Together We Thrive?

In a series of scholarly papers published, in 2007, in the journal "Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics" the authors O. B. Toon,, R. P. Turco, A. Robock, C. Bardeen, L. Oman, and G. L. Stenchikov described the results of their computer-based simulations of global climate, following the detonation of a number of relatively small nuclear weapons (15 kt each) in several major cities of the northern hemisphere. [Robock, A., Oman, L., Stenchikov, G. L., Toon, O. B., Bardeen, C., and Turco, R. P.: Climate consequences of regional nuclear conflicts, Atmos. Chem. Phys., 7, 2003–2012, 2007, http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/7/2003/2007/.]

 For example, following a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, employing just 100 such nuclear weapons, uncontrollable fires burning in ruined cities on the Indian sub-continent would, over a period of days, loft a mass of soot into the upper atmosphere, which was estimated to be as large as 5 million tons.

 The climate model showed that this large mass of soot would be distributed within weeks over the entire northern hemisphere, and then more slowly over the southern hemisphere. Within months, global temperatures were seen to fall as much as 1.3 degree C, with a recovery time calculated to be as long as ~10 years.

 The consequences for agriculture of a global fall in temperatures of 1.3 degree C, extending over at least a several year period, were considered to be dire. A global decrease in the available food supply was estimated to be as large as 20%. Under such conditions, it was said, starvation would be widespread, especially in the third world, and casualties due to famine would probably far exceed those due to the direct effects of nuclear weapons; e.g., possibly as many as 1 billion people would die from starvation, whereas the number of prompt deaths due to blast, fire, and radiation were expected to exceed tens of millions of people.

 The climate model was the state-of-the-art general circulation model, ModelE, from the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, which included a module to calculate the transport and removal of aerosol particles. It is able to represent the atmosphere up to a height of 80 km, and simulates plume rise to the middle and upper stratosphere, producing a long aerosol lifetime. The atmospheric model was connected to a full ocean general circulation model, with simulated sea ice, allowing the ocean to respond quickly at the surface and on yearly time scales in the deeper ocean.

 This work was a continuation of well-known past work, circa 1985, describing so-called nuclear winter scenarios. In that work, nuclear exchanges between the USSR and the USA were found to cause large decreases in global temperatures, lasting for long periods of time. But, it is now thought that these scenarios actually underestimated the climatic effects of large-scale nuclear exchanges, due to inadequate simulation of the degree to which soot would be lofted into the upper atmosphere. [Crutzen, P. J. and Birks, J. W.: The atmosphere after a nuclear war: Twilight at noon, Ambio, 11, 114–125, 1982; Turco, R. P., Toon, O. B., Ackerman, T. P., Pollack, J. B., and Sagan, C.: Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions, Science, 222, 1283–1292, 1983; Pittock, A. B., Ackerman, T. P., Crutzen, P. J., MacCraken, M. C., Shapiro, C. S., and Turco, R. P.: Environmental Consequences of Nuclear War SCOPE-28, Vol. 1, Physical and Atmospheric Effects, Wiley, Chichester, England, 1985 (Second ed. 1989).]

 Using improved models for soot transport, changes of global climate following a nuclear exchange between the USSR and the USA of a combined total of 1750 Mt of TNT equivalent, over a period of one week, was simulated. This scenario involved the injection of 50 million tons of soot into the upper atmosphere and, following an initiation period of a few months, led to reductions in global temperature of 3.5 degree C, lasting for ~3 years, decreasing to ~1.5 degree C after 10 years. [Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals, A. Robock, L. Oman, and G. L. Stenchikov, J. of Geophys. Research, Vol. 112, D13107, doi:10.1029/2006JD008235, 2007.]

 The extraordinary results obtained from these simulations have been public information now for 6 years. However, the amount of media discussion that has been provoked is minimal. Insofar as USA national policy is concerned, public attention today is fixed instead on other important matters such as unemployment, the budget deficit, the Affordable Care Act, and the so-called "nuclear option" in the US Senate.

 Although the media are also very much interested in the ongoing struggle with Iran over its enrichment of uranium, and its construction of a heavy water nuclear reactor which will enable it to produce plutonium, little or no energy is being spent on contemplation of the looming disaster represented by the remnant ~5,000 nuclear weapons in each of the arsenals of the USSR and the USA, and the 100's of nuclear weapons possessed by England, France, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel.

 I agree that allowing the number of members of the nuclear club to increase represents a present danger to us all. However, the retention of ~10,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the established nuclear weapons club members is, I believe, an even bigger threat.

 Somehow, it must be possible to so stigmatize the use of nuclear weapons, that even their possession will ultimately be deemed unacceptable by the world's people. If the USA does not lead the way to the abolition of nuclear weapons, then what nation will?

 The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty will be up for review in 2015, but signs for the continuation of effective prohibitions on the development of nuclear weapons, by non-nuclear weapons states, are not good. Many nations of the world are unhappy with the lack of significant progress toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, promised for the last 40 years by members of the nuclear weapons club.

 It seems altogether right then that the USA should attempt to break through this logjam of fatalism and distrust by drastically, and if needs be unilaterally, reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in its own arsenal; e.g., to well below 1000 nuclear weapons.

 It seems right too that the USA should set an example by stopping the development of new technologies geared toward the extension of the lifetimes of its stockpiled nuclear weapons and, above all, by ending research focused on accumulating more knowledge of the science and engineering of nuclear weapons; i.e., such knowledge which may enable the creation of a new generation of still more destructive nuclear weapons.

 The USSR, under M. Gorbachov, showed the world that Cold War hostilities could be checked, and for a while reversed. Now it's up to the USA to play an essential role in the reduction of global tensions. If left to fester, these tensions, along with developing new nuclear weapons technologies may, in my opinion, lead eventually to the extermination of us as a species.

US Nuclear Explosions: a Thing of the Past?

Jeremy Bernstein, well-known author and former physicist, opines at the end of an article entitled "At Los Alamos: Learning to Love the Bomb", and appearing in the November 2013 issue of the American Physical Society News, that:

"The last above-ground nuclear test by the United States took place in 1962, ... . This is certainly a good thing. But I have only one misgiving. No one has seen a nuclear explosion in more than thirty years and the number of people who have ever seen one is dwindling. For most people, nuclear weapons are an abstraction. Perhaps there should be one more explosion in the desert of Nevada to remind us."

Now, this seems to me to be a truly bizarre suggestion! Perhaps Mr. Bernstein has been dithered by worry over the ongoing construction, in Iran, of the heavy water nuclear reactor at Arak, and the possible use by the Iranians of the plutonium which will be produced by this reactor, to build a nuclear weapon. Indeed, he has recently expressed his unease about the Arak reactor in an article in the New York Review of Books, dated 11 Nov 2013, and entitled "Iran's Plutonium Game."

Nevertheless, the idea of an above-ground nuclear explosion in Nevada, the purpose of which would be to "remind us" that nuclear weapons are not an abstraction: well, it just takes one's breath away.

Meanwhile, it seems to me that we might all be more concerned by the not remote possibility of an above-ground explosion of a nuclear weapon, within the borders of the United States, purposed by the agents of some adversarial nation-state or by an ad hoc group of self-appointed haters, and in the not so very distant future.

DNFSB Questions Nuke Lab Safety

Safety problems persist and expand throughout the Department of Energy’s nuclear weapons complex. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, in its latest report to Congress, cites Los Alamos National Laboratory as being the most problematic in this regard. Other troubled sites are the Y-12 facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Hanford site, the Savannah River site, the Pantex site, and the Nevada National Security site.

On 30 October 2013, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) issued its “Fourth Annual Report to Congress: Summary of Significant Safety-Related Aging Infrastructure Issues at Operating Defense Nuclear Facilities.”  Quoting now from that report, which is available online:

“DNFSB believes this report provides a means of keeping all parties apprised of safety-related concerns regarding aging infrastructure at Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities.”

“DOE relies on several facilities that are at or near the end of life, but still must carry out national security and legacy waste cleanup missions.”

“Two of the most critical facilities are the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research (CMR)

Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), constructed in 1952, and the 9212

Complex at the Y-12 National Security Complex that began service in 1951.”

“DOE deferred funding for the CMR Replacement Project for five years, and expects to operate the existing CMR Facility through 2019.”

“The 9212 Complex [at Y-12] is comprised of Building 9212 and thirteen collocated buildings, portions of which have been in operation for more than 60 years. The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is scheduled to replace the 9212 Complex, but DOE does not plan to commence operations in UPF until 2025.”

“A third facility of concern to the Board is the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at LANL. PF-4

was designed and constructed in the 1970s and lacks the structural ductility and redundancy required by today's building codes and standards. In 2007, a DOE-required periodic reanalysis of the seismic threat present at the Los Alamos site was completed. It indicated a greater than fourfold increase in the predicted earthquake ground motion. Total facility collapse is now considered a credible event. PF-4, the nation's sole plutonium fabrication center, contains significant amounts of plutonium, much of it in a form that is readily dispersible (i.e., powders and liquids), and is stored in containers that have not been certified to survive facility collapse. The resulting radiation dose consequence to the public following such an event was determined to exceed DOE's allowed evaluation levels by several orders of magnitude. The Board formally identified its concerns with the issuance of Recommendation 2009-2, Los Alamos National Laboratory Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety.”

“In response to this increased seismic threat, LANL undertook a series of actions to

improve the safety posture of PF-4. These actions included efforts to reduce the likelihood and severity of a post-seismic fire, and address the nine known building weaknesses that could lead to loss of PF-4' s ability to confine its nuclear material or total structural collapse. A more detailed seismic analysis to further refine PF-4's response to a major earthquake was also undertaken and completed in September 2012. It identified two additional weaknesses that would result in collapse. Detailed planning to address these weaknesses has been initiated by LANL.”

“DNFSB, in its July 18, 2012, letter, expressed concern that this latest analysis was proceeding without adequate definition and technical justification. Subsequently, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, in his September 28, 2012, response to DNFSB, reported that he had directed the National Nuclear Security Administration to initiate action to evaluate PF-4 using a second modeling approach. This alternate analysis is currently being performed by an independent engineering firm. Final results are expected in December 2013. DNFSB awaits these results before reaching final conclusions on the appropriate urgency of compensatory and corrective actions.”

“PF-4 Safety System Reliability: [this building] lacks … fire-suppression systems and [an] active-confinement ventilation system that would adequately protect the public and workers from the consequences associated with post-seismic accidents.”

“Other facilities meriting continued attention are the high-level waste tank farms at the

Hanford Site and the Savannah River Site, the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility at LANL, and T Plant (Waste Storage, Treatment, and Packaging Operations) at the Hanford Site.”

“SIGNIFICANT SAFETY -RELATED AGING INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES”

“The following are the most significant safety-related aging infrastructure issues that exist today in the DOE defense nuclear complex”:

• “Los Alamos National Laboratory, Plutonium Facility (PF-4) - seismic fragility of building, and degraded safety system reliability: [DNFSB completed] seismic analyses

of PF-4 in May 2011 and September 2012 [and] identified building vulnerabilities

that could result in loss of confinement, or facility collapse, with resulting high radiological dose consequences to workers and the public. [Also,] the facility lacks a set of  safety controls (fire suppression systems and active confinement ventilation systems) that  would adequately protect  the public and workers from consequences associated with post-seismic accidents.”  

• “Los Alamos National Laboratory, Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility (CMR) - seismic fragility of building: [DNFSB estimates that] there is a 1 in 55 chance of seismic collapse during a ten year time-frame, which would result in release of nuclear material, and injury/death of facility workers.”

• “Los Alamos National Laboratory, Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility-building and equipment end of life. RLWTF has reached its end of life and despite ongoing life-extension efforts, requires replacement to support future laboratory missions

reliably. Equipment failures pose a risk to facility workers.”

• “Nevada National Security Site, Device Assembly Facility - degradation of water tank and fire suppression system lead-ins.”

• “Pantex Plant, Site-Wide Fire Suppression Systems – degradation of fire-suppression systems.”

• “Y-12 National Security Complex, 9212 Complex-seismic and high wind fragility of building, and building and equipment end of life.”

• “Hanford Site, Single-Shell and Double-Shell Tank Farms-aging tanks.”

• “Hanford Site, T Plant (Waste Storage, Treatment, and Packaging Operations) - seismic fragility of building.”

• “Savannah River Site, H-Canyon - aging systems and structures.”

• “Savannah River Site, Tank Farms - aging tanks.”

• “Savannah River Site, A-Area, Fire Protection Water Supply Systems - degraded pumps and tank.”

“NEW ISSUES ADDED DURING THE PAST YEAR”

• “Hanford Site, Double-Shell Tank Farms - aging tanks.”

• “Savannah River Site, A-Area, Fire Protection Water Supply Systems - degraded

pumps and tank.”

“ISSUES REMOVED FROM THE REPORT DURING THE PAST YEAR”

• “None”

“As directed by Congress, DNFSB will continue to exercise its existing statutory authority in addressing these and other safety-related issues within the DOE defense nuclear complex.”

A Scientist Rebels

The following is reprinted from The Atlantic Monthly, issue of January, 1947:

The letter which follows was addressed by one of our ranking mathematicians to a research scientist of a great aircraft corporation, who had asked him for the technical account of a certain line of research he had conducted in the war (i.e., during WW II.) Professor Wiener's indignation at being requested to participate in indiscriminate rearmament, less than two years after victory, is typical of many American scientists who served their country faithfully during the war.

Professor of Mathematics in one of our great Eastern institutions (MIT), Norbert Wiener was born in Columbia, Mis­souri, in 1894, the son of Leo Wiener, Professor of Slavic Languages at Harvard University. He took his doctorate at Harvard and did his graduate work in England and in Gottingen. Today he is esteemed one of the world's foremost mathematical analysts. His ideas played a significant part in the development of the theories of communication and control which were essential in winning the war.

  Editor, The Atlantic Monthly

Sir:

I have received from you a note in which you state that you are engaged in a project concerning controlled missiles, and in which you request a copy of a paper which I wrote for the National Defense Research Committee during the war (WW II.) As the paper is the property of a government organization, you are of course at complete liberty to turn to that govern­ment organization for such information as I could give you. If
it is out of print as you say, and they desire to make it available for you, there are doubtless proper avenues of approach to them.

When, however, you turn to me for information concerning controlled missiles, there are several considerations which determine my reply. In the past, the comity of scholars has made it a custom to furnish scientific information to any person seriously seeking it. However, we must face these facts: the policy of the government itself during and after the war, say in the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, has made it clear that to provide scientific information is not a necessarily innocent act, and may entail the gravest consequ­ences. One therefore cannot escape reconsidering the estab­lished custom of the scientist to give information to every person who may enquire of him. The interchange of ideas which is one of the great traditions of science must of course receive certain limitations when the scientist becomes an arbiter of life and death.

For the sake, however, of the scientist and the public, these limitations should be as intelligent as possible. The measures taken during the war by our military agencies, in restricting the free intercourse among scientists on related projects or even on the same project, have gone so far that it is clear that if continued in time of peace this policy will lead to the total irresponsibility of the scientist, and ultimately to the death of
science. Both of these are disastrous for our civilization, and entail grave and immediate peril for the public.

I realize, of course, that I am acting as the censor of my own ideas, and it may sound arbitrary, but I will not accept a censorship in which I do not participate. The experience of the scientists who have worked on the atomic bomb has indicated that in any investigation of this kind the scientist ends by putting unlimited powers in the hands of the people whom he is least inclined to trust with their use. It is perfectly clear also that to disseminate information about a weapon in the present state of our civilization is to make it practically certain that that weapon will be used. In that respect the controlled missile represents the still imperfect supplement to the atom bomb and to bacterial warfare.

The practical use of guided missiles can only be to kill foreign civilians indiscriminately, and it furnishes no protec­tion whatsoever to civilians in this country. I cannot conceive a situation in which such weapons can produce any effect other than extending the kamikaze way of fighting to whole nations. Their possession can do nothing but endanger us by encouraging the tragic insolence of the military mind. If therefore I do not desire to participate in the bombing or poisoning of defenseless peoples - and I most certainly do not - I must take a serious responsibility as to those to whom I disclose my scientific ideas.

Since it is obvious that with sufficient effort you can obtain my material, even though it is out of print, I can only protest pro forma in refusing to give you any information concerning my past work. However, I rejoice at the fact that my material is not readily available, inasmuch as it gives me the opportunity to raise this serious moral issue. I do not expect to publish any future work of mine which may do damage in the hands of irresponsible militarists.

I am taking the liberty of calling this letter to the attention of other people in scientific work. I believe it is only proper that they should know of it in order to make their own independent decisions, if similar situations should confront them.

Norbert Wiener

Ground Water Monitoring Wells at LANL

The Department Of Energy Office of the Inspector General recently issued a report about alterations made to the methodology in use at Los Alamos National Laboratory for installing characterization and monitoring wells. These wells, of which there are 32 in number, have been deemed necessary to determine the type and extent of groundwater contamination by detritus from the nuclear weapons program. (See IG Report No. INS-L-13-05, dated 9 July, 2013, available on the DOE's website.)

 The installation of characterization and monitoring wells into the regional aquifer underlying LANL has been a contentious topic for the past ~10 years. At issue has been the use of an apparently inappropriate technology for the drilling of these wells; specifically, the use of the mud rotary drilling method. It has now been admitted by LANL authorities that the use of drilling muds to facilitate the drilling process, a standard practice in some parts of the well-drilling industry, was probably misguided, since residual muds left in the well bore acted to obscure the presence of chemical and radioactive contaminants in the well water.

 This defeated the whole purpose of the characterization and monitoring well program, which was to detect the type and measure the extent of groundwater contamination by chemical toxins and radioactive poisons from the nuclear weapons program.

 The IG's report points out that LANL no longer uses the mud enhanced drilling methodology, having substituted air and/or drilling foam for mud. Meanwhile, wells that have been drilled with mud have been, to some extent and where possible, rehabiliated. Hence, the IG's report says that " ... steps had been taken to ensure that data derived from monitoring wells is more reliable."

 What the IG's report does not make clear is that a large fraction of the wells that are now in place at LANL have been drilled with mud, and that the rehabilitation of such wells is itself a fraught process.

Plutonium in the News

On June 27, 2013 the Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, Charles McMillan, announced to LANL staff that he was temporarily halting plutonium operations at PF-4. Evidently, this was in response to a report by the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of the Inspector General, released to the public three days earlier, in which LANL's plutonium  operations were criticized as being unsafe. The DOE's report followed analyses by the Congressionally mandated Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) of the hazardous conditions at PF-4. And today, the DNFSB continues to bring these conditions to the attention of the new DOE Secretary Ernest J. Moniz.

Meanwhile, in spite of LANL's having signed an agreement with the State of New Mexico to make all of its environmentally relevant information available to the general public, none of this information about potential hazards at PF-4 can be found on LANL's website.
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DOE - Office of the Inspector General (taken from DOE website):

AUDIT REPORT: OAS-M-13-04  / June 24, 2013 / Mitigation of Natural Disasters at Los Alamos National Laboratory

Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos) is at some risk of seismic events and susceptible to forest fires, including those started by lightning.  Since 2000, there have been two major forest fires that threatened Los Alamos.

Although Los Alamos had made progress in upgrading existing nuclear facilities, concerns remained regarding the mitigation of risks related to natural disasters.  Specifically, we found seismic issues affecting the Plutonium Facility that remain to be addressed.  Additionally, we found that fire protection and prevention vulnerabilities in Area G Waste Storage and Disposal Facility (Area G) continue to exist.  Further, we found that several known risks exist with compensatory measures implemented in Area G that may lessen their efficacy in mitigating natural disasters.  Los Alamos' processes and procedures have not always been fully effective in ensuring that hazards, including natural disasters, are fully analyzed and effectively mitigated.

National Nuclear Security Administration officials responsible for overseeing Los Alamos pointed out that decisions to budget and schedule mitigation measures are based on factors including the probability of an event occurring, such as a seismic event, and whether a structure is considered to be a permanent or limited life facility.  While a number of compensatory and corrective actions have been completed, in our view, further actions are needed to mitigate existing vulnerabilities.  Management concurred with the report's recommendations and indicated that corrective actions have been or would be initiated to mitigate potential risks.
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July 15, 2013

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) writes to the new Department Of Energy (DOE) Secretary Ernest J. Moniz:

The staff of DNFSB performed a review of the Criticality Safety Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) in May 2013. This review indicated significant non-compliances with applicable DOE requirements and industry standards ... . In addition, this review identified criticality safety concerns stemming from weaknesses in the conduct of operations at the Plutonium Facility. The Board notes that some of these deficiencies are long standing and indicate flaws in the federal oversight and contractor assurance systems.

The Board is aware that the Laboratory Director paused programmatic activities in the Plutonium Facility on June 27, 2013. ... the Board requests a report and briefing by the National Nuclear Security Administration ... that details a) any corrective actions NNSA is taking to incorporate criticality safety controls into procedures, ..., b) any root causes NNSA has identified for recent criticality safety infractions, and c) any improvements NNSA has determined are needed to the federal oversight and contractor assurance systems relative to criticality safety, conduct of operations, and effectiveness of corrective actions.
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July 17, 2013

DNFSB writes again to DOE Secretary Ernest J. Moniz:

The DNFSB is responding to former DOE Secretary Chu's March 27, 2013 letter assessing public and worker protection for a seismic collapse scenario at the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) Plutonium Facility (PF-4). In that letter, Sec. Chu concluded that PF-4 can continue to operate safely, provide its confinement safety function, and meet the DOE's quantitative safety objectives ... .

The Board does not agree with the methodology used by the LANL contractor for the seismic analysis upon which Sec. Chu based his conclusions. Consequently, the Board does not agree with the NNSA's conclusion that these modeling results demonstrate compliance with DOE standards for confinement integrity following a design basis earthquake. ... .

Progress is Very Slow

In a letter dated 20 June, 2013 the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board congratulated Dr. Ernest Moniz upon his appointment as the new Department of Energy Secretary. The Board went on to remind the new Secretary of the challenges facing him, of which the most pressing was the possible collapse of the Plutonium Facility (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory, in the event of a design basis earthquake.

 The Board noted that its previous studies of seismic hazards at LANL had shown that the collapse of PF-4 during a design basis earthquake was a plausible outcome, along with the release of massive amounts of plutonium dust into the air over the nearby communities. Subsequently, LANL's own in-house analysis showed that the risk of such a catastrophic accident was not negligible. Consequently, LANL has been working to upgrade the earthquake resistance of PF-4, as well as to reduce the amount of plutonium being stored at the site.

 Citizen activist groups in the Los Alamos area have continued to remind the DOE of its obligation to protect
surrounding communities from the dangers inherent in having a nuclear weapons lab in their midst. These groups have provided input to the DNFSB, supporting its judgement of the dire effects on local populations of a design basis seismic event at PF-4. (For example, see my blogpost of 24 Nov 2011 entitled "Accidental Fall-out from LANL.")
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 The Obama Administration has announced its intent to abandon construction of the Mixed OXide waste plutonium fuel facility at the Savannah River nuclear weapons site, the escalating costs of this unfinished factory having been judged to be prohibitive. However, no acceptable alternative plan for disposition of plutonium from retired nuclear weapons is being proposed. An unintended consequence of this failure to follow through with the MOX fuel program may be the collapse of the agreement with the Russians to dispose of excess plutonium from nuclear weapons. (See my blogpost of 22 Aug 2012 entitled "MOX Redux: Better to Bury than to Burn?")
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 The Obama Administration has also announced its intent to reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads in the US arsenal to ~1000, contingent upon the Russians agreeing to a similar reduction. However, the Russians have expressed an unwillingness to proceed, citing America's threatening increase in the size of its anti-ballistic missile forces. (Since the US unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002.)
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 Finally, the Obama Administration intends to reduce the amount of carbon dioxide being released into the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels, especially from coal burning power plants, principally by EPA regulations authorized under the Clean Air Act. As an important component of this program, construction of new nuclear power plants is being encouraged. (See the Presidents speech at Georgetown University on 25 June 2013.) Unfortunately, however, no provision is being made for the disposition of waste from these new power plants, nor for the disposition of waste from the ~100 aging nuclear power plants still in operation. (A problem since the Administration decided to abandon construction of the Yucca Mountain Nuclear Waste Repository in 2010.)
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 Saturday, 29 June 2013: Both the Santa Fe New Mexican and the Los Alamos Monitor report that the LANL Director Charles McMillan announced on Thursday that certain operations involving plutonium at PF-4 will be halted until safety problems identified in a recent DOE Office of the Inspector General report have been mitigated. This report, entitled "Mitigation of Natural Disasters at Los Alamos National Laboratory", and dated June 2013, is available online. It makes for some very interesting reading.