Today, the New York Time's Matthew Wald described the continued failure of DOE/NNSA to complete the Hanford, Washington Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) construction project. Currently, it is estimated that this project has been 60% completed, and that its total cost will be in excess of $12 billion. Many problems with the design of WTP have been identified recently, which reflect safety concerns, and required changes to the design may be extensive. Senator Ron Wyden (Dem. Oregon), who chairs the Senate Energy Committee, with DOE oversight responsibility, is focusing his attention on this problem.
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1 April 2013 / In a letter, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Chairman Peter Winokur reported to U. S. Sen. Ron Wyden about the state of nuclear safety at Hanford Site. Three separate areas of concern were addressed: (1) safety issues associated with the Hanford Tank Farms; (2) unresolved technical matters related to the design of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP); (3) the current state of Hanford's safety culture. DNFSB performed this study at Sen. Wyden's request.
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27 March 2013 / Outgoing DOE Sec. Chu wrote to DNFSB to inform them that the status of the safety upgrade at LANL's PF-4 (Plutonium Facility) has progressed to the extent that he now felt it acceptable to proceed with normal operations at PF-4. DNFSB had previously pointed out to DOE/NNSA the potentially hazardous conditions existing at PF-4. DNFSB may or may not agree with Chu's latest assessment.
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25 March 2013 / Acting DOE Sec. Nielie Miller wrote to DNFSB to inform them of the status of upgrades to the criticality safety program and procedures at all of the DOE/NNSA facilities. The problems with criticality safety procedures at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) seem to be the most serious, when compared with the other DOE/NNSA facilities. By contrast, excellent performance, in terms of criticality safety, has been turned in at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL).
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DNFSB organized the Pantex Public Meeting, of 14 March, 2013, to inquire into alleged deficiencies in Pantex Plant's safety culture:
Testimony (excerpted) of Ms. Neile Miller
Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
& Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security /U.S. Department of Energy
To the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
Pantex Plant Public Meeting
Amarillo Civic Center
401 S. Buchanan Street
Amarillo, TX, 79101
14 March 2013
INTRODUCTION
In my time here with you today, I want to assure you of two things. First, I am fully aware of the significant safety culture concerns that have been raised by our workers here at the Pantex Plant. Second, we are engaged in —and fully committed to — the timely resolution of any and all nuclear safety deficiencies within the Department, be they cultural, managerial, contractual, design, or operational in origin. This holds true across the NNSA as well as the broader DOE complex, including Environmental Management. I reaffirm the Administration’s and the Department’s commitment to safe and secure work environments for all Federal and contractor employees.
BACKGROUND DISCUSSION
As you know, the Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) recently completed an assessment of the safety culture at the Pantex Plant. The results were sobering; so sobering in fact, that my staff immediately convened to discuss options that could be quickly implemented to address these findings, even as we contemplate longer-term actions to fully implement the recommendations from the HSS report
SAFETY CULTURE ACTIONS
Immediately following the briefing by HSS regarding its safety culture findings at Pantex, NNSA issued a letter to Babcock & Wilcox /Pantex directing immediate focus at all management and working levels to a safety conscious work environment (SCWE) for all on-going activities and operations.
CONCLUSION
As an organization tasked with one of the Nation’s most critical missions, we at DOE understand the fundamental, make-or-break challenges that our work entails. The safe and successful execution of our mission greatly affects our Nation’s safety and security, and demands the very best of all of us, year in and year out. That is why it is so important to embed the commitment to safety deeply in the culture of the NNSA enterprise, so that it will be embraced by all those who succeed us. Our safety culture is critical to protecting and improving the NNSA legacy. We must not fail in this effort.
Our commitment to safety is reflected in the personal passion for safety that the Secretary has expressed on several occasions. His message is clear, and my senior managers and I reinforce it whenever we meet with our workers and stakeholders: The Department has an unwavering commitment to maintain safe and secure work environments for all Federal and contractor employees. Furthermore, we will ensure that the Department’s and contractor’s operations do not adversely affect the health, safety, or security of the surrounding communities or the nation.
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Letter (paraphrased) from Paul Matney, Ed. D., President of Amarillo College, dated March 7, 2013 to DNFSB:
President Matney describes the great importance of Babcock & Wilcox /Pantex jobs to the Amarillo community. He says that B&W Pantex is the third largest local employer and gives jobs to 3000 local residents. According to Matney, "Pantex Plant and its workers have long been a vital part of the Texas Panhandle community and its mission remains critical to the safety and security of our nation."
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