, which had somehow found its way into groundwater at the newly drilled R-28. It was estimated that during the period of time from the 1950’s to the 1970’s, between 58,000 and 230,000 lbs of dissolved chromium had been dumped(10) into Sandia Canyon.

This view was supported somewhat by the fact that a number of alluvial (shallow) wells in Sandia, Pueblo, Los Alamos, and Pajarito Canyons had shown a record of sporadic high levels of chromium in filtered(14) groundwater samples. For example, in the Pueblo Canyon alluvial well APCO-1, chromium concentrations were as high as 5300 mg/L, on 3-29-95; in the Los Alamos Canyon alluvial LAO-2 the concentration was 400 mg/L, on 12-21-93; and in the Pajarito Canyon alluvial PCO-3 the concentration was 740 mg/L, on 6-7-93, all in filtered samples. However, it was also true that these high levels of chromium were neither persistent in time, nor were they spread out in space; i.e., they existed for periods of time of no more than a few months, usually did not recur, and they were observed only at isolated locations. Other nearby alluvial wells did not show these sharp chromium concentration spikes. Perhaps most importantly, in no case had such high chromium concentrations been measured in alluvial wells during the past five years.

However, it may have seemed odd that no other deep wells in the vicinity of R-28 had ever shown signs of elevated chromium levels; e.g., the old test well TW-3, in Los Alamos Canyon, had never registered high levels of chromium. Also, none of the Los Alamos County water supply wells, PM-1, PM-2, and PM-3, in place since 1977, and PM-4 and PM-5, in place since 1988, had ever shown signs of elevated chromium. These water supply wells are, in no case, more than two miles from R-28, and surround it. PM-1 and PM-3 are in Sandia Canyon itself, PM-4 is in Cañada del Buey, PM-5 sits between Tenmile Canyon and Cañada del Buey, while PM-2 is in Pajarito Canyon. These last three wells are all to the south of Mortandad Canyon.

Finally, it may have seemed odd too that no intermediate depth wells had ever shown elevated chromium levels; e.g., MCOI-8, MCOI-4, and MCOBT-4.4, all in Mortandad Canyon, and all located within 1 ½ miles upstream of R-28, had no history of high chromium concentration.

Subsequently, many studies have been performed, based on computer simulations, in an attempt to better understand this situation. LANL scientists now believe that there is a plume of groundwater, contaminated by high levels of dissolved chromium (~400 mg/L (+/-) 25 mg/L), confined to an area centered on R-28, and extending no more than one-half mile in any direction; see Fig. 4.2-1 of ref. 3. It is problematic as to how these high levels of Cr(VI) have been maintained, essentially without change, for at least the past three years.

Based upon these observations, it is reasonable to speculate that there is a large source of chromium located somewhere upstream of R-28. And, in fact, a source of sedimentary chromium is known to exist in a wetland at the head of Sandia Canyon, adjacent to, and downstream from, the site of the old power plant cooling tower; see Fig. 1.0-1 of ref. 3.

Presumably, this chromium is in its reduced state, Cr(III), which is largely insoluble in water, for values of pH near neutral. Further, evidence exists that this source of chromium is being mobilized by outfalls from a large sewage treatment plant which sweep regularly through the wetland(15).

In order to further test this hypothesis, LANL has planned for several new wells to be drilled in the immediate vicinity of R-28. The latest news(14) is that, in the first of these wells to be completed, SCI-2, perched water has been detected at a depth of 509 ft bgs, and a filtered sample of this water shows a chromium concentration of ~500 mg/L.

Lead (Pb)

The subject of lead in groundwater at LANL is also of some interest. During the period 1959-1961 LANL conducted underground weapons tests at MDA-AB (TA-49). These were the so-called hydronuclear tests, described by Bob Thorn(16). Residues of these tests included a variety of toxic materials(17), among which was an estimated 200,000lbs of elemental lead (Pb).

The tests were conducted in unlined earthen shafts, dug to depths of between 30 and 100 ft. These shafts were disrupted by the test explosions and, one assumes, toxic residues were mixed into the adjacent tufa and soil. What has become of these residues, the mobility of which has been unrestricted by any artificial barrier, over the past 50 years? I alluded to this subject in a previous publication(1). This subject has also been discussed by Bob Gilkeson, in a recent study(4).

Bob quotes data(13) taken from the WQDB, describing the history of Pb concentrations measured in the old test wells DT-5A, DT-9, and DT-10, located at MDA-AB. He points out the very large excursion in the record of Pb concentrations recorded at DT-5A, during the period 1992-1995; i.e., to a level of ~9000 mg/L, which is 90 times the MCL. It seems that DT-5A is located in the middle of a cluster of five shafts, once used for hydronuclear tests, and is no farther than 1000 ft from any one of those shafts.

Bob notes also that, during this same period, excursions were recorded in Pb concentrations from DT-9 and DT-10, although to values of less than 100 mg/L. But, those two wells are both located outside of the cluster of shafts, and at a distance of several thousand feet from the nearest shaft. Meanwhile, at the old test well TW-3, located in Los Alamos Canyon, approximately five miles distant from MDA-AB, no excursion in Pb concentration was ever seen.

Enquiring minds ask for an explanation of these phenomena. After all, if what was measured at DT-5A, DT-9, and DT-10 were Pb residues from old hydronuclear tests, residues which had somehow become mobile for a period of a few years during the early 1990’s, then such residues could become mobile again, at some future time.

It appears that LANL may actually favor an explanation of these facts based on a theory(18, 19) of “ … well sampling and well construction issues rather than from LANL contamination.” This appears to be a peculiar theory, on the one hand, because it assumes something which is not much in evidence; viz., that either the drilling fluids, or the well casing and/or the well screening materials used in the construction of DT-5A were rich in Pb, but not so for DT-9 and DT-10, and not at all so for TW-3. On the other hand, this theory is also peculiar since it does not attempt to account for the pronounced time-history of the Pb concentrations that have been observed. At the same time, LANL personnel deny the presence in groundwater of Pb residues from old hydronuclear tests at MDA-AB(19).

However, it is also true that LANL’s point of view finds support in other data found in the WQDB. These data are the records of the concentrations of other common metals, found in the groundwater at these four wells. In Figs. 1, 2, 3, and 4, I plot the histories of measured concentrations for iron (Fe), zinc (Zn), and lead (Pb), at the old test wells DT-5A, DT-9, DT-10, and TW-3, respectively.

Interestingly, excursions in Pb concentration, appearing during the 1993-1994 time period, are accompanied by excursions in both the concentrations of Fe and Zn. Moreover, at DT-9 and DT-10, the excursion in Pb concentration is much smaller than the excursions in both the concentrations of Fe and Zn. At TW-3, concentration histories show a series of fluctuations, but do not show a dominant excursion in the concentration of any metal during the 1993-1994 time period(20).

It may be relevant that LANL will report, in its soon to be released Environmental Surveillance Report for 2007(21), that elevated levels of Pb, and several other metals, have been detected recently in Water Canyon and Threemile Canyon surface water. Water Canyon borders on MDA-AB, and Threemile Canyon borders on Water Canyon. Anon!

Conclusion

We have seen that the subject of metals in groundwater at LANL is one of minor mystery; and we have seen two examples of such mystery.

The story of the high levels of chromium in the groundwater beneath Mortandad Canyon is at least curious. Hard evidence to support the prevailing theory, that the original source of chromium contamination was the old water cooling tower at the head of Los Alamos Canyon, is only now beginning to emerge(3). Earlier, the evidence seemed to be just circumstantial. Certainly, a power plant cooling tower did dump lots of chromium into Sandia Canyon, and that chromium had to go somewhere. But, the connection between that cooling tower in Sandia Canyon, and R-28 in Mortandad Canyon, was tenuous, and seemed to be confined to the histories of chromium contamination measured in samples from select alluvial wells, mostly, but not exclusively, upstream of R-28. Also, these histories showed, for the most part, an isolated excursion in chromium concentration during the period 1993-1995; and this excursion did not recur. At the same time, similar excursions did not occur in other nearby alluvial wells.

But wait! The story of the high levels of Pb, Fe, and Zn measured in groundwater beneath TA-49 is similarly strange. This is because the histories of these three contaminants, in the three deep wells DT-5A, DT-9 , and DT-10, are ones that themselves show sharp excursions in concentration during the 1993-1995 time period, which failed to recur; see Figs. 1-4.

Could all of these isolated concentration excursions, occurring at different locations, but at roughly the same time, be just a coincidence? Or was there some, as yet, unaccounted for influence on the measurements of metal concentrations made at wells distributed over a wide area on the Pajarito Plateau, during 1993-1995?

Bibliography

1) “Summary [with Commentary] of ‘Radionuclides in Groundwater’ from LANL’s ‘Water Quality Data Base’ I.”, Ken LaGattuta NNMCAB, 7-18-08.

2) “Summary [with Commentary] of ‘Radionuclides in Groundwater’ from LANL’s ‘Water Quality Data Base’ II: History of Tritium Activities”, Ken LaGattuta NNMCAB, 8-30-08.

3) D. Katzman, “Chromium Fate and Transport for Chromium Contamination from Sandia Canyon”, LA-UR-08-4702. The story of the contamination of groundwater beneath Sandia Canyon by chromium is extensive and ongoing.

4) “Comment on the Large Plume of Lead in the Groundwater Below the LANL Legacy Waste Disposal Site MDA AB and the Deficiencies in the LANL Protection Practices …” , Robert H. Gilkeson, 8-25-08.

5) See remarks in ref. 2, relating to the proper use of the MDA.

6) See remarks in ref. 2, relating to (-) Result values.

7) Office of Water (4606M), EPA 816-F-03-016, www.epa.gov/safewater, June, 2003. The Primary Drinking Water Standard defines values of the MCL beyond which serious health effects could ensue, for the general population. It should be clear that applying a drinking water standard to groundwater, which may not be used for regular drinking, is a conservative approach.

8) Ibid. The Secondary Drinking Water Standard defines values of the MCL beyond which noticeable minor health effects could ensue, for the general population.

9) “Los Alamos National Laboratory News”, James E. Rickman, March 17, 2006.

10) “Los Alamos National Laboratory News”, James E. Rickman, December 7, 2006.

11) “Los Alamos National Laboratory News”, James E. Rickman, May 3, 2007. Quoting from this news release: “Personnel in the Lab's Water Stewardship Project recently began construction of monitoring well R-35 in lower Sandia Canyon. This regional-aquifer-monitoring well is being constructed upgradient and near Los Alamos County drinking-water-supply well PM-3. The R-35 well will act as a ‘sentinel’ that can determine whether a plume of hexavalent chromium—a component of a corrosion inhibitor used from the 1950s to the 1970s—is approaching the county’s PM-3 well.” However, R-28 was installed(12) in 2003, and the discovery of high levels of dissolved chromium in this well was made(13) in May, 2005.

12) (www.wqdbworld.lanl.gov / Chemistry/ Characterization Wells/ Completion Reports.

13) (www.wqdbworld.lanl.gov / Chemistry/ Metals/ Groundwater.

14) D. Katzman (LANL), in talk presented to the NNMCAB’s EMSR Committee, Sept. 10, 2008. He emphasized the importance of obtaining filtered water samples, when attempting to measure the concentration of Cr(VI) in groundwater. Presumably, unfiltered samples would include sediments onto which insoluble Cr(III) could be adsorbed.

15) Ibid. Katzman reported that the nitrogen detected in groundwater at R-28 is in the form of nitrate, suggesting that its origin is in sewage.

16) R. N. Thorn and D. R. Westervelt, “Hydronuclear Experiments”, LA-10902-MS, Feb., 1987.

17) D. G. Levitt, etal , “Site Characterization and Monitoring of TA-49 at LANL”, in Proceedings of Waste Management ‘03 Conference, Tucson, AZ, Feb. 23-27, 2003.

18) Environmental Surveillance at Los Alamos during 2006, LA-14341-ENV.

19) Terry Morgan (LANL), during a discussion of EM issues at LANL, Aug., 2008. Present were T. Morgan, A. Simmons, L. Bonds-Lopez, and myself.

20) Unfortunately, all entries in the WQDB for metals in groundwater, prior to 1993, are for unfiltered samples; entries for filtered samples, begin in 1993. Although in Figs. 1-4, for data prior to 1993, I have recorded the values measured for unfiltered samples, beginning with 1993-1994 the recorded values are largely for filtered samples. Most importantly, the peaks appearing circa 1993-1994 are for filtered samples.

21) Environmental Surveillance at Los Alamos during 2007, (DRAFT) Executive Summary, Table ES-4, Sept., 2008.

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Tritium in Groundwater and the RACER Database

2010-01-07T17:40:00.000-07:00

The Department of Energy (DOE) has sponsored the creation of an online database and data analysis tool called Risk Analysis, Communication, Evaluation, and Reduction (RACER) located at www.racerdat.com. This tool is being administered by the New Mexico Community Foundation (NMCF) and has been publicly available since early 2009. Currently, it is said that there are approximately 7 million pieces of environmental data accessible through RACER. Presumably, most of these data pertain to contamination left by the DOE's nuclear weapons program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL).

RACER is also a tentative component of the DOE's newly refurbished Environmental Justice (EJ) Program. DOE says that the its EJ program aims to assist members of economically disadvantaged communities across the United States to participate in evironmental decision-making. This would be a decision-making related to the disposition of detritus from large DOE operations; in particular, to the accumulated legacy waste from its nuclear weapons program. But, whether or not RACER will prove to be useful in this regard, remains to be seen.

Quoting from a January, 2010 letter from the NMCF to RACER users:

"RACER is the first project ever in the United States where the public has full access and full transparency to environmental data at a Department of Energy site. It's giving the public a voice in a way that it never really had before."

Continuing from the same letter (but paraphrasing somewhat):

Do you have questions about what chemical or radionuclear contaminants may be present in the Northern New Mexico environment?

For example, is the soil on the Pajarito Plateau contaminated with chemical residues from high-explosives tests conducted at Los Alamos National Laboratory?

Has laboratory analysis confirmed the presence of radionuclides along your favorite hiking trail in Bandelier National Monument?

Have tritium levels in local groundwater ever exceeded national drinking water standards and, if so, where and when did this occur? (end of paraphrase)

Prior to the appearance of RACER, much of the groundwater data that it contains could be found in LANL's Water Quality Data Base (WQDB). However, the WQDB itself was withdrawn from public access in early 2009.

In my opinion, the extent to which RACER's data will act to "give the public a voice" is doubtful. Nevertheless, as an example of the kind of questions that could be raised by perusing this data, I've copied here a white-paper which I wrote in mid-2008, while a member of the DOE-sponsored Northern New Mexico Citizens Advisory Board. The paper was concerned with tritium activities in groundwater on the Pajarito Plateau, and was based entirely on data taken from the WQDB. No response to the questions raised in this paper has ever been offered by representatives of LANL, or of the DOE.

RADIONUCLIDES in GROUNDWATER: A HISTORY of TRITIUM ACTIVITIES at LANL

Introduction

In an earlier communication(1), the first of a series, I presented a brief summary of the contents of LANL’s online Water Quality Data Base (WQDB). This was intended to serve as a non-technical introduction to the WQDB for members of the Northern New Mexico Citizens Advisory Board (NNMCAB). Although no feedback was evoked from NNMCAB members, reaction to this overview from LANL staff was quick, and in the course of a long face-to-face conversation I was presented with many critical LANL thoughts(2).

In this, the latest installment in my ongoing study of the WQDB, I react to some of these criticisms, while I present a WQDB based history of tritium concentrations measured all around the LANL site, beginning in the 1960’s, and extending to the present day. I continue to hope that my efforts will help to inform the future work of the NNMCAB.

Throughout the following, some paragraphs are repeats taken, with minor modifications, from my earlier paper(1).

Data tabulated in the WQDB (www.wqdbworld.lanl.gov) is a record of the activities of specific radionuclides, at particular locations (wells or springs), usually in units of pCi/L (picocuries per liter). Uncertainties in measured values of activities are also usually tabulated, as well as the estimated(3) Minimum Detectable Amount (MDA). In many cases, the listed MDA is greater than the measured value of the activity, and its associated uncertainty. If so, then the measured activity is accompanied by a < sign, indicating that the measurement is thought to be of a “non-detect”(4). Often values of measured activities appear with a minus sign, indicating that the measured activity was less than the activity of a corresponding blank sample and, therefore, also of a non-detect(5).

Note that, generally, for activities recorded prior to 1995, no value at all for the MDA appears in the WQDB. In the following, I will not refer to data preceded by a < sign, or by a minus sign.

History of tritium activities

Keep in mind, while perusing the following, that the DOE sets the upper bound for acceptable values of tritium activity in drinking water at approximately 20,000 pCi/L.

Tritium, a beta emitter and essential to the weapons program, has been found to be widespread in groundwaters of the Pajarito Plateau. Levels in the alluvial wells of Los Alamos and Mortandad Canyons have been very high, until within the last ten years, when levels have subsided. For example, at LCAO-2 a value of 190000 pCi/L was measured on 8-13-70, but levels have decreased since then to a value of 64 pCi/L, returned on 1-15-08. At MCO-3 a level of 12000000 pCi/L was measured on 3-24-87, while the level was 5400 pCi/L on 7-12-04. Levels measured at drinking water wells have been moderately high until as recently as the 1980’s when they were found to be at 5900 pCi/L at PM-1 on 9-10-81, and 4200 pCi/L at PM-3 on 3-30-82. However, the measured levels at drinking water wells have now subsided to values of less than 1 pCi/L.

Levels measured at some wells of recent origin are also high; e.g., at the intermediate depth regional wells, such as R-6i, levels were 4300 pCi/L on 11-17-05, and 3800 pCi/L on 1-23-08. Levels measured at a few deep regional wells are a bit high. For example, a level of 195 pCi/L was returned from R-28 on 11-29-07, and a level of 28 pCi/L was returned from R-15 on 2-25-08.

Since 2001, levels returned from the Buckman wells have all been below 2 pCi/L. Prior to these recent measurements, there were only a very few measurements recorded. These occurred in 1973, and returned levels of approximately 100 pCi/L.

The highest recorded values of tritium activity are depicted in Fig. 1. Here, the history of detected tritium activity is displayed for the three sites, MCO-3, LAO-1, and PM-1. The first two of these sites are alluvial wells (shallow wells), one in Mortandad and one in Los Alamos Canyon, and the third site is a Los Alamos County drinking water well (deep well).

The similarity between these three histories is striking. The measured values of tritium activity were very low prior to 1970, jumped to high values, often suddenly, remained at a constant level for up to 2 decades and then, beginning around 1990, subsided slowly at a rate which was characteristic of the site.

In fact, this same behavior can be seen to have occurred at many other LANL locations. For example, Fig. 2 records the histories of tritium activities at the Mortandad Canyon alluvial well MCO-5, the Los Alamos County drinking water well PM-3, and the deep characterization well DT-10, located at TA-49. It seems that all these histories suggest a series of events in which some source of tritium contamination first appears around 1970, persists at a constant intensity until about 1990, and then subsides, either gradually or abruptly.

Looking back at Fig. 2, the decrease of the measured tritium activity with time, between 1987 and 2007, is very close to an exponential, with a resident half-life which I estimate to be about 7.6 years. Similarly, assuming an exponential decrease in tritium activities for the DT-10 and PM-1 histories too, I arrive at a value for the resident half-life in these two wells of about 12.3 years. Returning now to Fig. 1, I estimate the resident half-life of tritium in LAO-1 to be about 7.9 years.

Thus, it seems reasonable to conjecture that the deep wells PM-1 and DT-10, whose tritium resident half-lives I estimated to be 12.3 years, show time histories which reflect the natural decay rate of tritium (T1/2 = 12.3 yrs., for the beta decay of 3H), and suggest that the natural residence time for waters in the vicinity of the relevant well screens in these wells is much greater than 12 years. On the other hand, the shallow wells MCO-5 and LAO-1, have tritium resident half-lives which I estimated to be 7.6 to 7.9 years, suggesting that there is an exchange of waters in these wells with the surrounding area which takes place over a period of approximately 7 years.

The behavior of all of these histories of detected tritium activities is interesting, and has led to some prior well-informed speculation. In a August, 2005 paper(6), it was suggested by scientists working under contract to the DOE that this behavior could be traced to the contamination of groundwater by the Omega West reactor(7), formerly located at the head of Los Alamos Canyon. This reactor operated continuously from 1956 until 1992, when it was shut down for servicing, and soon thereafter decommissioned.

During the shut-down it was discovered that there was a leak of a significant size in a pipe buried underneath the reactor. This was a pipe which transported primary coolant water between the reactor and its external cooling tower. [Evidently, there was no provision made in the reactor design for a secondary coolant system, so that the primary coolant system could be completely contained within the reactor building, as is the case for all existing NRC licensed commercial power reactors.] At that time, it was said that it was not known for how long that the leak had existed.

[As is well-known, a fission reactor’s primary coolant should be completely isolated from the environment, since it contains a build-up of tritium produced by absorption of neutrons emitted by the 235U fuel. In cases where the fuel cladding has developed cracks or holes, highly radioactive fission products may also be released into the primary coolant. Among these is 99Tc.]

The radionuclide 99Tc, an electron(beta) emitter, is a common product of the fission of 235U, and does not occur naturally on the earth, except in the minutest of quantities. In fact, 99Tc is normally found in groundwater at activity levels as high as 1 pCi/L only in the immediate vicinity of a water cooled nuclear reactor. There, it can be ejected into the coolant during fission of the uranium fuel in the core, and may be released into the environment with coolant water effluents.

During the period 1956 to 1994 the Omega West reactor operated at the head of Los Alamos Canyon and occasionally deposited its wastes, containing 99Tc, directly into the canyon(8). Thus the presence of technetium in groundwater downstream of the now decommissioned Omega West reactor is a probable remnant of the operation of that reactor.

The high concentrations of 99Tc in the alluvial well LAUZ-1, in Los Alamos Canyon, and in the alluvial wells MCO-5, MCO-6, MCO-7, MCO-7.5, MT-1, MT-3-, and MT-4, in Mortandad Canyon, and in the intermediate wells MCOI-4, MCOI-5, and MCOI-6, in Mortandad Canyon, can be taken as evidence of contamination by effluents from that reactor. For example, 99Tc has been detected in groundwater taken from LAUZ-1 at levels of up to 38 pCi/L; in groundwater from MCO-7.5 at levels up to 23 pCi/L; and in groundwater from MCA-5 at levels up to16 pCi/L.

The regional wells R-22 and R-34 have shown the presence of 99Tc in groundwater taken from the aquifer underlying Mortandad Canyon, at levels of 5 pCi/L. However, there have been no detections of 99Tc at locations removed from the Pajarito Plateau. In particular, this radionuclide has not been detected in the Buckman wells.

Conclusion

Based upon the evidence presented, it is arguable that a major contribution to the past contamination of groundwater by tritium, beneath certain parts of the Pajarito Plateau, was made by a leak in the Omega West reactor primary coolant system, and that this source of contamination had been ongoing for as long as two decades(6).

[Oddly, during all this time, measurements of tritium activity in groundwater were also ongoing and evidence of the contamination of groundwater by tritium was persistent. It may seem difficult now to imagine how such data could not have been seen, at the time that it was being collected, as evidence for the existence of a major reactor leak. However, for as long as two decades, apparently nothing was done to put a stop to this potential hazard. Perhaps the hazard was judged to be of no great significance for the public health.

In this context, it is interesting to note that the Agency for Toxic Substances Disease Registry (ATSDR), an arm of the United States Public Health Service, issued a report(8) in April of 2005, in which they found no evidence of impacts to public health from LANL operations, over the period 1980 to 2001. However, no mention is made in this report of the very high tritium activities, recorded during the period 1980-1995, in the groundwater of alluvial wells located in Los Alamos and Mortandad Canyons. Concerning tritium, the ATSDR only reports, without comment, measurements of tritium activities in certain biota; e.g., 27,000 pCi/L in honey from Mortandad Canyon, sampled in 1980; 11,000 pCi/L in elk bone, sampled in 1994-5; and 17,000 pCi/L in “produce”, collected in 1999. The ATSDR is unalarmed by these values since the DOE sets a standard for the tritium contamination of biota at approximately ten times its standard for tritium in drinking water.]

Bibliography

(1) “Summary [with commentary] of “Radionuclides in Groundwater” from LANL’s “Water Quality Data Base”, K. LaGattuta, NNMCAB, 7-18-08.
(2) Meeting called at LANL by Lorrie Bonds-Lopez to inform me of my errors: in attendance, besides myself, were Ms. Lopez, Ardyth Simmons, Terry Morgan, and Mike McLaughlin (briefly present), Aug., 2008.
(3) As pointed out by LANL’s Terry Morgan, the Minimum Detectable Amount (MDA) or, Minimum Detectable Activity, is the result of a “calculation”. It seems to me, however, that this calculation is only an approximation to some exact theory of error, and must be problematic to some degree. Therefore, it is fair to refer to it as an “estimate”. Note that, prior to ~1995, Results appearing in the WQDB are unaccompanied by any value at all for the MDA.
(4) The level at which the recorded activity of a particular radionuclide is said to be a “detect” is somewhat arbitrary. In fact, at various times this level has been set at the MDA plus one standard deviation (SD); at other times, a “detect” has been assigned as the MDA plus two SD’s; and at still other times, a “detect” has been set at the MDA plus three SD’s. For cases in which a measured activity is close to the MDA, it is necessary to ask: Is this value, returned by some analytical laboratory, a real measure of the activity of a particular radionuclide, or a measurement error of some sort? The answer can best be couched in terms of probabilities. Generally, as a measured value approaches the MDA from above, the probability of its being a real value and not an artifact should approach zero. But, the probability of a measured value of activity at, or even below, the MDA, being a real measure of activity, with non-zero probability, depends upon one’s estimation of the reliability of the precise value of the MDA. (The SD is an accepted measure of the most probable variation from the mean found in a lengthy data series. For the data recorded in the WQDB, the SD could be taken as the tabulated Uncertainty.)
(5) If the measured activity of a sample (S), inside a container, is less than the apparent measured activity of the empty container (C), then a negative value appears in the Results column of the WQDB; i.e., since Result = S-C. The data errors accumulated over the course of a lengthy series of sample measurements are partly due to the variable influence of the individual sample containers upon the measurement process.
(6) In, “A Vadose Zone Flow & Transport Model for Los Alamos Canyon, Los Alamos, New Mexico”, by Bruce A. Robinson, etal, published online, August 26, 2005. In this numerical simulation of tritium transport beneath the Pajarito Plateau, the authors estimate the source concentration of tritium in the Omega West reactor’s primary coolant water to be ~18 x 106 pCi/L. They also describe the history of detected tritium activities from LAO-1, and from LAO-3, both alluvial wells in Los Alamos Canyon.
(7) “Lab completes Omega West reactor decommissioning”, LANL Public Affairs, July 30, 2003.
(8) In, “LANL Public Health Assessment”, ATSDR/US-HHS, April 26, 2005. It seems that the ATSDR undertook this study, in part, because of worries expressed to it by members of the general public, living around Los Alamos, about possible deleterious health effects arising from past LANL operations. It is interesting to note a passage appearing on p94 of this Assessment: “Three underground storage tanks were used to hold liquid radioactive wastes produced when the Omega West reactor was active. Usually, when the tanks were full, their contents were emptied and transported to the TA-50 Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility. Occasionally, when the tanks were full, liquid waste water was discharged directly into Los Alamos Canyon.”

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

National Park Status for Los Alamos?

2010-01-06T18:20:00.000-07:00

The U. S. National Park Service has recently announced its intent to conduct a study for the preservation and interpretation of four historic sites associated with the Manhattan Project. One of these four is the Los Alamos National Laboratory and townsite (for more info see the website: parkplanning.nps.gov/mapr.) It seems that national pride in the singular product of the Manhattan Project may soon be reburnished.

On the other hand, some months ago (on June 25, 2009, in a public meeting at the Buffalo Thunder Hotel) members of the Centers for Disease Control's "Los Alamos Historical Document Retrieval and Assessment Project" (LAHDRA) presented their draft final report. Much interesting information was conveyed during the approximately two hours allotted to the summarizing of this report.

For example, quoting directly from the LAHDRA final report’s chapter 22, under the heading, “Early airborne releases of Plutonium”:

“Plutonium was processed in crude facilities in D Building during World War II, and many roof-top vents were unfiltered and unmonitored. After DP West Site took over production late in 1945, there was some filtering of releases, but poor monitoring practices caused releases to be underestimated. Documents indicate that DP releases for 1948-1955 alone were over 100 times the total reported by the Lab for operations before 1973.”

After the meeting Joe Shonka of Shonka Research Associates, a contributing author of the report, said that LAHDRA was intended to be a historical study: “Almost everybody is already dead,” he said. “How many people do you know who were alive in the ’40s?”

Shonka noted that the “hapless civilians”, who were caught up in fallout from the first atomic explosion at Trinity Site in New Mexico, “had not been fully evaluated.” Moreover, “There is a lot of distrust and some of this [LAHDRA report] may help the public to trust that scientists know what goes on.”

However, quoting from the LAHDRA final report’s, chapter 22, under the heading
“Public exposures from the Trinity test”:

“Residents of New Mexico were not warned before the 1945 Trinity blast, or warned of health hazards afterward, and no residents were evacuated. Exposure rates in public areas from the world’s first nuclear explosion were measured at levels 10,000 times higher than currently allowed. Residents reported that fallout ‘snowed down’ for days after the blast, most had dairy cows, and most collected rain water off their roofs for drinking. All assessments of doses form the Trinity test issued to date have been incomplete in that they have not addressed internal doses received after intakes of radioactivity through inhalation or consumption of contaminated water or food products.”

In my view, it is questionable that a careful reading of the LAHDRA final report will do much to rebuild trust in activities having to do with nuclear materials. In this context, that a contributor to the LAHDRA study (J. Shonka), should refer to people who lived within approximately 30 miles of the Trinity blast, and who were all unwarned and thus unsheltered at the time, as “hapless civilians” seems disturbing.

According to Webster, “hapless” means “unlucky.” But, these people were not just unlucky. Rather, they had had their vital interests deliberately subordinated to national interests, as a part of the culmination of the then top secret government program.

Concerns of Northern New Mexico Citizens Probed

2010-01-06T12:20:00.000-07:00

In this post I contrast the "Community Survey Report for Northern New Mexico" (CSR), available on this blog, with the "Los Alamos National Laboratory Community Leaders Study" (CLS), available at www.lanl.gov/cpo/. Both of these works first appeared in late 2009.

The former is an unfunded survey performed by myself, with 225 respondents. The latter is a DOE-LANL funded survey conducted by Research & Polling, Inc. of Albuquerque, NM, with 224 respondents. The former survey attempts to assess the feelings of ordinary local community members toward DOE-LANL and is driven by a personal curiosity, fueled by two years of frustrating service on the DOE's Northern New Mexico Citizens Advisory Board (NNMCAB). The latter study attempts to explore the question of how DOE-LANL is perceived by local community leaders, and is inspired by a need of DOE-LANL administrators for programmatic feedback.

Here are a few lines from the CSR:

"A survey was conducted of the attitudes of citizens of Española and Santa Fe toward DOE operations in NM.

Results show that worries about legacy waste, as well as wastes generated by present and possible future DOE operations, are combined with an appreciation for the economic benefits brought to NM by DOE operations."

"Based on these survey results, it is plausible to say that money and jobs brought to Northern NM by the DOE are considered to be very important to many of Northern NM’s citizens. At the same time, concerns about pollution caused by the DOE’s operations are very worrisome. Often, feelings of gratification due to economic benefit, and worries about pollution, appear within the same individual."

"There is evidence of ambivalence toward the DOE’s ongoing nuclear weapons program. Although strong opinions pro and con about nuclear weapons do not appear within the same individual, uncertainty about this issue can still be seen in the views of individual respondents."

"It seems fair to say that suspicion about the DOE’s operations in northern New Mexico is widespread. The fact that many DOE employees live and work in Northern New Mexico is not seen as a reason to be sanguine about the DOE’s operations here."

Here are a few lines from the CLS:

"This tracking study (CLS) was commissioned by LANL. The objective was to measure the Lab’s perceived progress in maintaining community relationships and listening and responding to the needs of the communities in Northern NM ... . The study measures changes in Community Leaders’ awareness and satisfaction levels with specific Lab programs and activities over the past year. The results of the research will help to better shape and direct ... contributions to the region in the ... future."

"Over the past two years, LANL has improved its overall image among Community Leaders throughout Northern NM. LANL’s persistent efforts to be involved with, and support, a variety of community programs have clearly helped its overall standing in the region. The Community Leaders’ positive opinion of LANL is reflected in their overall impression ratings. Approximately three-fifths (61%) of Leaders have a favorable impression of the Lab, which has grown from 52% in the previous year, while unfavorable ratings have dropped from 13% to 6% currently."

The difference in emphasis between the CSR and the CLS is clear enough. However, both works attempt to address legitimate concerns regarding the relationship between DOE-LANL and the Northern New Mexico community.

The completed CSR was first presented publicly on Nov. 18, 2009, at Northern New Mexico University, to NMED's Community Radiation Monitoring Group. It had been previously summarized at November, 2009 meetings of the NNMCAB.

(A discussion of LANL employee attitudes, as reflected in a 2009 LANL internal survey, has been blogged recently at LANL-the-rest-of-the-story.blogspot.com.)

Community Survey Report for Northern New Mexico

2009-12-21T13:52:00.000-07:00

Abstract
A survey was conducted of the attitudes of 225 citizens of Española and Santa Fe toward DOE operations in New Mexico. Results show that worries about legacy waste, as well as wastes generated by present and possible future DOE operations, are combined with an appreciation for the economic benefits brought to New Mexico by these same DOE operations.

Introduction

The Department of Energy (DOE), since the beginning of its program in the mid-1990’s to clean up its nuclear weapons (NW) waste sites, has believed that it was important to its success to enlist support from members of the local communities. As one means of obtaining such support the DOE, through its office of Environmental Management (EM), has created Site Specific Advisory Boards (SSAB), located at its major NW production and/or laboratory sites around the country, and staffed by local citizen volunteers. Today the DOE can point to several accomplishments of these Boards, and argue plausibly that the Boards have been an asset to DOE-EM’s program to clean up so-called legacy waste[1].

Nevertheless, it must be admitted that a variety of problems has been experienced by the SSABs, and that these problems began to emerge early on[1,2]. For example, it has been noted that local Board members will struggle amongst themselves to reach agreement about critical questions regarding the clean up at their particular site, either to no avail, or if successfully then accompanied by a residue of bad feelings. Polarization of the Board can then ensue.

Occasionally, it has been found that Boards that are experiencing polarization are divided between members who feel a strong economic interest in the future of their DOE facility and other members who feel no economic interest but are critical of the DOE’s NW program. Such a situation may emerge if a NW production and/or laboratory facility is located within an economically depressed region in which there is an active anti-nuclear movement[2].

During the last two years the northern New Mexico Citizens Advisory Board (NNMCAB) has experienced some polarization. Heated discussions amongst Board members have revealed underlying prejudices, both pro and con, with regard to the DOE and its operations. Often, discussions have devolved into assertions about what members of the local community want and think. However, no real evidence has been offered to support these claims.

Consequently, a formal survey of attitudes held by members of the northern New Mexico community toward DOE-LANL was thought to be advisable. The survey was designed to reflect the debates that have occurred among NNMCAB members, during the past two years.

The local community being sampled included proportionate numbers of residents from Rio Arriba and Santa Fe counties. Hopefully, such a survey will help the DOE, LANL, and the NNMCAB to better understand the local community in which they live and work[3]. This will be particularly important as actual remediation of the affected waste sites begins, and more public involvement in the planning for long-term stewardship of these sites is sought.

In truth, DOE-LANL already conducts an annual survey of local attitudes. However, these professionally conducted surveys[4] have been confined to so-called community leaders; e.g., mayors, city council members, and local businessmen. Such surveys do not attempt to assess the attitudes of ordinary citizens.

Procedure

The procedure invoked was evolved from an approach which is standard in the polling industry[5]. The sample size obtained was of 225 respondents, which implies a maximum probable error of 6.7%, with 95% confidence[6]. As will become clear from the Results section of this report, the differences in average response rates observed were often much in excess of 10% and, therefore, much in excess of the maximum probable error.

Although the polling industry ordinarily makes use of telephone contacts to obtain its survey results, for the present survey I obtained results entirely through face-to-face contacts. In order to facilitate the process, I chose to set up polling stations in places where large numbers of people would be expected; i.e., in the lobbies of local Health and Fitness centers, during times of maximum usage.

Survey Statements

As described in the Introduction, the statements selected for this survey were suggested by conversations between members of the NNMCAB, over the past two years. The form of the survey, and its statements, were as follows:

(For each of the following, please circle one response:
5=Strongly Agree; 4=Agree; 3=Neutral; 2=Disagree; 1=Strongly Disagree)

1. I believe that local communities have benefited greatly from DOE operations in New Mexico.
5 4 3 2 1

2. Money and jobs that the DOE has brought to New Mexico are the most important factor.
5 4 3 2 1

3. Radioactive and chemical wastes generated at LANL over the past60 years are of concern to me personally.
5 4 3 2 1

4. Radioactive and chemical wastes transported to, and stored at, the WIPP site are of concern to me personally.
5 4 3 2 1

5. I worry about present and future DOE operations at WIPP, at SNL, and at LANL.
5 4 3 2 1

6. The DOE is a trustworthy organization, and I feel safe knowing that their operations are located nearby.
5 4 3 2 1

7. Nuclear technologies developed at LANL and SNL have benefited New Mexico communities.
5 4 3 2 1

8. Nuclear weapons technologies developed at LANL and SNL have made the people of New Mexico more safe and secure.
5 4 3 2 1

9. Since some managers of the DOE's operations at LANL, SNL, and WIPP live within local communities, then local citizens need not worry about what the DOE is doing.
5 4 3 2 1

10. I don't believe that DOE operations are potentially hazardous to New Mexico's clean air and water.
5 4 3 2 1

Results

Surveys were completed by 225 individual respondents, and response profiles for each of the ten statements were determined by averaging over respondents. These profiles exhibited clear differences in the level of agreement, or disagreement, to the individual statements. Additional written comments by respondents appear in the Appendix.

Strongest agreement was displayed to the two statements:

3. Radioactive and chemical wastes generated at LANL over the past 60 years are of concern to me personally.

4. Radioactive and chemical wastes transported to, and stored at, the WIPP site are of concern to me personally.

Moderate agreement was displayed to the two statements:

1. I believe that local communities have benefited greatly from DOE operations in New Mexico.

5. I worry about present and future DOE operations at WIPP, at SNL, and at LANL.

Weak, although still significant, agreement was displayed to the statements:

2. Money and jobs that the DOE has brought to New Mexico are the most important factor.

7. Nuclear technologies developed at LANL and SNL have benefited New Mexico communities.

Neutrality of opinion was displayed to the two statements:

6. The DOE is a trustworthy organization, and I feel safe knowing that their operations are located nearby.

8. Nuclear weapons technologies developed at LANL and SNL have made the people of New Mexico more safe and secure.

Finally, disagreement was displayed with the two statements:

9. Since some managers of the DOE's operations at LANL, SNL, and WIPP live within local communities, then local citizens need not worry about what the DOE is doing.

10. I don't believe that DOE operations are potentially hazardous to New Mexico's clean air and water.

Graphs of the profile of these averaged responses appear in the accompanying five Figures. Each Figure contains the profile of the average response to just two statements, where Fig. 1 shows responses to the two statements which evoked the strongest agreement (statements #3 and #4); Fig. 2 shows responses to the two statements evoking moderate agreement (statements #1 and #5); Fig. 3 shows responses to the two statements evoking weak agreement (statements #2 and #7); Fig. 4 shows neutrality of opinion (statements #6 and #8); and Fig. 5 shows disagreement (statements #9 and #10).

Discussion

As has been remarked earlier, and as should be clear from Figs. 1-5, the profiles of responses to the ten statements were quite varied, being strongly dependent on the subject being addressed; i.e., on the statement #. These differences are summarized in Fig. 6, where the average response to each statement (average over each profile) is plotted versus statement #.

Further, after averaging all responses over all ten statements, the overall average response was determined to be 3.25. Hence, since 3.0 indicates “no opinion”, or a “neutrality of opinion”, I assert that the phrasing of the ten statements did not prejudice respondents toward an overall agreement or disagreement and was, in this sense, an unbiased survey.

We next consider implications of the results obtained from the 225 respondents who participated in this unbiased survey.

More than any other issue touched on by the statements in this survey, the matter of potential radioactive and chemical contamination of the local environment seems to have evoked the strongest feelings amongst respondents; viz., “radioactive and chemical wastes generated at LANL over the past 60 years are of concern to me personally”, and “radioactive and chemical wastes transported to, and stored at, the WIPP site are of concern to me personally” (statements #3 and #4), produced strong agreement. Evidently, however, the strength of these feelings was reduced if the threat of potential contamination was located at a more remote site, or was placed off into the future; e.g., statement #5.

Respondents also agreed, although with less conviction, that “local communities have benefited greatly from DOE operations in New Mexico” (statement #1), and with still less conviction to the thought that “money and jobs that the DOE has brought to New Mexico are the most important factor” (statement #2). As well, it was felt by respondents to be only somewhat true that “nuclear technologies developed at LANL and SNL have benefited New Mexico communities” (statement #7).

Interestingly, respondents were either unsure, or of decidedly mixed opinion, that “the DOE is a trustworthy organization, and I feel safe knowing that their operations are located nearby” (statement #6), and “nuclear weapons technologies developed at LANL and SNL have made the people of New Mexico more safe and secure” (statement #8).

Definite disagreement was shown by respondents to the thought that “since some managers of the DOE's operations at LANL, SNL, and WIPP live within local communities, then local citizens need not worry about what the DOE is doing” (statement #9). Also, “I don't believe that DOE operations are potentially hazardous to New Mexico's clean air and water” (statement #10) evoked strong disagreement; i.e., in accord with the strong agreement of respondents to the closely related statements #3 and #4, which were expressed as a positive.

Summary

Based on these results, it is plausible to say that money and jobs brought to northern New Mexico by the DOE are generally considered to be very important to many of northern New Mexico’s citizens. At the same time, however, concerns about pollution caused by the DOE’s operations are very worrisome. Often, strong feelings of gratification due to economic benefit, and pronounced worries about pollution, appear within the same individual.

There is also evidence of ambivalence toward the DOE’s ongoing nuclear weapons program. Although, generally, it seems that strong opinions pro and con about nuclear weapons do not appear within the same individual, definite uncertainty about this issue can still be seen in the views of individual respondents.

Finally, it seems fair to say that suspicion about the DOE’s operations in northern New Mexico is widespread. The fact that many DOE employees live and work in northern New Mexico is, generally, not seen as a reason to be sanguine about the DOE’s operations here.

References

[1] History of the DOE-EM SSAB; March, 2009; http://www.em.doe.gov

[2] Advice and Consent: the DOE’s SSABs; Jennifer Weeks, Harvard U.’s Belfer Center for Science, Technology, and Public Policy; Discussion Paper; Sept., 2000.

[3] Tuler, S. and Webler, T.; 2003, SERI Report 03-004; Public Participation in Setting Clean Soil Standards at Rocky Flats; http://www.seri-us.org

[4] http:// www.lanl.gov/orgs/cpo/

[5] Research and Polling, Inc.; Albuquerque, NM; telephone: 505-821-5454.

[6] http://www.DSSResearch.com; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sample_size

Appendix

Additional written comments by respondents were as follows:

Let the masters of science at LANL focus on climate change, health care, etc.

The powers that be do not reside in, and perhaps do not even visit, New Mexico so why should I believe that they have the health and welfare of New Mexico’s citizens in mind? They do not!

I think LANL is good because it gives work to the community and because it is safe.

I believe that DOE does everything in their power and within the law to protect the economy, safety, and way of life in New Mexico, and wherever else they operate.

Sloppy procedures with radioactive materials at LANL concerns me greatly. I equate the DOE’s attitude toward New Mexico with that of the Catholic church’s attitude toward its pedophile priests, many of whom it dumped in New Mexico.

Statement #9 is poorly written. Also, if statement #10 refers to WIPP, then there are other problems that concern me more.

I am not very familiar with the DOE’s operations, and their effect on New Mexico.

Keep doing good work!

No more nuclear development in New Mexico please!

Yucca Mt. is example of DOE’s misuse of tax $. DOE is not credible!

DOE badly manages tailings and dump sites and inadequately protects ground water.

LANL has a terrible history of contamination of the ground water.

I do not consider myself to be well informed about these issues,

DOE needs to be more efficient at the planning and execution of its work.

Let’s move into the 21st century!

I hope that those who lost jobs at LANL will get them back.

Thank you for taking time to conduct this study!

I’m glad that over 1 million American lives were saved by the Manhattan project.

If LANL loses funding then I am concerned, otherwise no!

The cleanup at LANL is necessary, but the research there is questionable.

Statement #10 is tricky.

Fig. 1: statement #3 (solid line); statement #4 (dash line)

Fig. 2: statement #1 (solid line); statement #5 (dash line)

Fig. 3: statement #2 (solid line); statement #7 (dash line)

Fig. 4: statement #6 (solid line); statement #8 (dash line)

Fig. 5: statement #9 (solid line); statement #10 (dash line)

Fig. 6: mean of responses (solid line); variance of responses (dash line)