Safety problems persist and expand throughout the Department
of Energy’s nuclear weapons complex. The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, in its latest report to Congress, cites Los Alamos National Laboratory
as being the most problematic in this regard. Other troubled sites are the Y-12
facility at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Hanford
site, the Savannah River site, the Pantex site, and the
Nevada National Security site.
On 30 October 2013 ,
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) issued its “Fourth Annual
Report to Congress: Summary of Significant Safety-Related Aging Infrastructure
Issues at Operating Defense Nuclear Facilities.” Quoting now from that report, which is
available online:
“DNFSB believes this report provides a means of keeping all
parties apprised of safety-related concerns regarding aging infrastructure at
Department of Energy (DOE) defense nuclear facilities.”
“DOE relies on several facilities that are at or near the
end of life, but still must carry out national security and legacy waste
cleanup missions.”
“Two of the most critical facilities are the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research (CMR)
Facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
constructed in 1952, and the 9212
Complex at the Y-12 National Security Complex that began
service in 1951.”
“DOE deferred funding for the CMR Replacement Project for
five years, and expects to operate the existing CMR Facility through 2019.”
“The 9212 Complex [at Y-12] is comprised of Building 9212
and thirteen collocated buildings, portions of which have been in operation for
more than 60 years. The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is scheduled to
replace the 9212 Complex, but DOE does not plan to commence operations in UPF
until 2025.”
“A third facility of concern to the Board is the Plutonium
Facility (PF-4) at LANL. PF-4
was designed and constructed in the 1970s and lacks the
structural ductility and redundancy required by today's building codes and
standards. In 2007, a DOE-required periodic reanalysis of the seismic threat
present at the Los Alamos site was completed. It
indicated a greater than fourfold increase in the predicted earthquake ground
motion. Total facility collapse is now considered a credible event. PF-4, the
nation's sole plutonium fabrication center, contains significant amounts of
plutonium, much of it in a form that is readily dispersible (i.e., powders and
liquids), and is stored in containers that have not been certified to survive
facility collapse. The resulting radiation dose consequence to the public
following such an event was determined to exceed DOE's allowed evaluation
levels by several orders of magnitude. The Board formally identified its
concerns with the issuance of Recommendation 2009-2, Los Alamos National
Laboratory Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety.”
“In response to this increased seismic threat, LANL
undertook a series of actions to
improve the safety posture of PF-4. These actions included
efforts to reduce the likelihood and severity of a post-seismic fire, and
address the nine known building weaknesses that could lead to loss of PF-4' s
ability to confine its nuclear material or total structural collapse. A more
detailed seismic analysis to further refine PF-4's response to a major
earthquake was also undertaken and completed in September 2012. It identified
two additional weaknesses that would result in collapse. Detailed planning to
address these weaknesses has been initiated by LANL.”
“DNFSB, in its July
18, 2012 , letter, expressed concern that this latest analysis was
proceeding without adequate definition and technical justification.
Subsequently, the Deputy Secretary of Energy, in his September 28, 2012 , response to DNFSB, reported
that he had directed the National Nuclear Security Administration to initiate
action to evaluate PF-4 using a second modeling approach. This alternate
analysis is currently being performed by an independent engineering firm. Final
results are expected in December 2013. DNFSB awaits these results before
reaching final conclusions on the appropriate urgency of compensatory and
corrective actions.”
“PF-4 Safety System Reliability: [this building] lacks …
fire-suppression systems and [an] active-confinement ventilation system that
would adequately protect the public and workers from the consequences associated
with post-seismic accidents.”
“Other facilities meriting continued attention are the
high-level waste tank farms at the
“SIGNIFICANT SAFETY -RELATED AGING INFRASTRUCTURE ISSUES”
“The following are the most significant safety-related aging
infrastructure issues that exist today in the DOE defense nuclear complex”:
• “Los Alamos National Laboratory, Plutonium Facility (PF-4)
- seismic fragility of building, and degraded safety system reliability: [DNFSB
completed] seismic analyses
of PF-4 in May 2011 and September 2012 [and] identified
building vulnerabilities
that could result in loss of confinement, or facility
collapse, with resulting high radiological dose consequences to workers and the
public. [Also,] the facility lacks a set of
safety controls (fire suppression systems and active confinement
ventilation systems) that would
adequately protect the public and
workers from consequences associated with post-seismic accidents.”
• “Los Alamos National Laboratory, Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Facility (CMR) - seismic fragility of building: [DNFSB estimates that]
there is a 1 in 55 chance of seismic collapse during a ten year time-frame,
which would result in release of nuclear material, and injury/death of facility
workers.”
• “Los Alamos National Laboratory, Radioactive Liquid Waste
Treatment Facility-building and equipment end of life. RLWTF has reached its
end of life and despite ongoing life-extension efforts, requires replacement to
support future laboratory missions
reliably. Equipment failures pose a risk to facility
workers.”
• “Nevada National Security Site, Device Assembly Facility -
degradation of water tank and fire suppression system lead-ins.”
• “Pantex Plant, Site-Wide Fire Suppression Systems –
degradation of fire-suppression systems.”
• “Y-12 National Security Complex, 9212 Complex-seismic and
high wind fragility of building, and building and equipment end of life.”
• “Hanford Site, Single-Shell and Double-Shell Tank
Farms-aging tanks.”
• “Hanford Site, T Plant (Waste Storage, Treatment, and
Packaging Operations) - seismic fragility of building.”
• “Savannah River Site, H-Canyon - aging systems and
structures.”
• “Savannah River Site, Tank Farms - aging tanks.”
• “Savannah River Site, A-Area, Fire Protection Water Supply
Systems - degraded pumps and tank.”
“NEW ISSUES ADDED DURING THE PAST YEAR”
• “Hanford Site, Double-Shell Tank Farms - aging tanks.”
• “Savannah River Site, A-Area, Fire Protection Water Supply
Systems - degraded
pumps and tank.”
“ISSUES REMOVED FROM THE REPORT DURING THE PAST YEAR”
• “None”
“As directed by Congress, DNFSB will continue to exercise
its existing statutory authority in addressing these and other safety-related
issues within the DOE defense nuclear complex.”
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