DOE Blames LANL Management

The U.S. Department of Energy's Office of the Inspector General issued DOE/IG-0922, dated September 30, 2014, entitled: "Management Alert / Remediation of Selected Transuranic Waste Drums at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) – Potential Impact on the Shutdown of the Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP)." See www.doe/oig for the entire report.
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 This latest "Management Alert" is part of DOE's ongoing attempt to cope with a radiation release, which occurred at its Carlsbad, NM, WIPP facility, in February 2014. Although still uncertain of the exact cause of that release, DOE is sure that the spontaneous rupturing of a stored drum, containing radioactive waste previously packaged at LANL, was the proximate cause.

 Moreover, since this was the first publicly acknowledged radiation release from WIPP, it is especially important for DOE to take prompt corrective actions. Consequently, even though still unsure as to which chemical reactions inside the drum led to drum rupture, DOE now blames the fact of drum rupture on management failures in LANL's Environmental Management Directorate. LANL's Director McMillan  seems to agree, since he has just reassigned four senior LANL EM managers.

 Indeed, LANL has had a many year-long history of critical problems. It had even once been thought that such problems were really local management problems, the result of a defective local management culture. Moreover, it was hypothesized that such problems were also owing to ineffective oversight by the long-time LANL contract manager, the University of California (UC.)

 UC, under contract to the federal government, had been managing LANL since its inception in 1943, until termination of its contract in 2006. UC had executed this contract for ~60 years as a public service, and often at a financial loss.

 During the early years of the George W. Bush Administration, however, it was argued that management problems at LANL were really the result of inadequate management incentives; i.e., low management salaries. Subsequently, the contract was passed from UC to a for-profit entity, LANS-LLC, led by Bechtel Corp.

 With LANS-LLC, local management incentives increased sharply. For example, the LANL Director's annual compensation package moved up from ~$200,000, under UC, to ~$1.2 million, under the new for-profit contractor. The number of senior managers also increased sharply. In order to pay for this management windfall, which amounted altogether to ~$10 million, ~100 non-management LANL employees had to be dismissed. Nevertheless, the frequency of occurrence of critical problems at LANL did not seem to change.

 Interestingly, in its zeal to privatize functions of the federal government, the G. W. Bush Administration also moved the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) contract from UC, where it had been since the founding of that Laboratory in 1953, to a private sector entity. Just as at LANL, senior management salaries and bonuses soared at LLNL, when the contract with UC ended in 2007. However, one would be hard put to notice any change in LLNL performance as a result of the new management incentives.

 One should also not fail to notice the situation at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL.) Here, local management problems had never been of much public interest, and the SNL contract had long been let in the private sector. Nevertheless, during the G. W. Bush Administration senior manager compensation at SNL lurched upward, in order to bring it up to the new levels being set at LANL and LLNL. Today, the SNL Director takes home in excess of $2 million each year.

 Thus, aspiring managers' interest in the nuclear weapons industry has been very well maintained.

 Meanwhile, critical problems at LANL seem to continue unabated. Perhaps the local management culture has somehow not yet been corrected. Or maybe DOE is looking for a convenient scapegoat, in order to deflect renewed attention from its own well-known management failures.

Conflicted and Confounded over Nukes

Let's try to imagine a person moving in opposite directions at the same time. This is familiar behavior in the quantum mechanical world, fathomable by quantum mechanicians. However, to ordinary joes like you and me, such behavior is usually forbidden; i.e., unless, we happen to be acting like politicians.

 But, as for President Barack Obama, can he be both anti-nuke and pro-nuke at the same time? Consider the facts:

 In 2008 Obama ran for President for the first time while expressing his "Goal of a Nuclear-Free World [To] Show the world that America believes in its existing commitment under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to work to ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons. [However,] America will not disarm unilaterally." Less than a year into his presidency, he addressed an international forum in Prague, saying that his government “will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons.”  In 2010, he made a first  step is this direction by signing a treaty with the Russians to reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads in the
arsenals of the two ersatz superpowers to below 1550 warheads each, within seven years. However, as a means of ensuring that this agreement would be ratified by  the US Senate, the President promised congressional weapons enthusiasts that he would also lead a program of refurbishing of the  US nuclear weapons establishment; e.g., nuclear weapons factories and R&D centers, "spending $85 billion over 10 years to modernize the nation’s nuclear weapons complex" (NYT,) as well as other side-agreements written into the treaty, at Republican insistence, such as that "he would follow through on development of missile defense in Europe, despite Russian resistance" (NYT.)

 The FY 2015 budget recently submitted by the Administration to Congress showed clearly that Pres. Obama intends to make good on his promise to congressional hawks, and then some; e.g., he also intends the replacement of aging nuclear weapons delivery systems, submarines, planes, and missiles, within the next 10-20 years. At the same time, no further reductions in the size of the US arsenal of nuclear weapons seem to be in the offing. For this unfortunate circumstance, says the Administration, we have only the bad behavior of the Russians to blame; i.e., especially as regards their latest actions in the Ukraine.

 As a way of further justifying its apparent new-found enthusiasm for nuclear weapons, the Administration notes the fact that other nuclear weapons states are upgrading and expanding their arsenals of nuclear weapons; viz., the Pakistanis, and the Indians, both according to their own public statements. Of course, the North Koreans are trying to enhance their status as a nuclear weapons power, too, and the Iranians are suspected of trying to move in the same direction. The Administration says that it is the responsibility of the United States, as the sole surviving super-power, to help keep the world safe from more nuclear weapons states, and from more nuclear weapons, by continuing to maintain and improve the reliability of its own arsenal of nuclear weapons.

 Not only does the Administration seem conflicted in its plans for its arsenal of nuclear weapons, but it seems confounded in its plans for the disposition of the chemically toxic waste and radioactive waste produced by its nuclear weapons industry, not to mention the enormous quantity of hi-level radioactive waste produced by the nation's nuclear power plants. As pointed out previously in this blog, the President began his tenure by closing the Yucca Mt repository for high-level nuclear waste, before a single Curie of radioactive material had been assigned there for storage, but after an expenditure of ~$10 billion, for planning and construction. As yet, no other facility for the storage of high-level radioactive waste is so much as in the planning stage.

 The only fully operational storage facility for low-level nuclear waste from nuclear weapons factories is the WIPP site, in Carlsbad, NM. However, the WIPP site is now closed for repair, owing to the occurrence ~eight months ago of a mysterious accident which led to the release of radiation into the local environment. According to DOE, the cause of this accident is still not completely understood.

 Therefore, by way of dealing with this pressing problem, the DOE has announced the reassignment of four senior managers at Los Alamos National Laboratory's Environmental Management unit. Evidently, even though all of LANL's EM functions are already funded entirely by DOE's EM money, which money does not pass through NNSA coffers, the actual management of EM activities at LANL is performed locally. According to the latest press reports, this situation will now change: DOE's EM management team will now have direct day-to-day control over LANL's EM activities.

 Perhaps this management change will make all the difference, due to the imposition at LANL of DOE EM's highly touted matrix management system, and in spite of the Obama Administration's sharp reduction in money budgeted for DOE EM, in its US 2015 budget.

 Finally, I will only point out once again the debacle of the MOX fuel program. The Administration is closing down this complex program after already having spent ~$10 billion in planning and construction, and years working out technical and political details with the Russians. The safe and secure disposition of weapons grade plutonium, declared surplus by the nuclear weapons program, will once again become a matter of great national concern.

DNFSB Cites NNSA Safety Lapses

In a recent letter to the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board takes DOE/NNSA to task for its failure to adequately plan for foreseeable emergencies at its nuclear weapons factories, R&D centers, and waste sites.

The following is excerpted from that letter:

September 2, 2014

RECOMMENDATION 2014-1 TO THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY from DNFSB

Emergency Preparedness and Response

The need for a strong emergency preparedness and response program to protect the public and workers at the DOE's defense nuclear facilities is self-evident. Design basis accidents resulting from natural hazards and operational events do occur and must be addressed.

Consequently, emergency preparedness and response is a key component of the safety bases for defense nuclear facilities. It is the last line of defense to prevent public and worker exposure to hazardous materials.

One of the objectives of DOE’s order on emergency preparedness and response is to “ensure that the DOE Emergency Management System is ready to respond promptly, efficiently, and effectively to any emergency involving DOE/NNSA facilities, activities, or operations, or requiring DOE/NNSA assistance.”

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board) believes that the requirements in this order that establish the basis for emergency preparedness and response at DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities, as well as the current implementation of these requirements, must be strengthened to ensure the continued protection of workers and the public.

Problems with emergency preparedness and response have been discussed at Board public hearings and meetings over the past three years, as well as in Board weekly reports and other reviews by members of the Board’s technical staff. At its hearings, Board members have stressed the need for DOE to conduct meaningful training and exercises to demonstrate site-wide and regional coordination in response to emergencies.

Board members have also encouraged DOE to demonstrate its ability to respond to events that involve multiple facilities at a site and the potential for several “connected” events, e.g., an earthquake and a wildland fire at Los Alamos.

On March 21, 2014, and March 28, 2014, the Board communicated to the Secretary of Energy its concerns regarding shortcomings in the responses to a truck fire and radioactive material release event at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in Carlsbad, New Mexico. The DOE Accident Investigation Board explored and documented these shortcomings in its reports. Many of the site-specific issues noted at WIPP are prevalent at other sites with defense nuclear facilities.

The Board has observed that these problems can be attributed to the inability of sites with defense nuclear facilities to consistently demonstrate fundamental attributes of a sound emergency preparedness and response program, e.g., adequately resourced emergency preparedness and response programs and proper planning and training for emergencies.

The Board is concerned that these problems stem from DOE’s failure to implement existing emergency
management requirements and to periodically update these requirements.

DOE has not effectively overseen and enforced compliance with these requirements, which establish the baseline for emergency preparedness and response at its sites with defense nuclear facilities.

These requirements need to be revised periodically to address lessons learned, needed improvements to site programs, new information from accidents such as those at the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig and the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant, and inconsistent interpretation and implementation of the requirements.

Through its participation in DOE nuclear safety workshops in response to the events at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant and its lines of inquiry regarding emergency preparedness and response at recent public hearings and meetings, Board members have been supportive of DOE’s efforts to improve its response to both design basis and beyond design basis events.

However, the Board believes DOE’s efforts to adequately address emergency preparedness and response at its sites with defense nuclear facilities have fallen short as clearly evidenced by the truck fire and radioactive material release events at WIPP.

Background

Technical planning establishes the basis for emergency preparedness and response at DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities. Technical planning includes the development of emergency preparedness hazards assessments, identification of conditions to recognize and categorize an emergency, and identification of needed protective actions. This basis is used to develop emergency response procedures, training, and drills for emergency response personnel.

Hazards assessments form the foundation of the technical planning basis for emergency preparedness and response and provide the basis for the preparation of the procedures and resources used as personnel respond to emergencies.

The Board has observed that hazards assessments at many DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities do not:

(1) address all the hazards and potential accident scenarios,

(2) contain complete consequence analyses,

(3) develop the emergency action levels for recognizing indicators and the severity of an emergency,

(4) contain sufficiently descriptive protective actions.

One example of incomplete hazards analysis that is endemic to the complex is the lack of consideration of severe events that could impact multiple facilities, overwhelm emergency response capabilities, and/or have regional impacts.

This was a topic of discussion at the Board’s public meeting and hearing on the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, on March 14, 2013, and on the Y-12 National Security Complex in Knoxville, Tennessee, on December 10, 2013.

At many DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities, the Board has observed that training on the use of emergency response procedures, facilities, and equipment is not adequate to fully prepare facility personnel and members of the emergency response organization. Similarly, drill programs are not adequately developed and implemented to augment this training.

As part of their preparedness for emergencies, DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities have emergency response facilities such as Emergency Operations Centers and firehouses, and associated support equipment. The Board has observed that some emergency response facilities at DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities will not survive all potential accidents and natural phenomena events and, consequently, will be unable to perform their vital function of coordinating emergency response.

Many of these facilities will not be habitable during radiological or hazardous material releases. Equipment that is used to support operations of these facilities is frequently poorly maintained and may not be reliable during an emergency.

The Board has also observed problems with DOE efforts to demonstrate the effectiveness of its planning and preparation for emergencies and its response capabilities. Exercises are used to demonstrate a site’s capability to respond, and assessments are used to verify adequacy of planning and preparedness.

Exercises conducted at many DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities do not adequately encompass the scope of potential scenarios (i.e., various hazards and accidents) that responders may encounter. Some sites do not conduct exercises frequently enough or do not develop challenging scenarios. Many sites are not effective at critiquing their performance, developing corrective actions that address identified problems, and measuring the effectiveness of these corrective actions.

DOE oversight is a mechanism for continuous improvement and is used to verify the adequacy of
emergency preparedness and response capabilities at its sites with defense nuclear facilities.

The Board has observed that many DOE line oversight assessments are incomplete and ineffective, and do not address the effectiveness of contractor corrective actions. In addition, the Board has noted that the current scope of DOE independent oversight is not adequate to identify needed improvements and to ensure effectiveness of federal and contractor corrective actions.

As observed recently with the emergency responses to the truck fire and radioactive material release events at WIPP, there can be fundamental problems with a site’s emergency preparedness and response capability that will only be identified by more comprehensive assessments that address the overall effectiveness of a site’s emergency management program. For example, emergencies can occur during off-shift hours, such as the radioactive material release event at WIPP that happened at approximately 11:00 p.m. on Friday, February 14, 2014. Overall effectiveness was the scope of DOE’s independent assessments conducted prior to 2010.

These assessments consistently identified problems with site emergency preparedness and response, and also sought continuous improvement of these programs. In 2010, DOE independent oversight transitioned to assist visits and did not conduct independent assessments. In 2012, DOE independent oversight returned to conducting independent assessments. However, these assessments are targeted reviews, currently only focused on the ability of the sites to prepare and respond to severe events. As a result, these independent assessments do not encompass all elements of emergency management programs and will not identify many fundamental problems.

Causes of Problems

Based on an evaluation of the problems observed with emergency preparedness and response at DOE
sites with defense nuclear facilities, the most important underlying root causes of these problems are ineffective implementation of existing requirements, inadequate revision of requirements to address lessons learned and needed improvements to site programs, and weaknesses in DOE verification and validation of readiness of its sites with defense nuclear facilities.

The Board has observed at various DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities that implementation of DOE’s requirements for emergency preparedness and response programs varies widely. Therefore, the Board concluded that some requirements do not have the specificity to ensure effective implementation. For example, existing requirements for hazards assessments lack detail on addressing severe events. Requirements do not address the reliability of emergency response facilities and equipment. Requirements for training and drills do not address expectations for the objectives, scope, frequency, and reviews of effectiveness of these programs. Requirements for exercises do not include expectations for the complexity of scenarios, scope of participation, and corrective actions.

Guidance and direction that address many of the deficiencies in these requirements are included in the Emergency Management Guides; however, many sites with defense nuclear facilities do not implement the practices described in these guides. DOE has not updated its directive to address the problem with inconsistent implementation. In addition, DOE has not incorporated the lessons learned from the March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant in its directive. These lessons learned need to be more effectively integrated into DOE’s directive and guidance on emergency preparedness and response.

The Board also observed that DOE has not effectively conducted oversight and enforcement of its existing requirements. DOE oversight does not consistently identify the needed improvements to site emergency preparedness and response called for in its directive. When problems are identified, their resolution often lacks adequate causal analysis and appropriate corrective actions. When corrective actions are developed and implemented, contractors and federal entities frequently do not measure the effectiveness of these actions.

Conclusions

The Board and DOE oversight entities have identified problems with implementation of emergency preparedness and response requirements at various DOE sites with defense nuclear facilities. The Board has also identified problems with specific emergency preparedness and response requirements. These deficiencies lead to failures to identify and prepare for the suite of plausible emergency scenarios and to demonstrate proficiency in emergency preparedness and response. Such deficiencies can ultimately result in the failure to recognize and respond appropriately to indications of an emergency, as was seen in the recent radioactive material release event at WIPP. Therefore, the Board believes that DOE has not comprehensively and consistently demonstrated its ability to adequately protect workers and the public in the event of an emergency.
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Read the entire letter at www.dnfsb.org.

Although it may seem a bit of a stretch for DNFSB to ask DOE/NNSA to plan for accidents that "go beyond the design basis," the consequences of containment failure at a defense nuclear facility can be estimated, and could be horrific.

Of course, much depends upon the type of facility and its location but, in this regard, LANL's PF-4 is probably among the most sensitive of the existing sites. It would behoove DOE/NNSA to pay close attention.

Pit Options Examined

  In the following, I comment on Jonathon Medalia's "Pit Production Options", dated 21 February, 2014, and his "Manufacturing Nuke Pits," of 15 August, 2014, both written for Congressional Research Service.

 According to JM:

 The Plutonium Facility PF-4 at Los Alamos National Laboratory was built in 1970, to withstand a Design Basis Earthquake of a strength considered to be reasonable at that time.

 Only recently, PF-4 has been structurally reinforced and is said now to be able to withstand today's much stronger DBE; i.e., with less than a 50% chance of collapse.

 Fume hoods in PF-4 have been improved so as to better resist spilling their contents onto the PF-4 floor, following a DBE.

 Fire suppression technology at PF-4 has been ungraded so as to better impede the spread of out-of-control fire in the facility.

 JM claims that the probability of a significant medical hazard to the surrounding community, in the event of a DBE, out-of-control fire, and release of Pu laden dust and smoke into the atmosphere above PF-4, has become  nil.
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 Although Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has taken note of these LANL upgrades, it may still believe that in the event of a DBE and fire at PF-4, as much as "100,000 Ci of Pu could go up in the air." According to my very rough calculations, described in my blog (July 14, 2012, entitled "DNFSB Disagrees with NNSA Analysis",) this much radioactive material released into the air above PF-4 might require the evacuation of the entire surrounding Los Alamos community.

 JM also notes, in "Manufacturing Nuke Pits," that the (unvaulted) Material At Risk allowance at PF-4 is currently 1,800 kg Plutonium Equivalents, or ~670,000 Ci (using conversion factor of 0.37 Ci/gm.) Of this allowed MAR, only 295 kgs have been allotted to pit fabrication (corresponding to 109,000 Ci,) up to 441 kg of MAR can be used for PU-238 programs, and 386 kg of  MAR is still unallotted.

 With unvaulted MAR capable of emitting as much as ~670,000 Ci onto the floor in PF-4, it seems plausible that ~100,000 Ci could be released as smoke and dust following a DBE, facility collapse, and out-of-control fire. This corresponds to the DNFSB's worst case scenario.

 Also, with this much MAR, a criticality issue would probably intrude. Interestingly, and according to a letter dated 5 Sept., 2014 from NNSA's James J. McConnell to DNFSB's Peter S, Winokur, the criticality issue has recently been readdressed.

 It is true too that the allowable MAR is just a planned for upper limit, and the actual MAR at PF-4 today may be less. It which case, NNSA's future plans for PF-4 would become a subject for public inquiry.

 Finally, based on JM's statement that it takes three months to produce one pit and my own simple back-of-the-envelope estimations, I imagine that the upper limit of 295 kg of MAR allotted to pit fabrication may enable the construction of many more pits per year than LANL's publically planned for maximum of 30 ppy.

Nukes in Next Great War?

In their recent screed "NATO-based nuclear weapons are an advantage in a dangerous world" (Washington Post, 17 August, 2014) Brent Scowcroft, Stephen J. Hadley and Franklin Miller, talk about dangers which they think may soon confront NATO and NATO's military strategists. The three authors, national security junkies and ex-military strategists all, believe that the military advantages now enjoyed by NATO, vis-a-vis Russia, may disappear unless NATO continues to be backed by its currently well-stuffed arsenal of nuclear weapons.

They are very concerned about possible future reductions in the size of NATO's arsenal of nuclear weapons, and of a possible failure to continue with the modernization of these nuclear weapons systems. This concern is heightened by their firm belief that Russia is hard at work at modernizing its own nuclear weapons systems.

Such concerns may be keenest when felt by military strategists. And as I said, the authors warn about the disadvantage that NATO's military strategists may face if NATO's arsenal of nuclear weapons were to be reduced, and/or were not to be modernized.

Unsurprisingly, the authors are very unhappy with Pres. Obama's 5 April, 2009 Prague, Czech Republic speech, in which he called for an abolition of nuclear weapons. A push to abolish nuclear weapons would seem inconsistent with the authors' view, which I could summarize here as: in a world in which it is difficult to have faith in the peaceful intentions of one's neighbors, the only sound military strategy is to prepare for the worst.

Preparing for the worst, military strategists and their advocates must usually argue for more weapons, and for more destructive weapons systems.

But, if military strategizing by each of the world's militaries, accompanied by an increase in the size and destructiveness of all the world's military arsenals, were to continue unchecked, then the occurrence of the next great war would seem to be all but certain.

Somehow, disagreements between nations cannot be allowed to be distorted by rivalries between the world's militaries.

Recognition has been given to Von Clauswitz, a military theorist who said that war is the continuation of national policies by other means. But, in the future, it must be instead that disagreements between nations will not be the continuation of military rivalries, and will not be propelled by the concerns of competing military strategists.

Clearly, this will require exceptional leadership in the executive offices of today's rivalrous nations; e.g., leadership not cowed by the fears sown by military strategizers and their advocates.
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US Gov't: Realism + Idealism = Stasis

A political paralysis has settled over the US Congress, said by many to be driven by political polarization of the US electorate. The recent somewhat querulous behavior of the Executive Branch may be symptomatic of this polarization, and may itself be acting to increase the polarization. This unfortunate state of affairs is particularly evident in the areas of immigration reform, tax reform, and regulatory reform of the financial sector. Dysfunction can be seen too in the bitter political stand-off over health-care reform, which may engulf the Judicial Branch.

In the midst of this crisis in government, more remote areas of national interest are being neglected. As a complicating factor, there continues to be a stand-off in most policy areas between the policy realists and the policy idealists. This stand-off could hardly be more obvious than in the area of nuclear weapons policy.

Where nuclear weapons policy is concerned, the current US Administration seems to be trying to move in opposite directions at the same time. (See my blogposts of 12 July 2014, "US Gov't Dithers over Surplus Plutonium", and of 15 May 2014, "US Gov't Fails at Nuclear waste Disposal".) News about these conflicting policies has been reported widely in the national press and may be, partly, a reaction to the political polarization in Congress. It would seem, however, the Administration should make up its mind, since the game is afoot! Consider, for instance, the very important business of nuclear non-proliferation.

The nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT), first formulated in 1968, has had as its goal the reduction of the number of nuclear weapons in the world toward zero. The Treaty, again up for international discussion and possible refurbishment in 2015, is under serious threat, and may have to be watered down, or ultimately even abandoned.

If not, then it will be largely up to the present nuclear weapons states to develop creative policies, such that the NPT can continue to be meaningful and can continue to be in force. This will require new thinking and maybe some increased trust between the nuclear weapons nations which are today all at peace with each other, but may tomorrow be moved to use their nuclear weapons against each other's militaries and even against each other's civilian populations.

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Excerpted from Arms Control Today:

Nuclear Weapons Modernization: A Threat to the NPT?
Hans M. Kristensen /May 2014

Nearly half a century after the five declared nuclear-weapon states in 1968 pledged under the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament,” all of the world’s nuclear-weapon states are busy modernizing their arsenals and continue to reaffirm the importance of such weapons.

None of them appears willing to eliminate its nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.

Granted, the nuclear arms race that was a main feature of the Cold War is over, and France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have reduced their arsenals significantly. Nevertheless, huge arsenals remain, especially in Russia and the United States. China, India, North Korea, Pakistan, and possibly Israel are increasing their stockpiles, although at levels far below those of Russia and the United States. All nuclear-armed states speak of nuclear weapons as an enduring and indefinite aspect of national and international security.

As a result, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states still possess more than 10,000 nuclear warheads combined, of which more than 90 percent are in Russian and U.S. stockpiles. In addition to these stockpiled warheads, those two countries possess thousands of additional nuclear warheads. These warheads, retired but still relatively intact, are in storage awaiting dismantlement. Counting both categories of nuclear warheads, the world’s total combined inventory includes an estimated 17,000 nuclear warheads.
.
Moreover, many non-nuclear-weapon states that publicly call for nuclear disarmament continue to call on nuclear-armed allies to protect them with nuclear weapons. In fact, five non-nuclear-weapon states in NATO have volunteered to serve as surrogate nuclear-weapon states by equipping their military forces with the necessary tools to deliver U.S. nuclear weapons in times of war—an arrangement tolerated during the Cold War but entirely inappropriate in the post-Cold War era in which NATO and the United
States are advocating strict adherence to nonproliferation norms as a foundation for international security.

Thus, although the numerical nuclear arms race between East and West is over, a dynamic technological nuclear arms race is in full swing and may increase over the next decade. Importantly, this is not just a characteristic of the proliferating world but of all nuclear-armed states. New or improved nuclear weapons programs under way in those countries include at least 27 for ballistic missiles, nine for cruise missiles, eight for naval vessels, five for bombers, eight for warheads, and eight for weapons factories.
...
Consequently:

Despite significant reductions in the overall number of nuclear weapons compared with the Cold War era, all of the world’s nine nuclear-armed states are busy modernizing their remaining nuclear forces for the long haul. None of the nuclear-armed states appears to be planning to eliminate its nuclear weapons anytime soon. Instead, all speak of the continued importance of nuclear weapons.

The pace of nuclear reductions appears to be slowing as Russia and the United States shift their focus to sustaining their arsenals for the indefinite future. Three of the nuclear-armed states are increasing their arsenals, and nuclear competition among the nuclear-armed states appears to be alive and well.

Despite the financial constraints facing several of the nuclear-armed states, these states appear committed to spending hundreds of billions of dollars over the next decade on modernizing their nuclear forces.

Perpetual nuclear modernization appears to undercut the promises made by the five NPT nuclear-weapon states. Under the terms of that treaty, they are required to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” Nearly 50 years after this promise was first made, the non-nuclear-weapon states, who in return for that commitment renounced nuclear weapons for themselves, can rightly question whether continued nuclear modernization in perpetuity is consistent with the NPT.

Without some form of limitations on the pace and scope of nuclear modernization, the goals of deep cuts in and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons remain elusive and appear increasingly unlikely as continued reaffirmation of the value of nuclear weapons, sustained by a global nuclear competition, threatens to extend the nuclear era indefinitely.
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At this time, the media are filled with musings about the Guns of August, and such-like things. Appropriately, I think, let me end this blogpost by attaching the following excerpts from "The Sleepwalkers", a 2013 New York Times bestseller by Christopher Clark describing the roots of World War I, which I've just finished reading [with my comments included in square brackets]:

On the morning of June 28, 1914, when Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie Chotek, arrived at Sarajevo railway station, Europe was at peace.  Thirty-seven days later, it was at war. the conflict which followed would kill more than 15 million people, destroy three empires, and alter the course of world history.

[The military technology of the early 1900's enabled >15 million people to be killed in WW I. In 2014, the existence of >15,000 nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the major powers will enable the destruction of ~1 billion people, or more, in WW III.]

"The Sleepwalkers" reveals in detail how the crisis leading to WW I unfolded. It traces the paths to war in a narrative that moves among the decision centers in Vienna, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris, London, and Belgrade. Historian Christopher Clark examines the decades of history and of war that informed the events of July 1914 and details the mutual misunderstandings and unintended signals that drove the crisis forward within a few short weeks. [And in April 1917, was to include the United States.]
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And yet what must strike any 21st century reader who follows the course of the summer crisis of 1914 is its raw modernity. It began with a squad of suicide bombers and a cavalcade of automobiles. Behind the double-murder at Sarajevo was an avowedly terrorist organization, the Black Hand, which inculcated among its members a cult of sacrifice, death, and revenge. It had been associated with Serbian military intelligence, but was also extra-territorial, scattered in cells crossing geographical and political borders; it was largely unaccountable, with links difficult to discern from outside the organization.

[The Black Hand was hardly an organization in stasis, or advocating stasis. Rather, its members were intensely active, promoting violent revolution and the formation of a Slav state, eventually to be united with Russia. By contrast, the condition which has developed today in Washington is one of real stasis, but in a world filled with nuclear weapons where violent revolution may soon again become commonplace.]

US Gov't Dithers over Surplus Plutonium

Department of Energy Report of the Plutonium Disposition Working Group: Analysis of Surplus Weapon Grade Plutonium Disposition Options / Public release in April 2014

This is a lengthy, but accessible account of the costs and benefits of five different options for disposing of 34 Metric Tons of excess plutonium from decommissioned US nuclear weapons. The options divide naturally into two classes: 1) nuclear reactor based options which transform the weapons grade plutonium into nuclear waste unsuited, without reprocessing, to the creation of new nuclear weapons (2 options); 2) non-reactor based options that do not change the isotopic composition of the plutonium, but make it difficult to access physically (3 options.) The option cited by the DOE as preferred is from the second class, and is the so-called blending and permanent storage in an approved repository option. This is also the option estimated by DOE to be the least expensive to pursue.

An obvious weakness in this presentation is two-fold: 1) the blending and permanent storage option, the preferred option, is described too simply as involving the physical mixing of the surplus plutonium with an unspecified filler material, in such a way as to turn it into TRansUranic (TRU) waste; 2) the approved repository is the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP,) or some WIPP-like TRU waste facility, yet to be constructed.

However, considering the recent problems at WIPP, apparently the result of TRU waste containers having been packaged at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) with untested and unapproved filler material, which led to an unexpected chemical reaction inside the container and an underground explosion at WIPP, this is a truly unfortunate selection.

A further weakness in this unclassified report, is that none of the five options have been evaluated in terms of the amount of money and technical effort that would be required to reconstitute the dispositioned plutonium for future weapons use. For example, both of the reactor based options would require reprocessing of the spent fuel, as well as isotopic purification of the extracted plutonium, and would be extraordinarily expensive as a means of obtaining weapons grade plutonium. However, the non-reactor based options would only require separation of the weapons grade plutonium from the matrix of additives with which it had been mixed. Clearly, the cost of reconstituting the plutonium should be a highly relevant consideration when determining whether a particular option could be effective as a means of rendering the dispositioned plutonium unavailable for future weapons use.

Now, it is clear from the report that the reactor based options would both be very expensive to pursue, whereas the non-reactor based options would be less so. Moreover, among the non-reactor based options the blending and storage option is projected to be the least expensive; i.e., it is the least expensive of all five options. Yet, the reactor based options provide, by far, the most security against retrieval of the dispositioned plutonium, for use in weapons, and the non-reactor based blending and permanent storage option appears to provide the least security.

It seems that the DOE is being penny wise and pound foolish in the matter of the disposition of excess plutonium from US nuclear weapons!

On the other hand, so many things in life are really just trade offs --- . Suppose that the US Congress, as well as the citizens of the State of New Mexico could be convinced to go along with this scheme to mix plutonium waste with filler (kitty litter?) and bury it at WIPP. According to the present DOE report, such a plan would require that the size of WIPP be expanded, but only  by  ~10%. Now if this would be found by all concerned to be a acceptable alteration to the present WIPP mandate, then the probability immediately improves that WIPP might also be expanded to accept so-called tank waste from the DOE's Hanford, WA facility, and maybe even ultimately high-level waste from commercial nuclear power plants.